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Figure 1: The Global Risks Landscape 2016
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Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2015.
Note: Survey respondents were asked to assess the likelihood and impact of the individual risks on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 representing a risk that is not likely to happen or have 
impact, and 7 a risk that is very likely to occur and have massive and devastating impacts. See Appendix B for more details. To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks 
are abbreviated; see Appendix A for the full name and description.
Figure 2: The Global Risks Interconnections Map 2016
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ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are abbreviated; see Appendix A for the full name and description.
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Figure 3: The Most Likely Global Risks 2016: A Regional Perspective
Table A: Global Risks 2016
Table B: Trends 2015
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2015.
Note: Respondents were asked to select the three global risks that they believe are the most likely to occur in their region. For legibility reasons, the names of the global risks 
are abbreviated; see Appendix A for the full name and description. Oceania is not displayed because of the low number of respondents.
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1.1
Risk: Asset bubble in a major 
economy
Unsustainably overpriced assets such as 
commodities, housing, shares, etc. in a 
major economy or region.  
 
IDEA
• House icons, which could also be interpreted as an 
upwards arrow. The house represents the asset, 
whilst the arrow signifies the inflated price
1.2
Risk: Deflation in a major 
economy
Prolonged ultra-low inflation or deflation 
in a major economy or region.  
 
 
IDEA
• Graph displaying a decrease, to signify deflation
1.3.
Risk: Failure of a major financial 
mechanism or institution
Collapse of a financial institution and/
or malfunctioning of a financial system 
impacts the global economy.  
 
IDEA
• Bank icon with broken pillars, to suggest collapse 
of financial institution
1.4.
Risk: Failure/shortfall of critical 
infrastructure
Failure to adequately invest in, upgrade 
and secure infrastructure networks 
(e.g. energy, transportation and 
communications) leads to pressure or a 
breakdown with system-wide implications.
IDEA
• Broken train track to suggest breakdown 
of transportation networks
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3.3.
Risk: Large-scale terrorist attacks
Individuals or non-state groups with 
political or religious goals successfully 
inflict large-scale human or material 
damage.  
 
IDEA
• Building in target sight
3.4.
Risk: State collapse or crisis (e.g. 
civil conflict, military coup, failed 
states, etc.)
State collapse of geopolitical importance 
due to internal violence, regional or global 
instability, military coup, civil conflict, failed 
states, etc.
IDEA
• Burning flag
3.5.
Risk: Weapons of mass 
destruction
Nuclear, chemical, biological and 
radiological technologies and materials 
are deployed creating international crises 
and potential for significant destruction.  
IDEA
• Mushroom cloud, to represent nuclear/chemical 
weapons
4.1.
Risk: Failure of urban planning
Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and 
associated infrastructure create social, 
environmental and health challenges.  
 
 
IDEA
• Collection of urban buildings to represent an 
urban area
3. GeoPolitical 4. Societal
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1.9.
Risk: Unmanageable inflation
Unmanageable increase in the general 
price level of goods and services in 
key economies.  
 
 
IDEA
• Price tag featuring multiple dollar symbols to 
represent high prices
2.1.
Risk: Extreme weather events 
(e.g. floods, storms, etc.)
Major property, infrastructure and 
environmental damage as well as human 
loss caused by extreme weather events.  
 
IDEA
• Tornado
2.2.
Risk: Failure of climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation
Governments and businesses fail to 
to mitigate climate change, protect 
populations and help businesses 
impacted by climate change to adapt.
IDEA
• Globe with thermometer, representing the 
world climate
2.3.
Risk: Major biodiversity loss 
and ecosystem collapse (land 
or ocean)
Irreversible consequences for the 
environment, resulting in severely 
depleted resources for humankind as 
well as industries.
IDEA
• Upside-down fish with crosses for eyes, 
representing environmental consequences
1. Economic 2. Environmental
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4.6.
Risk: Water crises
A significant decline in the available 
quality and quantity of fresh water 
health and/or economic activity.  
 
 
IDEA
• Water droplet
5.1.
Risk: Adverse consequences 
of technological advances
Intended or unintended adverse 
consequences of technological 
advances such as artificial intelligence, 
geo-engineering and synthetic biology 
causing human, environmental and 
economic damage.
IDEA
• Android-style robot to represent technology, 
and artificial intelligence
5.2.
Risk: Breakdown of critical 
information infrastructure 
and networks
Cyber dependency increases vulnerability 
to outage of critical information 
infrastructure (e.g. internet, satellites, 
etc.) and networks causing widespread 
disruption.
IDEA
• Wi-fi symbol to represent the internet 
and networks
5.3.
Risk: Large-scale cyberattacks
Large-scale cyberattacks or malware 
causing large economic damages, 
geopolitical tensions or widespread loss 
of trust in the Internet. 
 
 
IDEA
• Bug, to represent a cyber-bug
4. Societal 5. Technological
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1.5.
Risk: Fiscal crises in key 
economies
Excessive debt burdens generate 
sovereign debt crises and/or 
liquidity crises.  
 
 
 
IDEA
• Bag of money with hole, money falling out
1.6.
Risk: High structural 
unemployment or 
underemployment
A sustained high level of unemployment 
or underutilization of the productive 
capacity of the employed population 
prevents the economy from attaining high 
levels of employment.  
IDEA
• Figures (people), with a downwards arrow 
between them to signify underutilization 
of people
1.7.
Risk: Illicit trade (e.g. illicit 
financial flow, tax evasion, human 
Large-scale activities outside the legal 
framework such as illicit financial flow, tax 
and organized crime undermine social 
interactions, regional or international 
collaboration and global growth.
IDEA
• Prisoner icon, to represent illicit behaviour
1.8.
Risk: Severe energy price shock 
(increase or decrease)
Energy price increases or decreases 
significantly and places further economic 
pressures on highly energy-dependent 
industries and consumers.  
 
 
IDEA
• Lightning bolt, to signify energy and shock
1. Economic
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4.2.
Risk: Food crises
Access to appropriate quantities and 
quality of food and nutrition becomes 
a major scale.  
 
 
IDEA
• Wilted crop, to represent food crises
4.3.
Risk: Large-scale involuntary 
migration
Large-scale involuntary migration induced 
by conflict, disasters, environmental or 
economic reasons.  
 
 
IDEA
• Passport/passport control icon to represent 
migration and the crossing of borders
4.4.
Risk: Profound social instability
Major social movements or protests (e.g. 
street riots, social unrest, etc.) disrupt 
political or social stability, negatively 
impacting populations and economic 
activity. 
 
IDEA
• Police figures with shields, to indicate dispute, 
riots and social unrest
4.5.
Risk: Rapid and massive spread 
of infectious diseases
Bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi 
cause uncontrolled spread of infectious 
diseases (for instance due to resistance to 
antibiotics, antivirals and other treatments) 
leading to widespread fatalities and 
economic disruption.
IDEA
• Virus
4. Societal
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2.4.
Risk: Major natural catastrophes 
(e.g. earthquake, tsunami, 
volcanic eruption, geomagnetic 
storms)
Major property, infrastructure and 
environmental damage as well as 
human loss caused by geophysical 
disasters such as earthquakes, 
volcanic activity, landslides, tsunamis 
or geomagnetic storms.
IDEA
• Erupting volcano
2.5.
Risk: Man-made environmental 
catastrophes (e.g. oil spill, 
radioactive contamination, etc.)
Failure to prevent major man-made 
catastrophes, causing harm to lives, 
human health, infrastructure, property, 
economic activity and the environment.  
 
 
IDEA
• Radioactivity symbol
3.1.
Risk: Failure of national 
governance (e.g. failure of rule 
of law, corruption, political 
deadlock, etc.)
Inability to govern a nation of geopolitical 
importance due to weak rule of law, 
corruption or political deadlock.  
 
 
IDEA
• Broken scale, to signify the failure of the 
rule of law
3.2.
Risk: Interstate conflict with 
regional consequences
A bilateral or multilateral dispute between 
states escalates into economic (e.g. trade/
currency wars, resource nationalization), 
military, cyber, societal or other conflict.  
 
 
 
IDEA
• Crossed swords to represent conflict
2. Environmental 3. GeoPolitical
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5.4.
Risk: Massive incident of data 
fraud/theft
Wrongful exploitation of private or 
unprecedented scale.
IDEA
• Cloud with a padlock in the middle, to represent 
data and privacy/security
5. Technological
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3.3.
Risk: Large-scale terrorist attacks
Individuals or non-state groups with 
political or religious goals successfully 
inflict large-scale human or material 
damage.  
 
IDEA
• Building in target sight
3.4.
Risk: State collapse or crisis (e.g. 
civil conflict, military coup, failed 
states, etc.)
State collapse of geopolitical importance 
due to internal violence, regional or global 
instability, military coup, civil conflict, failed 
states, etc.
IDEA
• Burning flag
3.5.
Risk: Weapons of mass 
destruction
Nuclear, chemical, biological and 
radiological technologies and materials 
are deployed creating international crises 
and potential for significant destruction.  
IDEA
• Mushroom cloud, to represent nuclear/chemical 
weapons
4.1.
Risk: Failure of urban planning
Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and 
associated infrastructure create social, 
environmental and health challenges.  
 
 
IDEA
• Collection of urban buildings to represent an 
urban area
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1.9.
Risk: Unmanageable inflation
Unmanageable increase in the general 
price level of goods and services in 
key economies.  
 
 
IDEA
• Price tag featuring multiple dollar symbols to 
represent high prices
2.1.
Risk: Extreme weather events 
(e.g. floods, storms, etc.)
Major property, infrastructure and 
environmental damage as well as human 
loss caused by extreme weather events.  
 
IDEA
• Tornado
2.2.
Risk: Failure of climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation
Governments and businesses fail to 
to mitigate climate change, protect 
populations and help businesses 
impacted by climate change to adapt.
IDEA
• Globe with thermometer, representing the 
world climate
2.3.
Risk: Major biodiversity loss 
and ecosystem collapse (land 
or ocean)
Irreversible consequences for the 
environment, resulting in severely 
depleted resources for humankind as 
well as industries.
IDEA
• Upside-down fish with crosses for eyes, 
representing environmental consequences
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4.6.
Risk: Water crises
A significant decline in the available 
quality and quantity of fresh water 
health and/or economic activity.  
 
 
IDEA
• Water droplet
5.1.
Risk: Adverse consequences 
of technological advances
Intended or unintended adverse 
consequences of technological 
advances such as artificial intelligence, 
geo-engineering and synthetic biology 
causing human, environmental and 
economic damage.
IDEA
• Android-style robot to represent technology, 
and artificial intelligence
5.2.
Risk: Breakdown of critical 
information infrastructure 
and networks
Cyber dependency increases vulnerability 
to outage of critical information 
infrastructure (e.g. internet, satellites, 
etc.) and networks causing widespread 
disruption.
IDEA
• Wi-fi symbol to represent the internet 
and networks
5.3.
Risk: Large-scale cyberattacks
Large-scale cyberattacks or malware 
causing large economic damages, 
geopolitical tensions or widespread loss 
of trust in the Internet. 
 
 
IDEA
• Bug, to represent a cyber-bug
4. Societal 5. Techn logical
World Economic Forum  Global Risk Report Graphics
1.5.
Risk: Fiscal crises in key 
economies
Excessive debt burdens generate 
sovereign debt crises and/or 
liquidity crises.  
 
 
 
IDEA
• Bag of money with hole, money falling out
1.6.
Risk: High structural 
unemployment or 
underemployment
A sustained high level of unemployment 
or underutilization of the productive 
capacity of the employed population 
prevents the economy from attaining high 
levels of employment.  
IDEA
• Figures (people), with a downwards arrow 
between them to signify underutilization 
of people
1.7.
Risk: Illicit trade (e.g. illicit 
financial flow, tax evasion, human 
Large-scale activities outside the legal 
framework such as illicit financial flow, tax 
and organized crime undermine social 
interactions, regional or international 
collaboration and global growth.
IDEA
• Prisoner icon, to represent illicit behaviour
1.8.
Risk: Severe energy price shock 
(increase or decrease)
Energy price increases or decreases 
significantly and places further economic 
pressures on highly energy-dependent 
industries and consumers.  
 
 
IDEA
• Lightning bolt, to signify energy and shock
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4.2.
Risk: Food crises
Access to appropriate quantities and 
quality of food and nutrition becomes 
a major scale.  
 
 
IDEA
• Wilted crop, to represent food crises
4.3.
Risk: Large-scale involuntary 
migration
Large-scale involuntary migration induced 
by conflict, disasters, environmental or 
economic reasons.  
 
 
IDEA
• Passport/passport control icon to represent 
migration and the crossing of borders
4.4.
Risk: Profound social instability
Major social movements or protests (e.g. 
street riots, social unrest, etc.) disrupt 
political or social stability, negatively 
impacting populations and economic 
activity. 
 
IDEA
• Police figures with shields, to indicate dispute, 
riots and social unrest
4.5.
Risk: Rapid and massive spread 
of infectious diseases
Bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi 
cause uncontrolled spread of infectious 
diseases (for instance due to resistance to 
antibiotics, antivirals and other treatments) 
leading to widespread fatalities and 
economic disruption.
IDEA
• Virus
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2.4.
Risk: Major natural catastrophes 
(e.g. earthquake, tsunami, 
volcanic eruption, geomagnetic 
storms)
Major property, infrastructure and 
environmental damage as well as 
human loss caused by geophysical 
disasters such as earthquakes, 
volcanic activity, landslides, tsunamis 
or geomagnetic storms.
IDEA
• Erupting volcano
2.5.
Risk: Man-made environmental 
catastrophes (e.g. oil spill, 
radioactive contamination, etc.)
Failure to prevent major man-made 
catastrophes, causing harm to lives, 
human health, infrastructure, property, 
economic activity and the environment.  
 
 
IDEA
• Radioactivity symbol
3.1.
Risk: Failure of national 
governance (e.g. failure of rule 
of law, corruption, political 
deadlock, etc.)
Inability to govern a nation of geopolitical 
importance due to weak rule of law, 
corruption or political deadlock.  
 
 
IDEA
• Broken scale, to signify the failure of the 
rule of law
3.2.
Risk: Interstate conflict with 
regional consequences
A bilateral or multilateral dispute between 
states escalates into economic (e.g. trade/
currency wars, resource nationalization), 
military, cyber, societal or other conflict.  
 
 
 
IDEA
• Crossed swords to represent conflict
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Figure 4: The Risks-Trends Interconnections Map 2016
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2015.
Note: Survey respondents were asked to select the three trends that are the most important in shaping global development in the next 10 years. For each of the three trends 
identified, respondents were asked to select the risks that are most strongly driven by those trends. See Appendix B for more details. To ensure legibility, the names of the 
global risks are abbreviated; see Appendix A for the full name and description.
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This 11th edition of The Global Risks 
Report is published at a time of 
profound change. Global risks 
materialize in new and unexpected 
ways and are becoming more 
imminent as their consequences reach 
people, institutions and economies. 
We witness the effects of climate 
change in the rising frequency and 
intensity of water shortages, floods and 
storms worldwide. Stable societies are 
becoming increasingly fragmented in 
many regions of the world, and we 
note a weak global economy that is 
again facing headwinds.
At the same time, advances in 
technology and rapid digitization are 
fundamentally transforming societies, 
economies and ways of doing 
business. Often referred to as the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution, this 
development presents great 
opportunities for all actors involved and 
a previously unimagined solution 
space for some of the world’s most 
pressing problems. Yet it also presents 
elusive risks related to changing 
employment patterns, widening 
income inequality and rising cyber 
dependence. Managing the paradigm 
shift and transition process will be 
critical to securing stable economies 
and ultimately thriving societies. 
Achieving this calls for greater 
resilience as the key imperative for 
action. Collaboration across countries, 
areas of expertise and stakeholder 
groups is necessary to effectively 
address global risks and deliver on the 
resilience imperative. Yet across every 
sector of society, decision-makers are 
struggling to find common ground as 
they are faced with heightened 
volatility, uncertainty, 
interconnectedness and pace of 
change.
The motivations underlying The Global 
Risks Report at its inception in 2006 
– to shed light on global risks and 
developments and help create a 
shared understanding of the most 
pressing issues confronting the world, 
the ways they interconnect and their 
potential negative impacts – are 
therefore more relevant than ever. A 
shared understanding of challenges is 
needed as a base for multistakeholder 
collaboration, which has seen 
increasing recognition as the most 
effective way to address global risks 
and build resilience against them. To 
further inspire action, this year’s 
Report, like last year’s, also contributes 
to a shared understanding of the 
solution space, presenting examples of 
risk mitigation and resilience practices 
in the Risks in Focus section. In 
addition this year’s Global Risk Report 
includes a chapter dedicated to better 
understanding the evolving 
international security landscape and 
improving outcomes. 
As in previous years, the Report is 
based on the annual Global Risks 
Perception Survey, completed by 
almost 750 members of the World 
Economic Forum’s global 
multistakeholder community. In 
addition to the special section 
exploring the evolving security 
landscape in an era of uncertainty, the 
Report presents deep-dive 
discussions of risks to the stability of 
societies posed by the (dis)empowered 
citizen, who is empowered by 
technology but feels disempowered by 
traditional decision-making processes. 
It also discusses the societal 
consequences of climate change with 
a focus on food and water crises and 
the threat of global pandemics.
As one of the Forum’s flagship reports, 
The Global Risks Report has been a 
collaborative effort since its first edition 
in 2006. Produced by the Forum, it is 
able to draw on the unique expertise 
available within the Forum’s different 
communities and knowledge networks 
as well as within the organization as a 
whole. It also builds firmly on the 
Forum’s ongoing research, projects, 
debates and initiatives. The insights 
presented here are the result of 
numerous discussions, consultations 
and workshops and reflect the views of 
leaders from our various communities 
through the Global Risks Perception 
Survey.
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Executive 
Summary
Box 1: Definition of Global 
Risks and Trends
A global risk is an uncertain event 
or condition that, if it occurs, can 
cause significant negative impact 
for several countries or industries 
within the next 10 years.  
A global trend is a long-term 
pattern that is currently taking place 
and that could contribute to 
amplifying global risks and/or 
altering the relationship between 
them.
Now in its 11th edition, The Global Risks 
Report 2016 draws attention to ways 
that global risks could evolve and 
interact in the next decade. The year 
2016 marks a forceful departure from 
past findings, as the risks about which 
the Report has been warning over the 
past decade are starting to manifest 
themselves in new, sometimes 
unexpected ways and harm people, 
institutions and economies. Warming 
climate is likely to raise this year’s 
temperature to 1° Celsius above the 
pre-industrial era, 60 million people, 
equivalent to the world’s 24th largest 
country and largest number in recent 
history, are forcibly displaced, and 
crimes in cyberspace cost the global 
economy an estimated US$445 billion,1 
higher than many economies’ national 
incomes. In this context, the Report 
calls for action to build resilience – the 
“resilience imperative” – and identifies 
practical examples of how it could be 
done.
The Report also steps back and 
explores how emerging global risks 
and major trends (see Box 1), such as 
climate change, the rise of cyber 
dependence and income and wealth 
disparity are impacting already-strained 
societies by highlighting three clusters 
of risks as Risks in Focus. As resilience 
building is helped by the ability to 
analyse global risks from the 
perspective of specific stakeholders, 
the Report also analyses the 
significance of global risks to the 
business community at a regional and 
country-level.
The Global Risks 
Perception Survey
Almost 750 experts and decision-
makers in the World Economic Forum’s 
multistakeholder communities 
responded to this year’s Global Risks 
Perception Survey. Respondents are 
drawn from business, academia, civil 
society and the public sector and span 
different areas of expertise, 
geographies and age groups.
The survey asked respondents to 
consider 29 global risks – categorized 
as societal, technological, economic, 
environmental or geopolitical – over a 
10-year time horizon, and rate each 
according to their perceived likelihood 
of it occurring and impact if it does.
After its presence in the top five most 
impactful risks for the past three years, 
the failure of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation has risen 
to the top and is perceived in 2016 as 
the most impactful risk for the years to 
come, ahead of weapons of mass 
destruction, ranking 2nd, and water 
crises, ranking 3rd. Large-scale 
involuntary migration was also rated 
among the top five for impact, as was 
severe energy price shock (increase 
or decrease).
The risk rated most likely was large-
scale involuntary migration, with last 
year’s top scorer – interstate conflict 
with regional consequences – giving 
way to the environmental risks of 
extreme weather events and the 
failure of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation and followed by major 
natural catastrophes.
Geopolitical concerns remain 
prominent in the minds of respondents 
to the Global Risks Perception Survey 
for the second year in a row. The 
Report therefore delves into the 
international security landscape and 
explores what drives this evolution and, 
in particular, how it could be affected 
by the Fourth Industrial Revolution and 
climate change. The three scenarios 
for possible futures developed in this 
context inform new ways of building 
resilience to security threats through 
public-private collaboration.
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Global risks that remain serious 
because of their combined impact and 
likelihood involve some economic risks, 
including fiscal crises in key 
economies and high structural  
unemployment and 
underemployment. These are 
complemented by cyberattacks and 
profound social instability. Their 
assessment reflects the potentially 
profound impact of the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution on the economy and society 
and emphasizes the need for 
safeguarding future benefits.
Respondents were also asked which 
risks were related and could give rise to 
cascading risks. Three  emerged 
strongly: the potential for climate 
change to exacerbate water crises, 
with impacts including conflicts and 
more forced migration, calling for 
improved water governance to adapt to 
climate change and accommodate a 
growing population and economic 
development; the need to address the 
global refugee crisis, adding 
emphasis to policies that can build 
resilience in addition to responding to 
the immediate crisis; and the risks of 
failing to fully understand the risks 
around the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
and how this transition will impact 
countries, economies and people at a 
time of persistently sluggish growth.
Risks in Focus
Key to building resilience is the stability 
of societies. The first Risk in Focus 
therefore looks at the complex 
dynamics of societies in the age of 
digitization and discusses the 
phenomenon of the  (dis)empowered 
citizen, which is a result of the interplay 
of varying dynamics: as technology 
empowers citizens to find information, 
connect with others and organize, 
those citizens feel disenfranchised by 
distant elites. It explores the risk of 
social instability if both governments 
and business embark on either 
repressive actions or non-action out of 
uncertainty about how to deal with a 
more informed, connected and 
demanding citizenry, which could lead 
to an escalating downward spiral of 
broken trust and harsher response on 
either side. The chapter also, however, 
explores the benefits governments and 
business stand to gain by proactively 
looking for ways to engage with 
concerned citizens.
Food security risk in the context of 
climate change is the second Risk in 
Focus. Building upon the climate-water 
nexus discussed in Part 1, the chapter 
looks at how changing climate and 
weather patterns could jeopardize food 
security and agricultural production 
across geographies. The most climate-
vulnerable countries often heavily 
depend on agricultural productivity to 
sustain economic growth and 
development. But the recent years 
have also shown the climate 
vulnerability of G-20 countries such as 
India, Russia and the United States 
– the breadbasket of the world – and 
other large industrial producers of 
agricultural commodities. The chapter 
discusses how climate change–resilient 
crops and supply chain networks, as 
well as financing and insurance 
schemes, can help mitigate the social, 
economic and environmental aspects 
of food security risks related to climate 
change.
Drawing lessons from the Ebola crisis, 
the third Risk in Focus discusses 
global disease outbreaks. It warns 
that population growth, rapid 
urbanization and increasing 
transnational flows of commodities, 
people and animals intensify the risk of 
infectious transmission across 
geographies while equally diminishing 
the ability to respond – all at a time of 
growing resistance of microorganisms 
to today’s most effective medicines. 
Preparedness and response measures 
range from the behavioural, such as 
fact-based communication and 
education campaigns, to the need to 
invest in diagnostic, drug and vaccine 
R&D and in its enabling environment, 
especially advancing a regulatory 
framework. It raises the imperative for 
public-private sector collaboration 
across areas such as data availability 
and analysis, a joint research agenda, 
regulatory frameworks, long-term 
financing and ways to promote 
responsible media engagement as part 
of effective crisis management 
communication.
For each Risk in Focus, examples are 
given of three practical mechanisms 
that can build resilience against the 
identified threats.
Risks to Doing Business
Private sector respondents to the World 
Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion 
Survey were asked to identify their risks 
of highest concern for doing business in 
the next 10 years. The responses, from 
140 economies, reveal patterns of 
concern at country and regional levels 
that can usefully inform initiatives to 
engage the private sector in building 
resilience to global risks.
On a global scale, two economic risks 
– unemployment and 
underemployment and energy price 
shocks – are mentioned as the top risks 
of highest concern for doing business in 
half of the 140 economies. These are 
followed by the failure of national 
governance, fiscal crises, asset bubbles 
and cyberattacks.
Economic risks predominate in 
responses from Europe, including fiscal 
crises, unemployment, asset bubbles 
and energy prices – the latter also being 
the top concern in Canada – while 
executives in the United States are most 
concerned about cyber-related risks and 
attacks. Respondents from Central Asia 
and Russia worry about fiscal crises and 
unemployment, along with the risks of 
unmanageable inflation and interstate 
conflict. Environmental risks worry 
business leaders in East Asia and the 
Pacific, alongside energy prices, asset 
bubbles, and cyber attacks.
In South Asia concerns also include 
energy prices, together with fiscal crises, 
unemployment and failure of national 
governance – which is the top concern in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
– followed by energy prices shock and 
unemployment. Executives in the Middle 
East and North Africa likewise worry 
about energy prices, together with 
unemployment, terrorist attacks and 
interstate conflict. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the business community’s top 
concerns include unemployment, energy 
prices, the failure of national governance 
and the failure of critical infrastructure.
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Over the past decade, The Global 
Risks Report has expanded its scope 
from analysing the interconnected 
and rapidly evolving nature of global 
risks to also putting forward actionable 
solutions and calling for public-
private collaboration in strengthening 
resilience. Now in its 11th edition, the 
Report describes a world in which 
risks are becoming more imminent and 
have wide-ranging impact: tensions 
between countries affect businesses; 
unresolved, protracted crises have 
resulted in the largest number of 
refugees globally since World War II; 
terrorist attacks take an increasing toll 
on human lives and stifle economies; 
droughts occur in California and floods 
in South Asia; and rapid advances in 
technologies are coupled with ever-
growing cyber fragilities and persistent 
unemployment and underemployment. 
Implications of sweeping digitization 
(also termed the “Fourth Industrial 
Revolution”), ranging from 
transformations that are the result of 
rising cyber connectivity to the potential 
effects of innovations on socio-
economic equality and global security, 
remain far from fully understood. At 
the same time, climate change is 
unequivocally happening, and there is 
no turning back time. 
The increasing volatility, complexity 
and ambiguity of the world not only 
heightens uncertainty around the 
“which”, “when”, “where” and “who” 
of addressing global risks, but also 
clouds the solutions space. We need 
clear thinking about new levers that will 
enable a wide range of stakeholders 
to jointly address global risks, which 
cannot be dealt with in a centralized 
way. 
Taken together, this calls for a resilience 
imperative – an urgent necessity to find 
new avenues and more opportunities 
to mitigate, adapt to and build resilience 
against global risks and threats 
through collaboration among different 
stakeholders.
By putting the resilience imperative at 
its core, this year’s Global Risks Report 
combines four parts to present an 
analysis of different aspects of global 
risks – across both global risks and 
stakeholders – focused as much on the 
search for solutions as on the analysis 
of the risks themselves. 
Introduction
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Part 1 analyses the difference in risk 
perceptions over different time horizons 
and the perceived interconnections 
among risks, as visualized in the 
Global Risks Landscape 2016, all 
based on the Global Risks Perception 
Survey, which combines the views 
of different stakeholders. Three risk 
interconnection clusters stand out: 
climate change in relation to water and 
food crises; the growing challenges 
of the rising number of displaced 
people worldwide; and what the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution means in an era of 
economic risks. 
Part 2 discusses the implications 
of a changing international security 
landscape and identifies the drivers 
that are at work and the implications for 
addressing global risks. Inspired by 
the results of The Global Risks Report 
2015 and the continued instability of 
the global security situation, it lays 
out alternative and plausible futures 
that could materialize unless there 
is a change in how we respond and 
manage the forces at play. 
Part 3 explores three risks clusters 
that have the potential to challenge 
social stability. For each of these “Risks 
in Focus”, it describes three existing, 
practical initiatives that could help to 
build resilience. The concept of the 
(dis)empowered citizen is introduced 
to describe the tensions created 
by growing cyber connectivity that 
empowers citizens at the same time as 
they feel increasingly disenfranchised 
from traditional decision-making 
processes. The second contribution 
further explores one impact of climate 
change: coupled with rising population 
growth, it is threatening food security. 
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Risk: Profound social instability
Major social movements or protests (e.g. 
street riots, social unrest, etc.) disrupt 
political or social stability, negatively 
impacting populations and economic 
activity. 
 
IDEA
• Police figures with shields, to indicate dispute, 
riots and social unrest
4.5.
Risk: Rapid and massive spread 
of infectious diseases
Bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi 
c use uncontroll d spread of infectious 
diseases (for instanc  due o resistance to 
antibiotics, antivirals and other treatments) 
leading to widespread fatalities and 
economic disruption.
IDEA
• Virus
4. Societal
World Economic Forum  Global Risk Report Graphics
2.4.
Risk: Major natural catastrophes 
(e.g. earthquake, tsunami, 
volcanic eruption, geomagnetic 
storms)
Major property, infrastructure and 
environmental damage as well as 
human loss caused by geophysical 
disasters such as earthquakes, 
volcanic activity, landslides, tsunamis 
or geomagnetic storms.
IDEA
• Erupting volcano
2.5.
Risk: Man-made environmental 
catastrophes (e.g. oil spill, 
radioactive contamination, etc.)
Failu e to prevent major man-made 
catastrophes, causing harm to lives, 
human health, infrastructure, property, 
economic activity and the environment.  
 
 
IDEA
• Radioactivity symbol
3.1.
Risk: Failure of national 
governance (e.g. failure of rule 
of law, corruption, political 
deadlock, etc.)
Inability to govern a nation of geopolitical 
importance due to weak rule of law, 
corruption or political deadlock.  
 
 
IDEA
• Broken scale, to signify the failure of the 
rule of law
3.2.
Risk: Interstate conflict with 
regional consequences
A bilateral or multilateral dispute between 
states escalates into economic (e.g. trade/
currency wars, resource nationalization), 
military, cyber, societal or other conflict.  
 
 
 
IDEA
• Crossed swords to represent conflict
2. Environmental 3. GeoPolitical
Asset bubble in a major  
economy
Deflation i  a maj r
economy
Fai ure of a major financial
me anis  or instituti n
Failur /shortfall of critical
infras ructure
Fiscal crises in k y
econo ies
High st uctural
unemp oym n  or
undere ployment
Illicit trade (e.g. illi it fin ncial 
flow, tax evasion, human 
trafficking, organiz d crime, 
etc.)
Severe energy price shock
(inc as  or ecreas )
Unmanageable inflation
Ext em w ath r ve t
(e.g. fl ods, torms, etc.)
Failure of climate-change
mitigation and adaptation
Major biodiversity loss and 
eco yst m collapse (land
or ocean)
Major atural catastrophes
(e.g. earthquake, tsunami,
volcanic eruption, geomagnetic 
storms)
M n-made environmental
catastrophes (e.g. oil spill,
radio ctiv  contamination, etc.)
Failure of national
governance (e.g. f ilure of rul
of law, corru tion, political
deadlock, etc.)
Inters at  conflict with
regional o sequences
Large-scale terrorist attacks
State colla s  or crisis (e.g.
civil confl t, military up, 
failed states, etc.)
Weapons of mas
destruction
Failure of urban planning
Food crises
La ge-scale voluntary 
migration
Profound s cial instability
Rapid and massive spread 
of nfectiou  diseases
Water crises
Adverse consequences
of tec nologi al advances
Bre kdown of critical
information infrastructu e
and n twork
Large- cale cyberattacks
Massive incident of data
fraud/theft
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Part 1:  
Global Risks 2016
From the refugee crisis to economic 
slowdowns in emerging markets, 
from ever-rising numbers of terrorist 
and cyberattacks to water shortages, 
global risks have been in the headlines 
in the last year. Yet so have initiatives 
to address them, such as the COP21 
meeting on reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions or European Union (EU) 
summits to address the refugee crisis.1 
The Global Risks Report exists to raise 
awareness about global risks and 
their potential interconnections, and 
to provide a platform for discussion 
and action to mitigate, adapt and 
strengthen resilience. 
There is remarkable stability in this 
year’s Global Risks Landscape (Box 
1.1): many risks that are assessed as 
above average in terms of likelihood 
and impact were similarly assessed last 
year. This suggests the emergence of a 
new status quo, with geopolitical risks – 
such as interstate conflict or terrorist 
attacks2 – being at the forefront. 
Other risks rated as highly impactful 
or likely, such as involuntary migration 
and social instability, are partly a result 
of spillover effects of insecurity and 
conflict. Some geopolitical risks – such 
as the failure of national governance, 
which is pervasive across Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Figure 3) and considered to be among 
the top three most likely risks in the 
Middle East and North Africa, East Asia 
and the Pacific, and Central Asia – are 
considered to be important in some 
regions but not globally impactful. 
Consistent with the past, weapons 
of mass destruction is ranked as the 
second least likely risk to occur, but 
the second most impactful if it were 
to. Part 2 of this Report explores the 
international security landscape and 
how it could evolve in future.
Also prominent in the Global Risks 
Landscape 2016 are environmental 
risks such as failure of climate-
change mitigation and adaptation, 
which is considered the most 
potentially impactful risk and the 
third most likely, with water crises,3 
biodiversity loss and ecosystem 
collapse rising up the list of concerns. 
Environmental worries have been at 
the forefront in recent years (Figure 
1.1.1), reflecting a sense that climate 
change–related risks have moved 
from hypothetical to certain because 
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Box 1.1: Methodology of The Global Risks Report
This Report defines a “global risk” as an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for 
several countries or industries within the next 10 years. Based on this refined definition, this year 29 global risks were identified 
and grouped into the five customary categories: economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological. A 
description of the risks and the methodology employed can be found in Appendices A and B.
The Report also identifies 13 global trends that can potentially drive global risks. A “trend” is defined as a long-term pattern that 
is currently taking place and that could contribute to amplifying global risks and/or altering the relationship between them. 
Unlike risks, trends are occurring with certainty and can have both positive and negative consequences. Trends can alter how 
risks evolve and interrelate, and they inform efforts at risk mitigation.
Figure 1.1.1: The Evolving Risks Landscape, 2007–2016
Source: World Economic Forum 2007–2016, Global Risks Reports. 
 
Note: Global risks may not be strictly comparable across years, as definitions and the set of global risks have evolved with new issues emerging on the 10-year horizon. 
For example, cyberattacks, income disparity and unemployment entered the set of global risks in 2012. Some global risks were reclassified: water crises and rising 
income disparity were re-categorized first as societal risks and then as a trend in the 2015 and 2016 Global Risks Reports, respectively. The 2006 edition of the Global 
Risks Report did not have a risks landscape.
Breakdown of 
critical information 
infrastructure
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1st
Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Fiscal crises Major systemic Major systemic 
2nd
Retrenchment 
from globalization
(developed)
Retrenchment 
from globalization 
(developed)
Retrenchment 
from globalization 
(developed)
Climate change Water supply 
crises
Water supply 
crises
3rd
Slowing Chinese 
economy (<6%)
Oil and gas 
price spike
Oil price spikes Geopolitical Food shortage 
crises imbalances
4th
Oil and gas 
price spike
Chronic disease Chronic dise e Asset price collapse
imbalances
5th
Pandemics Fiscal crises Fiscal crises Extreme energy 
price volatility
Extreme volatility in 
energy and 
agriculture prices
weapons of mass 
destruction
Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Failure of climate-
change mitigation 
and adaptation
Breakdown of 
critical information 
infrastructure
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1st
Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Storms and 
cyclones
Severe income 
disparity
Severe income 
disparity
2nd
Middle East 
instability
Slowing Chinese 
economy (<6%)
Slowing Chinese 
economy (<6%)
Flooding
imbalances imbalances
3rd
Failed and failing 
states
Chronic disease Chronic disease Corruption Rising greenhouse 
gas emissions
Rising greenhouse 
gas emissions
4th
Oil and gas price 
spike
Global governance 
gaps
Fiscal crises Biodiversity loss Cyber attacks Water supply crises
5th
Chronic disease, 
developed world
Retrenchment 
from globalization 
(emerging)
Global governance 
gaps
Climate change Water supply crises Mismanagement 
of population 
ageing
2014
Fiscal crises
Climate change 
and
underemployment
Critical information 
infrastructure
2014
Income disparity
events
Unemployment 
and 
underemployment
Climate change
Cyber attacks 
Extreme weather
Water crises 
Unemployment 
breakdown
2015
Water crises
Rapid and massive
spread of infectious
diseases
Failure of climate-
change mitigation 
and adaptation
2015
Interstate conict
with regional
consequences
Failure of national
governance
State collapse or
crisis
High structural
unemployment or
underemployment
Extreme weather
events
Weapons of mass
destruction
Interstate conict
with regional
consequences
2016
Failure of climate-
change mitigation 
and adaptation
Weapons of mass 
destruction
Severe energy 
price shock
2016
Large-scale 
involuntary 
migration
Failure of climate-
change mitigation 
and adaptation
Interstate conict 
with regional 
consequences
Major natural 
catastrophes 
Extreme weather
events
Water crises
Large-scale 
involuntary 
migration
2007
Breakdown of
critical information
infrastructure
Chronic disease
in developed 
countries
Oil price shock
China economic 
hard landing
Asset price collapse
Top 5 Global Risks in Terms of Likelihood
Top 5 Global Risks in Terms of Impact
2007
Asset price collapse
Retrenchment 
from globalization
Interstate and
civil wars
Pandemics
Oil price shock
As in previous years, assessments of risks in this year’s Report are based on the Global Risks Perception Survey. The survey 
captures the perceptions of almost 750 experts and decision-makers in the World Economic Forum’s multistakeholder 
communities and was conducted in Fall 2015. Respondents are drawn from business, academia, civil society and the public 
sector and span different areas of expertise, geographies and age groups.
The analysis takes into account three complementary angles on global risks: an assessment of their likelihood and impact 
(Figure 1), and how these have evolved over the years (Figure 1.1.1); a regional breakdown of the perceived likelihood of risks 
(Figure 3); a mapping of interconnections among risks (Figure 2) and among risks and trends (Figure 4); and the difference of 
the level of concern in the short and long term (Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.1: The Changing Global Risks Landscape 2015–2016: The 10 Most 
Changing Global Risks
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014 and 2015, World Economic Forum. 
Note: We are presenting the 10 global risks assessments that have changed the most since the Global Risks 
Report 2015. To identify them, we take the distance between the two years for each risk, in absolute terms. 
To tease apart short- and longer-
term thinking and shed light on the 
psychology behind the responses, 
the survey asked experts to nominate 
risks of highest concern over two 
time horizons: 18 months and 10 
years. Global risks that have recently 
been in the headlines – such as 
large-scale involuntary migration, 
interstate conflict and cyberattacks – 
tend to feature higher as short-term 
concerns, indicating that recent events 
significantly influence our thinking 
about risks and, hence, stakeholder 
action.
The longer-term concerns are more 
related to underlying physical and 
societal trends, such as the failure 
of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, water crises and food 
crises. Interestingly, extreme weather 
events and social instability are 
considered a concern in both the short 
and long term, reflecting an expectation 
that the frequency and intensity of 
crises will continue to rise. One of 
the roles of this Report is to raise 
awareness about the importance of 
long-term thinking about global risks – 
especially significant when it comes to 
attempting to limit the extent of climate 
change and to adapt to the change 
that is already inevitable.
Three risk clusters are discussed in 
more detail below: the cluster linking 
the failure of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation with water crises and 
large-scale involuntary migration; the 
cluster linking large-scale involuntary 
migration with a range of risks related 
to social and economic stability; 
and the cluster linking economic 
global risks with uncertainty around 
the impacts of the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. 
 
Coping with the Changing 
Climate
Climate change and water crises, 
which have featured prominently in the 
Global Risks Landscape over the last 
five years, are joined this year by large-
scale involuntary migration. The links 
among these risks appear clearly in 
the Global Risks Interconnections Map 
2016 (Figure 2), and the intertwined 
challenges are unfolding against a 
background of many socio-economic 
pressures. 
As illustrated by the Global Risks 
Interconnections Map, climate change 
and water risks are intricately linked 
to food security concerns – a subject 
explored further in Part 3 of this Report. 
About 70% of the world’s current 
freshwater withdrawals are used 
for agriculture, rising to over 90% in 
most of the world’s least-developed 
countries.4 Carbon dioxide also causes 
ocean acidification, which makes it 
harder for small shellfish to form the 
calcium carbonite shells they need to 
grow – with implications rising up the 
food chain, threatening the availability 
of food from the seas as well.5
Challenges around water management 
are already immense. On the one 
hand, over a billion people lack access 
to improved water. Some 2.7 billion 
– or 40% of the world’s population – 
suffer water shortages for at least a 
month each year.6 The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
insufficient action has been undertaken 
to address them.
Figure 1.1 shows risks that have 
registered the highest increases and 
declines in perceptions of likelihood 
and impact, notably large-scale 
involuntary migration, now rated 
as the most likely and fourth most 
impactful. Other risks gaining in 
prominence on both dimensions 
include profound social instability 
– also one of the most highly 
interconnected risks, as shown in 
Figure 2.
The economic risks of unemployment 
and underemployment, asset 
bubbles, and fiscal crises in key 
economies have increased in both 
likelihood and impact over the past 
two years, although these have been 
overtaken by other concerns. At the 
same time, cyber threats remain at 
the top of respondents’ minds, as in 
previous years.
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Figure 1.2: The Top Five Global Risks of Highest Concern for the Next 18 Months 
and 10 Years
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2015, World Economic Forum. 
Note: Survey respondents were asked to select up to five risks of highest concern for each time frame. The 
percentage indicates the share of respondents who selected the specific global risk among the five risks of highest 
concern for each time frame. See Appendix B for more details. To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are 
abbreviated; see Appendix A for the full names and descriptions of the risks.
Brazil exemplifies the challenge of 
managing water even within a single 
country: it has 12% of the planet’s 
freshwater reserves, mostly in the 
Amazon region, but much of this water 
does not reach its urban population. 
Sao Paulo, which contributes a third 
of Brazil’s GDP, has a lower water-
per-capita availability than even the 
historically drought-prone north-
eastern region of the country. With 
hydropower constituting approximately 
64% of the electricity power load, there 
are conflicts caused by unclear rules 
about water governance at federal, 
state and basin levels.9 
Water management is further 
complicated around the world by 
economic pressures – developing an 
economy can be a thirsty business, 
based on unsustainable use of water. 
As countries industrialize, more fresh 
water is needed for energy production 
– the United States allocates about 
40% of its fresh water to energy, 
Europe over 30% – and the demand 
for water for energy and industry 
is forecast to increase by 70% by 
2030 across Asia.10 Globally, based 
on current trends, water demand 
is projected to exceed sustainable 
supply by 40% in 2030.11 Adding to 
the pressures, agricultural production 
will have to increase in the coming 
decades to feed a growing population 
and a rising demand for meat.12 
Unless current water management 
practices change significantly, many 
parts of the world will therefore face 
growing competition for water between 
agriculture, energy, industry, and 
cities. Tensions are likely to grow within 
countries, especially between rural 
and urban areas and between poorer 
and richer areas, and also potentially 
between jurisdictions. More than 60% 
of the world’s transboundary water 
basins lack any type of cooperative 
management framework. Even where 
such frameworks do exist, they often 
do not cover all states that use the 
basin.13 Interstate tensions over water 
access are already apparent in some 
parts of South Asia, and could impact 
the evolution of the international 
security landscape, as discussed in 
Part 2.
Climate change will only exacerbate 
these challenges. The latest 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) report, in November 
2014, reaffirmed that this warming in 
the climate system is “unequivocal” 
and that human influence is “extremely 
likely” to be the dominant cause. 
Atmospheric concentrations of three 
major greenhouse gases (carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide) are 
at their highest level in 800,000 years, 
with CO2 concentration up 13% since 
1990. The world today is estimated to 
be about 1°C warmer, on average, than 
it was in the 1950s, and the effects 
are being felt. Regional analysis of the 
Global Risks Perception Survey shows 
that declining water availability features 
as the most likely risk in the Middle 
East and North Africa and South Asia, 
and the likelihood of extreme weather 
events is considered especially high in 
North America, South Asia and East 
Asia and the Pacific (see Figure 3).
Scientists caution that a total 
warming of 2°C implies a high risk of 
catastrophic climate change that could 
damage human well-being on a global 
scale. Yet even if each country meets 
Development (OECD) estimates that 4 
billion people could be living in water-
scarce areas by 2050. According to 
the World Water Council, 80% to 90% 
of the scarce water in many of the 
world’s arid and semi-arid river basins 
is already being used, and over 70% 
of the world’s major rivers no longer 
reach the sea.7 On the other hand, 
inadequate sanitation exposes 2.4 
billion people to many diseases, such 
as diarrhoeal disease, which is the third 
leading cause of death among children 
under five.8
Governance – at global, regional 
and national levels – lies at the 
heart of water management. Even 
many developed countries are 
failing to proactively address water 
vulnerabilities, instead reacting only 
after extreme weather events. In 
developing countries, the political 
challenges inherent in water 
infrastructure and conservation 
projects are exacerbated by greater 
financing challenges. 
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its Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions plans, submitted to the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
agreed at the Paris Climate Conference 
in December 2015 (Box 1.2), warming is 
projected to reach 2.7°C by 2100.
Given these developments, it will, 
therefore, be impossible to live 
without adaptation – but adaptation 
planning is complicated by the 
difficulty of predicting not only the 
expected degree of warming but 
also the expected pace. One source 
of uncertainty is the Arctic feedback 
loop – will ice sheets collapse slowly 
or rapidly? The average sea level is 
already rising by 3 millimetres per 
year, faster than any other time in 
the last two millennia; many of the 
world’s cities lie on the coast or on 
river banks, with poor neighbourhoods 
most likely to be in low-lying areas 
vulnerable to flooding.14 Another 
source of uncertainty is the “Amazon 
Dieback” scenario: recent oscillation 
between unusually dry years and heavy 
flooding could be an early indicator of 
irreversible system phase change.15 If 
the Amazon stops absorbing carbon 
and starts releasing the estimated 
120 billion tonnes of carbon it holds – 
equivalent to 15 years’ worth of 100% 
Box 1.2: The Paris Agreement: A Historic Turning Point on Climate Change
The adoption of the Paris Agreement on 12 December 2015 by 195 governments is a major turning point in the global fight 
against climate change. The world’s nations agreed to limit global average temperature rise to “well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”. They also agreed to a 
review mechanism that will help ratchet up efforts every five years from 2018, as well as a floor for financial flows to developing 
countries. 
The Paris outcomes are far more ambitious than had been expected – a collective recognition of the dangerous risks posed by 
climate change as well as the cost of inaction. These outcomes are also sending unmistakable signals to the global markets that 
governments are willing to put aside their differences and do their part in tackling this biggest of global challenges. 
In the coming months and years, the impact of the Paris Agreement will be felt in board rooms, banks and stock exchanges 
across the world. The expectation is that, as a result, trillions of dollars needed for investments will be unlocked to put the world 
onto a climate-safe pathway. The time has come to pivot from business-as-usual.
One of the innovations that emerged from Paris was the official recognition of the role played by business, investors, cities and 
provinces in driving and delivering climate action. Effective mobilization of these constituencies – alongside civil society and 
faith-based groups – has indeed contributed to this successful outcome. But such mobilization was possible only because an 
ever-growing number of global businesses and cities today understand that deepened globalization has heightened 
vulnerabilities through global supply chain shocks. And that these disruptions could be further triggered by climate volatility and 
policy uncertainty.
To date, nearly 190 governments have submitted their climate action plans, covering over 95% of total global emissions. These 
efforts alone will not suffice, as even the most optimistic estimates suggest that these pledges taken together would contain 
warming only to 2.7°C above pre-industrial levels. But these bottom-up efforts will provide a solid foundation from which 
ambition can be ratcheted up in the coming years.
Developments in the real world will also help, with cost-competitive alternatives already available today. In 2014, renewables 
made up over half of total energy investment, while the cost of solar panels has fallen by 75% and that of batteries for electric 
vehicles by half since 2009. Wind-generated electricity in over 50 countries is now at grid parity – when the customer of 
electricity pays the same to buy wind energy as to buy traditional technologies. 
Looking forward, global attention will turn firmly towards implementation and developing specific action plans to deliver a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient world. With a clear direction of travel, the immediate next step will focus on policy frameworks and 
incentives that will deliver the results, as well as on the consolidation and scaling of much-needed public-private cooperation. 
For businesses, the Paris Agreement is a licence not only to implement climate-friendly practices but also to innovate and 
develop the next generation of solutions. The race is on for forward-looking businesses and governments alike to capitalize on 
these new business opportunities for growth and resilience.
fossil fuel emissions – the impact will be 
global.
Failure to address climate change and 
water crises will forcibly displace more 
people – the IPCC warns that droughts 
and coastal floods could cause 
“large-scale demographic responses 
– for example, through migration”. 
Forced displacement is already at an 
unprecedented level, causing severe 
humanitarian challenges, as explored in 
the following section.
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Humanity on the Move
The Global Risks Landscape sees a 
noticeable increase in both perceived 
likelihood and impact of the risk of 
large-scale involuntary migration.16 
The definition of this risk includes 
forced migration caused not only by 
violence and conflicts, such as those 
driving the exodus from Syria and Iraq, 
but also for environmental or economic 
reasons. The risk is seen as more 
relevant in the next 18 months than the 
next 10 years (see Figure 1.2). However, 
it is strongly interconnected with 
other risks that are considered highly 
worrisome in the longer term: not only 
interstate conflict and state collapse but 
also climate change and water crises, 
as discussed above.
Global refugee flows have reached a 
level that is unprecedented in recent 
history. In 2014, 59.5 million people 
were forcibly displaced in the world, 
compared to 40 million at the time 
of World War II.17 More than half of 
these recent refugees come from 
three conflict-ridden countries: Syria, 
Afghanistan and Somalia.18 The trend 
is upwards: during 2014, the number 
of people displaced – 42,500 per day 
– was four times greater than in 2010. 
Although the recent crisis in Europe has 
dominated headlines, and is reflected in 
the risk being considered most likely in 
that region (see Figure 3), the challenge 
is global with most regions affected 
(see Figure 1.3).
Three factors increase the risks posed 
by involuntary migration. First, people 
stay in host countries longer than 
they used to. The average duration of 
displacement lengthened from nine 
years in the 1980s to 20 years by the 
mid-2000s.19 Fewer than one in 40 
conflicts is now resolved within three 
years, and more than 80% last for more 
than 10 years.
The longer people stay away from 
their home countries, the harder it is 
to return: often they have lost their 
livelihoods, family ties and physical 
property; furthermore, property rights 
issues for returning refugees can be 
complex. Protracted refugee situations 
become even more difficult when 
refugees are granted only limited socio-
economic rights and opportunities, 
limiting their scope to reclaim 
livelihoods and dignity.
The lack of effective integration policies 
in most countries (see Box 1.3 for an 
example) can lead to the formation of 
ghettos or isolated communities on the 
margins of society, ripe for frustration 
and vulnerable to disenchantment and 
even radicalization. In Europe, the rapid 
inflow of migrants in 2015 challenged 
local financial and absorption 
capacities and exacerbated the trend 
towards polarization of societies and 
the political spectrum, which in turn 
undermined the efficiency of European 
governance structures.
Figure 1.3: Global Displacement Hotspots, 2014
Source: UNHCR 2015b, p. 3.
Note: A “hotspot” is defined as a country or area that has been suffering from conflict-related displacement flows 
during the reporting period.
Second, the global humanitarian 
architecture is not able to effectively 
respond to today’s challenges. Many 
countries, including some of Syria’s 
neighbours, have either not signed 
the Geneva Convention governing the 
status of refugees, or do not uphold 
it because there is no enforcement 
mechanism. Without formal refugee 
status, refugees can find it harder to 
access formal employment, social 
assistance or travel documents.
The institutional architecture for 
refugees focuses on providing a short-
term response to people displaced 
by conflict and violence. It assumes 
refugees will settle in camps and 
primarily need humanitarian assistance, 
whereas most now settle in urban 
areas20 – where humanitarian actors 
have not yet developed well-functioning 
operating models – and primarily 
need resilience building. Moreover, 
the Geneva Convention does not 
cover environmental migrants, whose 
numbers are expected to rise for 
reasons explored above.
Third, most forced migrants move to 
other developing countries, where 
social and governance systems may 
already be weak or likely to fail (see 
Figure 3). In 2014, 86% of refugees 
lived in developing countries and about 
12% in least-developed countries. 
In emerging economies, resource 
constraints can be significant: the UN 
estimates the cost of housing Syrian 
refugees in Jordan to be over 7% of 
Jordanian GDP.21
All these factors, if unaddressed, 
can fuel risks in host and destination 
countries. Although research on the 
economic effects of refugee inflows is 
limited, it suggests that refugees can 
make a positive contribution to the host 
country’s economy through increased 
demand, inflows of remittances, 
promoting the use of technology 
and engaging in international trade.22 
In advanced, ageing economies, 
incoming refugees can contribute to 
keeping aggregate demand high and 
the workforce stable.
Multistakeholder approaches that 
include local business communities 
can contribute both to mitigating risks 
that could emerge from large-scale 
involuntary migration and to building 
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resilience in transit countries and 
countries of destination. Measures 
to consider include work permits 
and access to jobs, skills recognition 
and training, and access to schools 
and public health services. At the 
same time, at the global level, the 
development community could help 
by focusing more strongly on building 
resilience and helping refugees to 
transition into self-reliance. This will 
be even more important in light of the 
slow and unstable growth the world 
is currently experiencing, which may 
further limit countries’ absorptive 
capacities.
Economic Growth 4.0
Fiscal crises in key economies, asset 
bubbles, and structural unemployment 
and underemployment are among 
economic risks rated as both highly 
impactful and likely; another global 
systemic financial crisis is rated as 
somewhat less likely than last year, 
but similarly impactful. Taken together, 
these risks could result in another 
economic slowdown with knock-on 
effects on employment and, ultimately, 
social stability.
Box 1.3: Refugees in Malaysia
Since the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a stateless ethnic and religious minority from Myanmar, have sought 
asylum in nearby countries, including Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia. In recent years, an increasing number of Rohingya 
people have fled by boat: 25,000 people departed from the Bay of Bengal just in the first quarter of 2015. Over 50,000 Rohingya 
refugees are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Malaysia,1 with thousands more 
unregistered. The situation in Malaysia is at once a protracted refugee situation – with multiple generations of refugees, some of 
whom have achieved moderate de facto integration – and a humanitarian crisis marked by a steady influx of emaciated and 
traumatized asylum-seekers.
The legal status of refugees in Malaysia is tenuous: the country has not ratified key international agreements (most notably the 
1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol), and it lacks a legal and administrative framework for responding to refugees. 
While the UNHCR has primary responsibility for refugees – including registration and documentation – there are significant gaps 
in protection and assistance. Refugees cannot attend Malaysian schools, face barriers accessing healthcare, and confront a 
range of security and protection risks, including detention.
Despite these challenges, refugees invariably show a vibrant entrepreneurial spirit, undertaking formal and informal work to 
support themselves and their families, at restaurants and retail shops, schools, factories and farms, operating their own small 
businesses, cleaning, collecting goods to recycle and working in skilled professions, for instance as electricians. Specific 
examples include refugees opening tea shops with the help of Malaysian acquaintances, opening grocery shops that serve as 
meeting places for other refugees, and opening home day care for Malaysian children in the neighbourhood. However, 
restrictions prohibiting them from undertaking employment legally mean that most resort to difficult jobs for low pay, and their 
illegal status leaves them vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
Rohingya refugees seek to improve their lives and livelihoods over the course of protracted displacement in various ways. They 
adopt skills and techniques – such as learning the local language and negotiating with authorities – to help them secure 
employment and make their way. Contrary to the widespread perception that refugees are a burden for the country of asylum, 
only a small proportion of refugees in Malaysia receive formal assistance from non-governmental organizations or the UNHCR; 
instead, most find innovative, albeit challenging, ways to support themselves and their families. They rely primarily on support 
from other refugees, community associations, and members of the host population to manage shocks, find work, overcome 
bureaucratic barriers and gain access to institutions. In the absence of formal social protection and services, Rohingya refugees 
have begun to develop their own: refugee-run community organizations, for example, register members, issue marriage 
certificates, operate convalescent shelters and help refugees find work.
Although it is important to recognize what refugees can do for themselves, the livelihoods of even the most successful are 
precarious. Many have relevant and transferable skills and a genuine desire to bring something to the communities in which they 
live, yet there is a marked dissonance between what refugees stand to contribute and the restrictive policies that limit their ability 
to do so. Addressing this gap requires a shift away from seeing refugees as passive victims or recipients of assistance or goods 
to understanding them as active agents pursuing lives and livelihoods in an extremely challenging environment, and in doing so 
contributing to the countries where they seek asylum.
Note
1 UNHCR 2015a; UNHCR 2015c.
Economic concerns are currently 
centred on the corporate and public 
debts built up by emerging markets 
in the recent low-interest rate 
environment: the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimates the extent of 
corporate over-borrowing at up to 
US$3 trillion,23 and the corporate debt 
to GDP ratio rose by 26 percentage 
points between 2004 and 2014 for this 
group of countries.24 Particular risks 
could emanate from China, where 
continued credit-based measures to 
address concerns about a slowing 
economy could further heighten 
vulnerability to a financial crisis.
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Concern is growing over debt levels 
at a time when long-term global 
economic prospects are expected to 
remain weak as a result of a worldwide 
slowdown in productivity growth over 
the past decade. In the short term, 
lower commodity prices and further 
appreciation of the dollar could pose 
balance sheet risks to both public 
and private sectors in countries with a 
high share of debt denominated in US 
dollars; in emerging markets, dollar-
denominated corporate debt issued 
in 2015 stands at US$120.5 billion in 
2015.25 Also plausible is an increase 
in risk premiums on investments in 
emerging markets, which have been 
compressed in recent years. Interest 
rates are likely to go up in future, which 
could undermine the sustainability 
of high debt and lead to reversals in 
capital flows.
The result could be numerous 
corporate and potentially sovereign 
defaults in emerging markets, 
triggering a financial crisis and further 
slowing growth. In turn, slower 
growth in emerging economies 
could further reduce commodity 
prices, exacerbating exchange rate 
shifts.26 With declining liquidity in 
financial markets in emerging market 
economies,27 a crisis in an emerging 
market could spark volatility in global 
financial markets, leading to a global 
economic slowdown (see Box 1.4). This 
would accentuate risks associated with 
unemployment and the weak fiscal 
position of many key economies.
In developed countries, concerns 
remain about debt levels – mainly 
public – creating another vulnerability 
in the interconnected global 
economy. National economic crises 
can spark global slowdowns, but 
international governance does not have 
mechanisms in place to address the 
underlying risks, which are under the 
purview of national economic policies. 
Because any country could be a weak 
link, it is critical to strengthen resilience 
in all countries.
Box 1.4: China’s Financial Vulnerabilities and the Transition to the New Normal
Because of its sheer size and rapid development, China plays a prominent role in shaping the global economic landscape. The 
country is now at a critical juncture as it transitions to a new phase of its economic development – referred to as a “new normal” 
by President Xi – in which its economy is based less on investments and exports and more on consumption and services. In the 
new normal, the Chinese economy will be more driven by market forces; it is expected to grow more slowly than its recent 
annual average of 7%, but more sustainably. However, whether this transition will be orderly is uncertain.
Uncertainty centres on the massive corporate debt built up by traditional industries that drove China’s last two decades of 
growth but now face lower demand. The IMF estimates, for instance, that, at the end of 2014, the ratio of total liabilities to equity 
in China’s construction sector exceeded 250;1 in the oil and gas sector, the ratio has more than doubled since 2007, albeit from 
a lower base.
China’s financial sector is another, related cause for concern. The Chinese banks that fuelled the rapid credit growth in now-
declining industries consequently face worsening asset quality and non-performing loans. Their profitability has plummeted over 
the past year, adding to concerns about the fragility and vulnerability of China’s underdeveloped financial system – which is 
dominated by large state banks and casts a large shadow banking sector. The central bank’s intervention in August 2015 to 
weaken the renminbi could increase the risks of capital outflows, making funding and liquidity conditions for banks even 
tougher. It could also exacerbate the risk of default of Chinese companies that borrowed in foreign currency.
The government faces a dilemma. If it tightens credit conditions, it could reduce investment more quickly than consumption can 
increase to compensate, and cause massive defaults among struggling and heavily leveraged companies. This could mean a 
much more severe economic slowdown, potentially causing a surge in unemployment and social unrest. However, if the 
government lets more credit flow to avoid these destabilizing defaults, it risks further increasing the indebtedness of 
underperforming industries and creating bigger problems down the line. The government seems to have opted for letting more 
credit flow: in October 2015, the central bank lowered its benchmark rates and relaxed reserve requirements for banks.
The hope is that more of the new liquidity will flow to productive service-based activities and high-end manufacturing that will 
yield higher returns and accelerate the transition to the new normal. Mitigating the risks of this further increase in debt, China still 
has policy buffers to absorb financial shocks – it has a relatively favourable fiscal situation, including low debt and large foreign 
reserves. This allows the central government to be lender of last resort for heavily indebted local governments, state-owned 
banks and enterprises; to intervene to stabilize the stock market; or to adopt stimulus plans.
However, overreliance on these buffers could exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and impede the transition process. Instead, the 
government should invest in improving the nascent safety net to boost consumption in a country where, on average, 
households save about 30% of their disposable income, one of the world’s highest.2
 
 
Notes
1 IMF 2015d.
2 Roberts 2015.
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With longer-term trends such as 
demographic changes and rising 
wealth disparities likely to heighten 
economic and social pressure in 
emerging economies over the next 
10 years, there is renewed urgency 
to generate growth. As explored in 
the Global Competitiveness Report 
2015–2016, productivity – the major 
driver of growth – has been declining in 
recent years.28
Many hope that emerging technologies 
will fuel a new wave of productivity 
and growth. The pace of innovation 
is increasing and the spread of 
technologies is inevitable,29 giving rise 
to individual innovations and disrupting 
business models, processes and 
products in ways that will require rapid 
adaptation.30 A recent study suggests 
that internet-related technologies 
such as mobile internet, automation 
of knowledge work, the Internet of 
Things and cloud technology will be the 
most disruptive and generate the most 
economic benefit (see Figure 1.4).31
The failure to understand and address 
risks related to technology, primarily 
the systemic cascading effects of 
cyber risks or the breakdown of critical 
information infrastructure, could have 
far-reaching consequences for national 
economies, economic sectors and 
global enterprises. By one estimate, 
European countries that do not 
react appropriately to technological 
change could lose 600 billion euros in 
value added over the next 10 years, 
corresponding to about 10% of 
Europe’s industrial base.32 Businesses, 
policy-makers and civil society 
therefore need to find appropriate 
frameworks to address four high-level 
risks associated with the transformation 
towards a more digitized economy.
First: cyber-related risks. Cyberattacks 
and related incidents have been 
entering the global risks landscape 
as among the most likely and most 
potentially impactful risks for the past 
two to three years – in North America, 
cyberattacks ranks as the most likely 
risk by far (see Figure 3) – with the 
potential threat for doing business 
explored further in Part 4. Cases 
have been rising in both frequency 
and scale. They have so far been 
isolated, concerning mostly a single 
entity or country, but as the Internet 
of Things leads to more connections 
between people and machines, 
cyber dependency – considered by 
survey respondents as the third most 
important global trend (see Figure 
4) – will increase, raising the odds of a 
cyberattack with potential cascading 
effects across the cyber ecosystem. As 
a result, an entity’s risk is increasingly 
tied to that of other entities. As cyber 
Figure 1.4: Estimated Potential Economic Impact of Technologies, US$ trillion, 
annual
Source: Based on Manyika et al. 2013. 
Note: Projections are to 2025 and include sized applications and consumer surplus.
Estimated potential economic impact of technologies
3.7-10.8
5.2-6.7
2.7-6.2 1.7-6.2
1.7-4.5
0.2-1.9
0.7-1.6
0.1-0.6 0.2-0.6 0.2-0.5 0.1-0.5 0.2-0.3
M
ob
ile
 In
te
rn
et
A
ut
om
at
io
n 
of
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
w
or
k
Th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 o
f T
hi
ng
s
C
lo
ud
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
A
dv
an
ce
d 
ro
bo
tic
s
A
ut
on
om
ou
s 
an
d 
ne
ar
-
au
to
no
m
ou
s 
ve
hi
cl
es
N
ex
t-
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
ge
no
m
ic
s
E
ne
rg
y 
st
or
ag
e
3D
 p
rin
tin
g
A
dv
an
ce
d 
m
at
er
ia
ls
A
dv
an
ce
d 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
ex
pl
or
at
io
n 
an
d 
re
co
ve
ry
R
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y
Range of sized potential 
economic impacts
High
Low
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
dependence rises, the resulting 
interconnectivity and interdependence 
can diminish the ability of organizations 
to fully protect their entire enterprise. 
As more organizations move to digitize 
their unique business value within more 
connected environments that rely more 
and more on machine learning and 
automated decision-making, cyber 
resilience takes on a new importance. 
Although organizations may recognize 
the benefit of cyber technologies for 
their bottom lines, they may not be 
fully internalizing cyber security risks 
and making the appropriate level of 
investment to enhance operational 
risk management and strengthen 
organizational resilience. Particular 
attention is needed in two areas that 
are so far under-protected: mobile 
internet and machine-to-machine 
connections. It is vital to integrate 
physical and cyber management, 
strengthen resilience leadership and 
organizational and business processes, 
and leverage supporting technologies. 
Second: the exchange of data between 
countries and stakeholders. Data have 
been called “the oil of the 21 century”, 
and a predictable legal framework is 
needed to realize the full economic 
potential of digitization. Recent cases of 
policy reversal have created uncertainty 
about the legal situation, which can 
hamper investment and adaptation 
of the latest technologies. Given the 
inherent international nature of data 
flows, in areas such as supply chains 
or 3D printing, national governance 
needs to be complemented by 
a functioning international legal 
framework. However, the current 
regulatory regime is underdeveloped 
and lacks the necessary legal certainty 
in areas such as privacy, transparency, 
encryption control, the effect of 
intellectual property regimes on data 
that cross borders, and the impact 
of proprietary data on competition. 
Given the many actors and industries 
involved and the competing interests 
at stake, stakeholders will probably 
struggle to find common agreement. 
Moreover, the physical infrastructure 
for data exchange, such as undersea 
cables, could also become a target in 
international conflict or terrorism.
Third: changes to the work 
environment. Although there is a lot 
of uncertainty about how many new 
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Box 1.5: Pathways to Resilience: Effective Leadership and Institutional Values 
Global risks recognize no geographic boundaries. Whether from natural or man-made or cyber disasters, the cascading effects 
can be felt oceans away. Escalating terrorist attacks in Africa, Europe and the Middle East; natural disasters related to climate 
change; and health disasters from infectious diseases increasingly impose both economic and human costs. How can the 
global community prevent or mitigate the adverse effects of catastrophic events in our increasingly complex and quickly evolving 
environment?
The Global Agenda Council (GAC) on Risk and Resilience advocates four key activities for companies, organizations and 
governments to build resilience at national and global levels.1 These recommendations resulted from a detailed study of entities 
that proved to be resilient in recent disasters, including Nepal’s 2015 earthquake, the 2014 Ebola outbreak and Chile’s 2010 
earthquake, along with an assessment of data from four sources including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Bank and the Zurich Insurance Group.
1. Clarify roles and responsibilities. During a crisis, it is critical to have clearly delineated and understood senior official and 
c-suite executive roles and responsibilities for risk and incident management. Confusion around “who is in charge” or “who has 
authority” wastes crucial time and resources, and makes response and recovery less efficient and effective. The need for 
well-defined roles becomes heightened when an organization faces novel or rapid-onset disasters or emergencies, such as 
those resulting from cyberattacks. Pre-determining, training and exercising roles, capabilities and plans helps to ensure an 
organization’s risk readiness. The successful management of complex crises also requires a capacity for adaptability and 
flexibility. Crisis managers must be able to adjust pre-established plans as needed given the unique characteristics of the crisis.
2. Develop Crisis Leadership Characteristics. Organizations that successfully position for, respond to and recover from 
major events also consistently have effective leadership – the qualities and actions of those with authority and influence can 
empower their entities to be resilient. Such leaders are steady and decisive in the face of uncertainty and pressure. They make 
decisions in a timely and prioritized way, and communicate them transparently. Recognizing that they cannot address risks 
alone, they galvanize others and are clear about what assistance they require. They understand when a disaster requires them 
to cut through policies that may prevent or delay action. Leaders who are effective during and after a crisis are those who have 
earned trust through their demonstration of openness, transparency, responsiveness and accountability. They are seen as 
honest and standing up against corruption. For example, an IMF assessment attributes much of Chile’s effective recovery from 
the 2010 earthquake to the nation’s “technocratic, rules-based, and transparent” leadership – and to its institutional practices, 
including the rule of law.2 Another example is seen in Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s speech in the wake of the 
July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway, which demonstrated how leadership during a crisis can significantly result in both 
increased trust in government and meet citizens’ expectations of responsiveness. These examples also highlight the role of 
meaning making – that is, the capacity for leaders to make sense of an adverse event and articulate to the public a clear path 
forward in a state of emergency.
3. Leverage expertise. When confronted with an unprecedented emergency, strategic crisis managers must be able to quickly 
identify and mobilize the most relevant and trustworthy expertise to help understand and respond to the crisis. Knowledge 
management systems and expert networks need to be set up in advance and across multiple sectoral, professional and 
disciplinary boundaries. Understanding the implications of the crisis beyond the immediate consequences and anticipating the 
potential pathways of cascading effects requires appropriate crisis management structures that enable additional expertise to 
formally support decision-making. For example, the United Kingdom’s Scientific Advisory Group in Emergency (SAGE) is an 
independent support group that provides science-based expertise for the management of complex and unprecedented crises 
to the UK cabinet. Access to such expert “force-multipliers” could help both public and private entities understand and address 
the unique aspects of a crisis. Having access to specialized expertise is especially crucial for novel or multi-faceted evolving 
crises – such as the Great East Japan Earthquake, which impacted the Fukushima nuclear reactor and caused many 
companies to struggle with what decisions to make.
4. Create a culture of integrated risk management and multistakeholder partnerships. Another necessary institutional 
value is the recognition of the scope of global risks and the need for partnerships to address them. A culture of risk 
management – the beliefs, norms and values that underpin daily actions – must span the whole organization, including its 
supply chains. Entities can no longer afford to have different types of risks managed by different policies and operating 
procedures and by different officials, executives and agencies. All parts of an organization must collaborate transparently on risk 
management through integrated planning because of the potential for risks to have cascading consequences, including 
spillovers between the virtual and physical realms – for example, a flood disabling a server farm, or a cyberattack interrupting 
electricity supply.
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types of jobs new technologies will 
create and what they may be, it is likely 
that more existing categories of jobs 
will be computerized. The US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics estimates that, by 
2022, 47% of US workers will have a 
high probability of their jobs becoming 
automated.33 Examples include robots 
taking over manual tasks in online 
retail stock keeping, healthcare and 
diagnostics, and checking in hotel 
guests, while knowledge workers in 
non-routine cognitive tasks could be 
displaced by advances in intelligent 
algorithms. The entire employment 
system may have to be re-thought 
to facilitate transitions between 
different types of jobs. Skills in STEM 
(science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics) are expected to increase 
in importance in the medium term, with 
longer-term needs projected to focus 
on skills such as creativity, problem-
solving and social intelligence.34
Fourth: widening wealth, income 
and social inequalities. Access to 
technology is likely to exacerbate 
income differences within and across 
countries, with those who adapt 
gaining and those who do not losing 
income. Four billion of the planet’s 7 
billion people still do not have access 
to the internet and may not be able to 
gain from technology-driven growth. 
Currently the distribution of income is 
largely determined by employment: 
Individuals and organizations must recognize the imperative to contribute to resilience and must also know what and how 
they can contribute. No single entity – public or private – possesses all of the necessary authority, resources, or expertise to 
ensure its resilience against catastrophic events. Instead, resilience necessitates collaborative approaches. Public-private 
partnerships that harness the core competencies of each sector have a critical role to play in strengthening resilience capacity 
and maximizing the benefits of investment in risk monitoring, business continuity planning, and disaster preparedness. 
Instilling a culture of collaboration will enable effective partnerships before, during and after disasters. For example, in 
Germany, the LÜKEX Strategic Crisis Management Exercises conducted every two years by the federal government are 
designed to address complex crises and their potential disruptive consequences across sectors through cascading effects. 
LÜKEX involves a large partnership between the public and the private sectors to build a culture of crisis management and 
trust across multistakeholder partnerships.3
 
Notes
1 “Resilience” is defined as “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a 
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.” UN Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) 2009; see http://www.unisdr.org/ we/inform/terminology.  
Further information about the GAC on Risk and Resilience can be found at http://www.weforum.org/content/global-agenda-council-risk-resilience-2014-2016-0 
 
2 Chile’s extraordinary comeback has been recently analysed in detail to provide leaders from around the world with concrete lessons they can apply when they face 
their own national crisis. See Useem, Kunreuther, and Michel-Kerjan 2015. 
3 OECD 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264249127-en
advancing technology could diminish 
returns to labour and lead to wealth 
accumulating in fewer hands. 
Excessive inequality lowers aggregate 
demand and threatens social stability, 
and can increase risks such as 
involuntary migration or terrorism 
caused by violent extremism. Rising 
inequality is also correlated to upticks 
in security problems, such as violent 
deaths or robbery.35
There is a role for public, private and 
civil society organizations in building 
resilience to the risks explored in this 
part of the Report. In Box 1.5, the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Agenda 
Council (GAC) on Risk and Resilience 
shares the results of research on what 
makes organizations resilient.
Conclusions
Every year The Global Risks Report 
seeks to remind readers of the varied 
interconnections between seemingly 
diverse global risks. As well as the 
interconnections explored in the 
three risk clusters above, each nexus 
of risks can also be linked back to 
the new status quo of heightened 
geopolitical and global security 
concerns: environmental stresses 
could increasingly see tensions among 
countries over access to water and 
land; mass forced migration can 
be both a symptom and a cause of 
cross-border tensions; and emerging 
technologies are set to transform 
the international security landscape, 
alongside many others. The next part 
of this Report turns the focus to how 
the global security landscape has and 
may continue to evolve.
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Endnotes
1 “COP21” refers to the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties, also known as 
the 2015 Paris Climate Conference.
2 The risk of interstate conflict has decreased somewhat this year, but remains in the 
upper right quadrant of the landscape for a second year in a row. In 2014, the two 
risks were assessed as significantly less important.
3 Water crises is classified as a societal risk, but it is related to both the environment 
and society at large.
4 UNESCO 2015.
5 See for example, the United Nations Environment Programme report on ocean 
acidification (UNEP 2010).
6 http://www.nature.org/newsfeatures/pressreleases/study-over-2-billion-people-
affected-global-water-shortages.xml
7 http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/WWVision/Chapter2.pdf 
(“The Use of Water Today”, World Water Council – Chapter 2)
8 Key facts from the Joint Monitoring Programme of the WHO/UNICEF 2015 report 
are available at http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/JMP-2015-
update-key-facts-English.pdf
9 OECD 2015b. 
10 US number:  
US National Renewable Energy Lab, part of US DoE http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/
workshops/water_nexus_workshop.html  “39% of all freshwater withdrawals 
made in the United States is dedicated to the production of electricity through 
fossil fuels and nuclear power.” Also “http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-
and-natural-resources/overview%20ofthewaterenergynexusintheus.aspx” 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/overview 
ofthewaterenergynexusintheus.aspx  “41% of freshwater drawn in the United States 
is for thermoelectric generation.” These figures are necessarily estimates and may 
rely on different assumption based on region and /or methodology.
EU number:
European Waters: Current Status and Future Challenges – a Synthesis, European 
Environment Agency 2012
Asia number: 
Research undertaken by Columbia University Water Centre for the World Economic 
Forum Water Initiative Report
11 2030 Water Resources Group. 2009.
12 The UN World Water Development Report (UNESCO 2015) suggests that by 
2050, agriculture will need to produce 60% more food globally, and 100% more in 
developing countries.
13 UNEP 2002.
14 Many of the world’s cities are on the coast or on the banks of major rivers. The 
World Bank and the OECD forecast that average global flood losses in coastal cities 
will multiply from US$6 billion per year in 2005 to US$52 billion a year by 2050 with 
just the socio-economic costs of floods, such as impact on population and property 
value, taken into account. Add in the risks from sea-level rise and sinking land, and 
global flood damage for large coastal cities could cost US$1 trillion a year if cities do 
not take steps to adapt.
15 In 2010, Amazonia experienced a record-breaking dry year as it did in 2005 (two 
1 in 100 year events). In 2009 and 2012, Amazonia experienced the other extreme 
with heavy flooding (two 1 in 500 year events). See Nobre and Castilla-Rubio 2012 
and Borma, Nobre, and Cardoso 2013.
16 In the context of the discussion on migration and refugees, it is crucial to 
differentiate between voluntary and involuntary migration and also the drivers of 
migration flows. In the following section we refer only to involuntary migration as 
defined by the Global Risks Report (see Appendix A: Description of Global Risks and 
Trends 2015).
 17 UNHCR 2015b. This estimate comprises internally displaced people, refugees 
and asylum seekers.  However, the share of refugees in the total population is higher 
in 1940, as the population amounted to about 2 billion vs. 7.3 billion today.
18 UNHCR 2015b.
19 Loescher and Milner 2011.
20 UNHCR 2015b.
21 IMF 2015a. 
22 Betts et al. 2014.
23 IMF 2015a.
24 IMF 2015c.
25 Dealogic. 
26 IMF 2015a 
27 IMF 2015a. 
28 World Economic Forum 2015.
29 Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011.
30 Schwab 2016.
31 Manyika et al. 2013. At the same time, the application of some of these technologies 
(nanosats, autonomous drones, cloud and Internet of Things) coupled with machine 
learning and artificial intelligence along with fast-improving technologies will create 
a step-change improvement in the dynamic decision support capabilities urgently 
needed by governments, businesses and communities in dealing with the complexities 
and risks associated with the climate-water-energy-food-land nexus at appropriate 
spatial and temporal dimensions, particularly in emerging economies and the broader 
developing world.
32 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2015.
33 Frey and Osborne 2013. Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne of the Oxford 
Martin School, University of Oxford, have estimated that 47% of US jobs are potentially 
automatable over the next decade or two.
34 Frey and Osborne 2013.
35 Aitken and Elgar 2011.
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Part 2:  
The Security 
Outlook 2030
The international security landscape 
is in flux, challenging the assumption 
of continued social, political and 
economic progress that characterized 
the first 25 years after the end of 
the Cold War. Transformative shifts 
in political and economic power 
– accelerated by technological 
innovation, social fragmentation 
and demographic shifts – will have 
profound ramifications for the 
international security order (see Box 2.1 
for the Forum’s definition).
Box 2.1: International Security 
Defined
“International security” refers to the 
measures taken by state or non-state 
actors, individually or collectively, to 
ensure their survival and integrity 
against transboundary threats.
The Security Outlook 2030 initiative 
was launched by the World Economic 
Forum in November 2014 (see Box 
2.2). This initiative harnessed foresight 
methodology to identify the drivers of 
future security landscapes and their 
implications. Ten multistakeholder 
workshops were held in six different 
regions of the world, and interviews 
were conducted with security experts 
and practioners. The process resulted 
in the definition of seven drivers and 
three scenarios featured in this Report.
The Security Landscape in 
Context
The landscape is characterized by two 
main phenomena: first is the vacuum 
created by frail or weakening states, 
which open up space for the rise of 
armed non-state actors in the global 
security space and create difficult 
spillover crises.1 The rise of well-
organized, armed non-state actors 
demonstrates a departure from the 
traditional Westphalian notion of the 
role of the state. This occurs in two 
Part 2 was contributed by Espen Barth Eide, Anja 
Kaspersen and Isabel de Sola from the World 
Economic Forum.
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Box 2.2: A Deep-Dive into International Security
Geopolitical uncertainty shows no sign of letting up, with new crises cropping up and protracted conflicts spilling over 
throughout 2015. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that geopolitical and international security risks are top of mind for 
executives, leaders and the wider World Economic Forum ecosystem. For three years in a row, The Global Risks Report has 
registered the growing concerns of leaders over international security: in 2014 and 2015, geopolitical risks shot to the top of the 
most likely and impactful risks. More than ever before, understanding geopolitics and international security is central to 
mitigating and building resilience to global risks.
The Forum therefore initiated a year-long, in-depth study to examine current trends and possible driving forces for the future of 
international security. Its purpose was to take a fresh look at how we assess international security risks and ensure greater 
preparedness. In parallel with the Global Risks Report project, the Forum convened over 250 constituents who could provide 
unique insights on international security–related matters from different angles. The project harnessed foresight methodology to 
identify the drivers of future security landscapes and their implications.
As summarized in Box 2.4, the seven driving forces that emerged from this consultation map closely onto the risks and trends 
identified as key by the 2015 Global Risks Perception Survey and discussed in Part 1 of this Report. Based on the findings of the 
special consultations on international security, this part of The Global Risks Report surveys the current international security 
landscape and points out two phenomena – failing states and strategic competition – that are transforming geopolitical and 
international security affairs. It also puts forward three scenarios for the international security landscape to 2030.
By drawing out the drivers and risks, the Forum aims to inform discussions among a broad range of stakeholders on the 
international security challenges of the future. This dialogue should ultimately be able to bring an agenda to the institutions 
empowered to take measures to defuse existing and emerging conflicts, and help to identify shared interests, build confidence 
and drive policy on a global scale.
ways: they position themselves as an 
alternative to traditional state-based 
governance structures, as a “non-state 
state”, and they challenge the state 
monopoly of violence.2 
Second is the return of strategic 
competition between strong states 
with conflicting interests. The two 
phenomena may seem contradictory 
but are in fact related: when instability 
leads to the breakdown of existing 
orders, openings are created that 
regional or global powers may seek 
to exploit to improve their positions. 
Likewise, competition between states 
may impede effective responses by 
global institutions to crises or problems, 
which then fester and worsen. Indeed, 
the confluence of weak states and 
competitive strong states has created 
security threats outside the mandates 
and capabilities of most international 
security arrangements and institutions. 
The fragmentation of states was 
the principal security concern in the 
period after the end of the Cold War. 
In contrast to the tense but stable 
superpower standoff that ended with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the conflicts 
of the 1990s and the 2000s were 
perceived to be “asymmetrical”, with 
technologically inferior but innovative 
adversaries challenging government 
security forces.
Although this phenomenon persists, 
we are now witnessing the rise of 
hybrid conflicts – situations where 
both classical and asymmetric threats 
coexist and reinforce each other. States 
and armed non-state actors learn from 
each other. Innovative combinations 
of conventional low-tech and novel 
high-tech tactics create unpredictable 
dynamics. The modern “battlefield” 
blurs the distinction between zones of 
war and zones of peace, as well as that 
between legitimate combatants, non-
traditional adversaries and civilians. It 
is hard to measure the impact of war, 
but conservative estimates suggest 
that, in 2014, around 180,000 people 
were killed in 42 armed conflicts around 
the world3. Indirect deaths and costs 
caused by war-related malnutrition, 
displacements, trauma, disease and 
preventable illnesses raise the toll 
even higher. Today more than 6 million 
people have been forcibly displaced 
by war and related distress, and the 
numbers keep growing.4 Deaths from 
terrorism are also on the rise; in 2014 
alone more than 32,000 people were 
killed in terrorist attacks in 93  
countries.5  The indirect costs of both 
trends, not only the human cost, are 
significant.
In some parts of the world, states 
themselves direct violence against 
citizens, or support terrorist activities 
abroad, in order to attain and promote 
their own security objectives. In these 
cases the state becomes the driver of 
insecurity, rather than the guarantor of 
peace and stability, leading to a further 
erosion of trust and confidence of 
citizens, violations of human rights, and 
increased pressure on neighbouring 
states who may be forced to absorb 
refugees or – either explicitly or 
inadvertently – find themselves 
harbouring insurgent groups.
The competition for influence between 
great powers of today resembles the 
Cold War period, but with important 
differences.6 Today’s world is more 
multilayered than multipolar: states are 
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under pressure not just from outside, 
challenged by their own citizens, as 
discussed in Part 3 of this Report. 
Leaders may consequently delay 
dealing with risks emerging from 
the reconfiguration of international 
relations, and ideology is no longer a 
primary driving force. Strong, weak-
willed states are challenged by smaller, 
strong-willed players, shifting the 
traditional notions of balance of power.
The current geopolitical and 
international security context, as 
demonstrated in this Report, makes 
clear that chronic and resurgent 
violence, conflicts, and economic and 
social volatility will remain prominent 
features of the current and future 
reality. The rising flows of people on the 
move as a result of greater insecurities 
represent only one of the symptoms of 
a deep-rooted and protracted systemic 
governance crisis, underlining the 
need for a transformative shift in how 
international affairs are managed.
With each passing year, it also 
becomes clearer that many actors 
are no longer aligned to a status 
quo defined by a selective United 
Nations (UN) Security Council. The 
assumption that shared values are 
a necessary basis for regional or 
multilateral arrangements may give way 
to alliances and arrangements defined 
by shared interests. With dwindling 
institutions of global governance, there 
is a growing role for public-private 
collaboration to tackle global security 
challenges (see Box 2.3).
A Tour of the Current International 
Security Landscape
The phenomena shaping the 
international security landscape are 
well illustrated by the challenge of 
Daesh, or the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State in Syria (ISIS). Although the 
territory it controls lies in Syria and 
Iraq, Daesh has recruited fighters 
from over 100 countries – partly 
through advanced marketing using 
popular social media platforms.7 In its 
recruitment strategy, Daesh exploits 
the resentment and disillusionment 
of young people, offering jihadism as 
an exciting anti-establishment cause. 
It also has local roots – including, it is 
assumed, some forces of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime demobilized after 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq as well as 
individual wealthy regional sponsors.
Many countries are engaged in the 
fight against Daesh: recent terrorist 
attacks from Ankara to Beirut, Tunis 
and Paris, with copycat attacks in other 
far corners, illustrate how the battlefield 
has become globalized. There are no 
simple ways to defeat Daesh. It will not 
be defeated as long as civil war rages 
in Syria – and civil war will continue to 
rage in Syria for as long as the powers 
that could end it disagree about 
what the endgame should be. Daesh 
is banking on the inability of major 
regional and global powers to set aside 
their differences and pragmatically 
find a political settlement that all 
would prefer to the status quo. So far, 
despite laudable recent attempts to 
build a common front, this calculation 
of diplomatic inefficacy seems well-
founded.
Military solutions, however, can go 
only so far.8 Aerial bombardment 
without a coherent strategy for long-
term stability may merely extend the 
vacuum in which terrorist groups 
can thrive. Daesh also needs to be 
suffocated socially and economically. 
And to prevent it – or something like 
it – appearing again in another guise, 
its appeal to significant numbers of 
young men and women all over the 
world needs to be understood and 
undermined.9
In the meantime, the situation in 
Afghanistan and its neighbourhood is 
regressing as security and territorial 
gains made by US-led coalition forces 
over the past decade have been lost 
to resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda 
fighters.
The spillovers from weakening states 
are affecting other regions. Violent and 
extremist groups are also at work in 
parts of the Sahel, northern Nigeria, the 
Horn of Africa, the African Great Lakes 
area and the Central African Republic. 
At the time of writing, other countries 
too are facing political tensions leading 
to violence. Burundi faces worrisome 
political tensions, which raises the risk 
of further severe civil unrest and inter-
ethnic violence. Elsewhere in Africa, 
economic growth continues despite 
serious security and social problems. 
Properly managing the demographic 
youth bulge in Africa will be critical for 
security outcomes, implying major 
investments in skills building and job 
creation.
Latin America likewise faces 
governance challenges, with organized 
criminal gangs gaining influence over 
many aspects of society in various 
countries, as a steady stream of drugs 
continue to flow from the region into 
the United States, Europe and Africa. 
Latin America is at a crossroads.10 
The combination of slower growth 
prospects, increasing social unrest 
and political instability combined with 
high levels of violent crime pose serious 
security challenges for the region. 
Several processes are underway in 
order to foster a region-wide security 
dialogue and establish cooperation 
mechanisms to address growing 
criminality, violence and insecurity.11
Strategic competition between states 
is raising the stakes. In the South and 
East China Seas, territorial disputes are 
far from resolved. Growing economic 
interdependence in a region lacking 
commensurate security architectures 
increases anxieties about the region’s 
ability to peacefully manage a potential 
misstep or overreach by one of the 
players. The key question here is how 
the region – and the wider world – 
relates to China’s rise, and indeed how 
China itself adapts its own policies 
as it emerges into one of the primary 
centres of political and economic 
might. A major transformation is 
underway in China’s armed forces, 
emphasizing expeditionary, air, 
Frail States
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Box 2.3: Public-Private Collaboration in Complex Crises
We have entered a new era, and it is not a peaceful one. Emerging conflicts and 
long-term violence are seriously impacting people, social fabrics and political 
systems. There has been a rise in de-structured conflicts and violence – often 
fought in densely populated urban areas – and international humanitarian law is 
repeatedly and systematically violated.
The lines between conflict and non-conflict zones are increasingly blurred, with 
pockets of vulnerability coexisting with pockets of progress. The lines are also 
blurred between criminal, inter-communal and politically motivated violence. More 
refugees and internally displaced persons are forced to flee for longer periods of 
time. Conflicts, mismanaged migration, poor governance and corruption are 
eroding gains from economic growth and development, affecting both low- and 
middle-income countries.
New models of public-private collaboration need to be promoted to support, 
finance and deliver immediate assistance and alleviate long-term needs, with 
business collaborating closely with frontline responders on responsible investment 
to strengthen state and societal resilience.
maritime and space technologies over 
its traditional emphasis on the Army 
and the defence of the home turf. 
The further development of a security 
mitigation apparatus that has its core 
in the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), but which has an 
even broader reach through its regional 
cooperative framework, is of particular 
importance. For instance, the evolving 
ASEAN Code of Conduct for maritime 
disputes, while not attempting to solve 
the underlying competing claims, is an 
attempt to avoid escalation into conflict.
As illustrated by its new security 
legislation and the long-standing 
debate about revising Article 9 of its 
constitution, thus allowing for a larger 
military role abroad, Japan’s security 
posture is evolving, potentially allowing 
for a more assertive Japan in regional 
and international security frameworks. 
India, while currently occupied with 
pressing domestic issues of internal 
conflict and social inequality, is also a 
key actor to watch as the Asian security 
landscape adapts to a post-Western 
world.
Europe has remained united over 
the Ukraine crisis, despite initially 
struggling to deploy sanctions 
against Russia because of its strong 
links in energy and finance. An ever 
bigger challenge is presented by 
the refugee crisis, a clear testament 
to the loss of state control and the 
frailty of intergovernmental structures. 
Insularity, xenophobia and right-wing 
populism are gaining ground across 
the continent, calling into question the 
integration process and a common 
European front on international security 
policies. If Europe proves unable to 
find common solutions to today’s 
pressing challenges, we might see 
a de-integration process unravelling 
achievements such as the Schengen 
passport-free zone, the common 
currency, or even the Single Market. 
While still unlikely to happen, such a 
process could hardly be expected to 
be harmonious and peaceful.
Meanwhile, the role of the United 
States in international security remains 
a source of uncertainty and contention. 
Many question whether or not the 
United States has the will and the 
means to remain the world´s dominant 
superpower, and whether or not it can 
uphold a Western, liberal agenda for 
the entire international system. Recent 
attempts to design an American foreign 
policy based on alliances, norms and 
international cooperation rather than 
unilateralism cannot be secured by 
the United States alone but require 
that other key actors also engage in 
upholding international order. The role 
played by the US Congress in how 
the United States is perceived on the 
world stage and the growing domestic 
polarization weakens the predictability 
of the country as a global actor – which 
risks causing discord between the 
United States and the rest of the world, 
its allies included. 
As an energy power, and possessing 
the world’s second largest arsenal 
of nuclear weapons, Russia will 
continue to play an assertive role 
in the geopolitical order. Following 
the annexation of Crimea, there is 
no clear political solution in sight to 
the continuing tensions in eastern 
Ukraine. EU-US sanctions combined 
with the low price of oil have hurt 
Russia’s economy, but have so far 
not achieved the desired policy shift. 
Other great powers’ desire to contain 
Russia collides with the desire for 
cooperation against the threat of 
Daesh. Russia’s future hangs in the 
balance between modernization and 
reliance on raw materials exports, with 
the current leadership increasingly 
looking East for politico-economic ties. 
Western countries, having reduced 
their investments in defence and being 
preoccupied with internal concerns, 
may find that they lack the resources 
and will to implement their long-term 
strategic objectives.12
Trust is waning in the capacity of 
existing multilateral mechanisms 
to resolve potential flashpoints. In 
their current form, global institutions 
such as the UN retain their relevance 
as meeting places, but they do 
not necessarily have the capacity 
and credibility to effectively uphold 
peace and security. The UN was 
designed for a very different world. 
The UN-centric intergovernmental 
“contract” needs a significant overhaul 
if it is to successfully mitigate the 
challenges and threats currently facing 
international security.
 
The Geo-Economics of International 
Security
International economic relations, 
international security and geopolitics 
are closely related. When relations 
between states are harmonious, trade 
and investment patterns are typically 
driven by economic considerations. 
However, in times of tense relations 
between states, politics may trump 
economics – for instance, through 
the introduction of sanctions against 
adversaries or preferable treatment for 
political allies.
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After decades of rapid globalization, the 
current geopolitical landscape shows 
some signs of returning to politics 
dominating economics. The economic 
growth spurred by globalization has 
shifted the balance of economic power, 
leading to renewed great power rivalry 
and global insecurities. New alliances 
are playing out in trade agreements, 
strategic infrastructure projects, new 
investment banks, and arrangements 
governing the internet and cross-
border data flows and storage – 
increasingly a source of tension, as 
seen with the annulment of the Safe 
Harbour Act agreement.13
Economic policies are increasingly 
“weaponized”, and not only through 
sanctions. Tools that were taken for 
granted in the era of globalization 
– such as access to raw materials 
and technology underlying financial 
transactions – may become politically 
restricted, posing new risks for 
industries that rely on free and open 
markets for access to technology, 
materials and customers. Businesses 
may find more and more obstructions 
as a result of anxieties around trade, 
technology transfer and intellectual 
property, calling into question the 
reliability of global supply chains, 
industrial partnerships and cross-
holdings.14
Civil wars and terrorism can disturb 
the flow of goods and services, with 
the interconnectedness of the global 
economy magnifying the impact. 
Ninety percent of traded goods travel 
by sea, often through stretches of water 
in Asia and Africa that are increasingly 
part of territorial disputes or targets 
of piracy: the Suez Canal, the Strait of 
Malacca, the Gulf of Guinea and the 
Strait of Hormuz – thoroughfares for 
trade, energy transport and supplies – 
are all surrounded by violent  
conflicts.15 Air transport costs are 
increasing because of heightened 
travel security procedures and the 
need to avoid overflying conflict 
areas. As discussed in Part 3 of this 
Report, epidemics can also threaten 
international security, with the recent 
Ebola crisis a reminder of potential 
vulnerabilities.
Driving Forces and 
Amplifiers
The Forum’s year-long consultations 
on international security identified 
seven key driving forces of change in 
the international security landscape 
(see Box 2.4). They are highly 
interconnected, each interacting with 
and affecting the others. From the 
seven, two stand out as warranting 
more detailed discussion: technological 
innovation and natural resources and 
climate management. They are not 
only drivers in their own right, but also 
significant amplifiers of the others.
Technological Innovation and 
International Security
From longbows to gunpowder, nuclear 
weapons, airplanes and drones, the 
history of international security is also 
the history of technological innovation,16 
and the history of humanity is defined 
by war, and war by the people 
who fight it and how they fight it.17 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution 
will profoundly affect our security, 
physically and virtually. Previous 
industrial revolutions have advanced 
human development but they also 
precipitated violent transfers of power. 
Technological innovation will continue 
to influence how conflicts arise, who 
fights them, where they are fought and 
how they are settled.
Some ways in which new technologies 
will impact international security in 
the coming 15 years can already be 
anticipated: for example, improved 
capacity to 3D-print weapons from 
digital templates and new possibilities 
for biological and chemical weapons. 
However, technologies are fusing 
in increasingly unpredictable ways, 
and potential nefarious uses are 
not always immediately apparent. 
Even if they were, innovation quickly 
outpaces the capacity for regulatory 
oversight. Breakthroughs in a range 
of technologies – from robotics to 
nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, 
genome sequencing, human 
advancements or meta materials – 
could destabilize security and shift 
balances of power.
Until recently, the ability to inflict large-
scale damage required either armies 
of people or sophisticated equipment, 
such as nuclear weapons, effectively 
available only to states. With the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution,18 large-scale 
damage is possible for small groups 
and even individuals working from 
home computers or labs. Existing tools 
to prevent the escalation of disputes – 
treaties, conventions, or doctrines such 
as “mutually assured destruction” – are 
of questionable use when destructive 
capacity is no longer limited to a 
handful of entities with broadly similar 
resources, tactics and interests in 
preventing escalation.
The internet has opened a new frontier 
in warfare: everything is networked and 
anything networked can be  
hacked.19 The “dark net” has become a 
trading place fuelling insecurity. Every 
future conflict will have a cyber element, 
and some may be fought entirely 
in cyberspace. Given that attack is 
easier than defence in cyberspace, 
this will dramatically change how the 
entire security apparatus prepares for 
potential breaches. Physical distance 
no longer offers protection; many 
technologies are dual-use; much 
critical infrastructure is privately owned; 
and attacks are easy to disguise given 
the challenges of attribution. Social 
media is already a significant tool in 
hybrid warfare,20 offering a new means 
for all sides to a conflict to conduct 
cy-ops and psy-ops,21 including scare 
tactics, recruitment and fundraising.22
The seabed and space are both also 
likely to become increasingly militarized, 
as more and more actors – state 
and commercial – have gained the 
ability to send up satellites or mobilize 
unmanned underwater vehicles 
capable of disrupting fibre-optic 
cables and satellite traffic. Off-the-shelf 
quadcopter drones are already being 
used by gangs to spy on and attack 
rivals. Autonomous weapons, capable 
of identifying targets and deciding to 
open fire without human intervention, 
will become increasingly feasible, 
challenging the laws of war.
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Box 2.4: The Seven Driving Forces of International Security
Technological innovation: Emerging technologies create challenges, but also opportunities to solve them.
Resources, climate management and security: Tensions are raised by growing competition over access to resources 
including energy, water and food.
Efficient governance: Corruption and lack of transparency or rule of law limits the progress of development and destabilizes 
societies.
Geo-strategic competition: Shifts in economic and political power and weakened mutual trust lead great powers to compete 
for influence, often creating competing spheres of influence.
Demographic shifts: Countries may struggle with bulges of youth or elderly populations, or with rapid influxes of migrants.
Social cohesion and trust: Fuelled by inequality, feelings of social exclusion, mistrust and marginalization threaten social 
stability.
Hybrid and asymmetric threats: More complex threats, indistinct adversaries and “black swans” are arising from a more 
interconnected world.
Technological
innovation
Hybrid and
asymmetric
threats
Resources,
climate
management
and
security
Efficient
governance
Demographic
shifts
Geo-strategic
competition
Social cohesion
and trust
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Natural Resources, Climate Change 
and International Security
Climate change is expected to amplify 
existing security problems and create 
new ones. As explored in Part 1, the 
world will increasingly feel its effects: 
extreme weather events including 
prolonged high temperatures and 
droughts, freak storms and floods, and 
rising sea levels threatening coastal 
cities and island countries are expected 
to occur more frequently and at greater 
scale, touching many countries, 
especially those already grappling 
with poverty, fragility and ineffective 
governance.
The likely impact of climate change 
on food security, explored in depth in 
Part 3, is another channel of impact on 
the international security landscape. 
As wells dry up, crops and fisheries 
fail, and people lose their livelihoods, 
simmering tensions between social 
groups are more likely to boil over into 
community violence. Armed non-state 
actors, including insurgencies and 
terrorist groups, will be able to leverage 
this new source of insecurity as an 
additional grievance on which to build 
their narratives, finding new recruits 
among those made destitute.
Stresses on water and food could 
contribute to rising tensions among 
states. Trade may be interrupted by 
the hoarding of commodities, local 
populations can object to foreign 
control of arable land, and arguments 
may erupt over rights to draw water 
from rivers and aquifers that cross 
borders.
Box 2.5: Scenarios Methodology
What are the most pressing issues leaders should address? What trends are driving transformations? To be as prepared as 
possible for the future, leaders need to think broadly and consider the worst that could happen.
Strategic foresight enables assessments of what the future context might look like through carefully researched and validated 
scenarios. Scenarios extrapolate existing trends to provide insights that can inform more robust decision-making. The three 
scenarios presented here (Figure 2.5.1) describe how the seven driving forces of international security could interact and how 
prominent actors might respond. The collaborative process of developing and using scenarios can generate the relationships 
necessary to drive change.
During a year-long initiative, launched at the Annual Meeting in 2015,1 over 250 members of the World Economic Forum’s 
network participated in consultations to build the scenarios. To ensure a broad perspective, our team conducted 10 workshops 
in six regions, with participants from government, the security sector, academia, civil society, youth, and the business sector, 
which together comprised 41% of the total number of participants (see Figure in the Acknowledgements section). A full list of 
contributors is included in the Acknowledgements.
Note
1 Eide and Kaspersen 2015c.
 
 
Figure 2.5.1: Illustrations of the Scenarios
Walled cities Strong regions War and peace
31The Global Risks Report 2016
P
art 2
P
art 4
P
art 3
P
art 1
Interstate tensions are also likely to be 
stoked by an increase in migration into 
countries less affected by the changing 
climate. Environmental stresses will 
accelerate migration across borders 
and also to cities, putting additional 
stress on urban infrastructure in many 
countries. Cities will need to find new 
tools and policies to manage security 
risks.
Security Outlook 2030: 
Three Alternative 
Scenarios
The potential for rapid and radical 
change, even though the form it 
takes is unknown, raises fundamental 
questions about planning and 
preparedness. In this section, three 
scenarios describe potential evolutions 
of the international security landscape 
to 2030 (see Box 2.5 for a description 
of the methodology used). These are 
not intended to be predictions, but 
plausible trajectories that can usefully 
challenge current thinking and serve as 
a call to action for the development of 
more adaptable and resilient response 
systems.
Future 1: Walled Cities
As greater penetration of information 
and communications technology 
broadens the horizons of citizens in 
many countries, raising expectations 
in areas such as health, education, 
infrastructure and quality of 
governance. At the same time, fiscal 
challenges are reducing governments’ 
ability to meet citizens’ expectations 
– and citizens become disillusioned 
by their exposure to public sector 
corruption, poor service delivery and 
ineffective institutions.
This scenario foresees widening 
inequalities of wealth, income, 
health, environment and opportunity 
continuing to pull communities apart. 
In wealthier nations, the middle classes 
are hollowed out by declining wages 
and dwindling public goods. Those 
who can afford it are increasingly 
retreating to gated communities and 
turning to the private sector for what 
were once public services, divorcing 
their interests from the common 
good.23 Fertile soil, fresh water and 
even clean air become increasingly 
commoditized and traded between 
those who can afford them. With 
economic and political elites feeling 
ever more identical and distant from 
citizens, states lose their ability to 
bring people together around a shared 
narrative or identity. Trust is eroded, as 
is the social contract between citizens 
and government.
The vitality of many states is challenged 
by demographic trends. In some 
regions, large youth populations come 
of age with few opportunities for stable, 
well-paid employment. In other regions, 
the demographic bulge is of the elderly, 
creating ever greater needs for finance 
for pensions and healthcare; this puts 
pressure on declining working-age 
populations and limits the resources 
available for states to address security 
issues.
Social cohesion is further weakened 
by mass migration, as youth seek 
economic opportunities and 
humanitarian or environmental 
catastrophes displace people. In the 
absence of narratives that foster a 
shared identity and common cause, 
mismanaged migration flows and poor 
integration of migrant communities 
create tensions. Anxiety over migration 
fuels the rise of extremist, xenophobic 
and ethno-nationalist political 
parties that advocate for a return of 
authoritarian government and national 
identities based on culture, ethnicity or 
religion, effectively exploiting narratives 
of “us” vs. “them”.
As younger populations spend more 
of their lives online, they fill the need 
for shared narratives and a sense of 
community with like-minded people, 
sometimes in faraway geographies. 
Meanwhile, millions of children are 
coming of age in refugee camps, 
often under duress, and with no 
natural sense of belonging. Rootless 
and disillusioned, often traumatized 
by growing up amid civil wars or 
community violence, more young 
people become anti-system and 
vulnerable to recruitment by violent 
groups or gangs.
Insurgencies, terrorist groups, and 
criminal organizations all exploit 
the security deficit, leveraging new 
technologies to strengthen their hands 
against strained security forces. 
Overwhelmed by internal threats, 
states double down on internal 
security issues and disengage from 
multilateral collaboration, reducing the 
effectiveness of global institutions and 
mechanisms.
In some areas, lines between states 
and violent non-state actors blur. 
Terrorist or criminal groups, often in 
opaque alliances, seize control of more 
territories and run them like states, 
threatening nations and even regions 
with collapse. The corridor between 
South America and Mexico, Iraq and 
the Levant, and swathes of West and 
Central Africa are among the areas now 
under pressure from combinations of 
civil wars, humanitarian crises, violent 
extremist activity, crime and gangs.
More and more frequently, legitimate 
non-state actors and organizations fill 
some of the spaces left by weakened 
national governments, often with 
social support. Companies and private 
charities fill the void and manage what 
were once public services. With their 
operations located near desperate 
communities, many companies are 
drawn into addressing the social 
consequences of insecurity and 
violence. Eroding state power also 
increases city power, with cities coming 
to be regarded as the most practical, 
functional unit of governance.24
The world divides into islands of 
order in a sea of disorder. As large 
numbers of people are displaced 
by environmental change and 
social violence, still-functioning 
states seek to protect themselves, 
often deploying private military and 
intelligence apparatus to minimize risks 
of involvement in protracted conflict. 
In this scenario, by 2030 the world 
resembles medieval times, when the 
citizens of thriving cities built walls 
around them to protect themselves 
from the lawless chaos outside.
Future 2: Strong Regions
An alternative scenario envisages the 
volatile and competitive interregnum 
paving the way for the emergence of a 
stable world by 2030 with several seats 
of power.
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In this future, as wealth accumulates 
in the South and East, more players 
are able to make strategic economic 
investments in diplomacy, critical 
technologies and infrastructures. The 
balance of power adjusts, creating a 
new order of mostly regionally based 
spheres of influence and interests 
that are generally accepted, as are 
newly evolved norms of engagement 
over political disputes and shared 
resources.
Far from their power being eroded, 
states in this world are strong – at 
times authoritarian. Strong leaders rise 
to power on promises to refocus on 
narrowly defined national interests, with 
minimum diversity and high solidarity 
for citizens. Narratives recalling 
(imagined) past glories and comforting 
homogeneity of ethnicity and creed 
become a strategy to compensate 
for the uncertainty of the future. As 
in the 1930s, leaders persuade their 
citizens to “escape from freedom”: 
these leaders strictly control borders, 
forcefully curb migration, invest more 
in military and police, and persuade 
people to accept mass surveillance 
as the only way to be protected from 
deadly threats.
Overwhelmed by mistrust among 
states, governments invest their 
political, financial and diplomatic capital 
in bilateral and regional processes. 
Effective regional powers emerge, 
as do new alliances of convenience 
where shared interests transcend 
the regional perimeter. Global 
governance mechanisms continue 
to lose credibility. New forms of 
cooperation initially run in parallel with 
the established global architecture, 
gradually taking over roles including 
development, trade, finance, security 
and the internet. Counterintuitively, this 
proves to reduce competition between 
states: with contentious issues taken 
off the global table, states are able 
to rebuild enough trust to maintain 
stability at the international level.
For example, in this world cyberspace 
is neither open nor global. States 
establish further controls over the 
internet, sometimes in collaboration 
with allies, building their own 
capabilities in data storage, search, 
and infrastructure – and using security 
threats and the promise of better 
public services through big data to 
win popular support.25 Climate change 
is another example: as its effects 
become clearer, states increasingly 
shift attention from cumbersome global 
efforts to more functional regional 
ones. The goal of saving all humanity 
from catastrophic climate change gives 
way to states and regions working 
together to adapt and protect “their 
own” citizens.
With bad memories of recent foreign 
interventions and increasing domestic 
polarization over foreign affairs, the 
United States refocuses its priorities 
and abandons its ambition to be the 
centre of the global stage, allowing 
others to fill the void on major political 
issues. China’s “peaceful rising” no 
longer raises apprehensions among 
other powers; its prominence in East 
Asia becomes an accepted fact. 
ASEAN goes into a comfortable orbit 
around its giant neighbour, while 
Japan focuses on maintaining good 
trade relations. The United States and 
China mutually accept their economic 
relevance and shared roles and 
responsibilities in a new world order.
Sweeping aside any last resistance, 
Russia consolidates its sphere of 
influence in Central Europe and 
Eurasia. Europe – having rebuilt its 
economic partnership with Russia 
and consolidated links with the United 
States – develops several levels of 
integration and remains functional as 
a coherent regional trade bloc. Latin 
America and the Caribbean leverage 
their abundant resources and strategic 
location to consolidate into a regional 
bloc. The push for African integration 
continues apace, with two sub-
regional integration blocs emerging 
as twin poles of influence. Following 
years of fruitless proxy conflicts in the 
Middle East and North Africa, two 
carefully balanced security alliances of 
functioning states restore some degree 
of order to the region.
Fifteen years into the future, this 
balance of regions and alliances is 
only beginning to consolidate as a new 
global order. Former rivals and enemies 
are tempted to test the boundaries, 
leading to strong pushbacks and 
reconfirmations from regional powers 
that the new order is here to stay. 
Security issues are handled by regional 
allies or relevant players, rather than at 
the global level.
Inevitably, there are losses for the 
global economy: geopolitical interests 
take predominance over economic 
ones, with corresponding inefficiencies 
as globalization goes into reverse. 
However, with the revolution in 
manufacturing and automation making 
it possible to produce goods closer to 
the consumer, there is less need for 
global trade in goods and less need 
to outsource production to low-wage 
countries. Companies must make 
costly and complex arrangements to 
be able to operate across regions; in 
many cases, abandoning international 
strategies, localizing or breaking up into 
smaller regional entities, prove to be 
more effective strategies.
Future 3: War and Peace
The final scenario envisages the world 
drifting into a major conflict during the 
next 15 years, which ultimately leads to 
a reworking of the global system.
In this future, established powers 
remain in denial about the major 
shifts of economic, demographic and 
political power that have taken place. 
Growing strategic competition between 
states erodes their trust in each 
other, and therefore their capacity to 
collaboratively resolve disagreements 
about the role of certain countries in 
certain regions: for example, the United 
States in the Asia-Pacific; Russia in 
Central Asia; and China in South-East 
Asia.
Meaningful progress slows on issues 
such as climate change, with global 
solutions blocked by states that 
calculate that taking action would 
be too problematic domestically, or 
that they could gain from new lands 
becoming suitable for crop production 
or resource exploitation. There is no 
longer consensus over the normative 
foundations or rules of the international 
system, which is not able to manage 
the rising tensions.
With stagnant growth and the rise of 
isolationist movements in established 
powers, space opens up for emerging 
powers to test the status quo. 
Meanwhile, internal pressures grow 
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in many countries: to varying extents, 
social turmoil erupts as emerging 
technologies put many people out 
of work and extreme weather events 
overwhelm the responsive capacity 
of governments. In some countries, 
upheavals feed into virulent nationalism, 
drawing on historical grievances 
against powerful neighbours.
Eventually, in this scenario, a major 
conflict erupts between two leading 
powers. One state experiences 
a massive cyberattack on critical 
infrastructure, causing loss of life. It 
accuses another state of complicity, 
and launches a conventional attack in 
retaliation. Denying any involvement, 
the second state considers it has been 
attacked without cause. Outraged 
populations on both sides demand 
further action; nervous leaders 
seek to shore up their positions 
and miscalculate the gravity of the 
consequences.
Other states are dragged into the 
escalating conflict and forced to 
choose sides. Armed non-state actors 
on both sides seek to leverage the 
conflict for their own ends, forcing the 
parties to the war not only to fight each 
other, but also to engage in hybrid 
conflicts against third parties.
Ultimately, the conflict stops short 
of all-out mutual destruction, but 
not before imposing high costs on 
both sides – human, economic, and 
infrastructure. The “nuclear taboo” 
– that states abstain from using the 
ultimate weapons, even if they possess 
them, still proves to hold true – but 
belligerents did begin to prepare for 
their application. There is no clear 
victor. In this scenario, the aftermath 
of the conflict leads to a sense of 
determination to prevent a repeat 
interruption to business as usual. The 
commonly accepted argument is 
that the lesson to be learned from the 
failure of previous global mechanisms 
to mediate conflicts is that those 
mechanisms were not only excessively 
ambitious but also largely ineffective.
States set about identifying the 
few basic practicalities that truly 
demand global cooperation: norms, 
for example, relating to the seas, 
air corridors, and finance. Because 
of their economic relevance, many 
of these norms are looked after by 
multistakeholder organizations, rather 
than intergovernmental organizations. 
Civil society and business leaders 
take on management roles in global 
arrangements. Other areas previously 
of interest to global governance 
institutions, from human rights and free 
trade to international development and 
control of the internet, are set aside 
as non-essential to the basic aim of 
preventing conflicts. The UN nominally 
retains a peacekeeping function in 
protracted conflicts, but is not able 
to regulate relations between leading 
states.
The result is a stripped-down global 
system in which the liberal ideals of 
freedom, democracy, justice and 
equality are no longer put forward as 
a paradigm to which all should aspire. 
A new entente emerges on respect for 
differences of political and economic 
approach, though this means 
accepting a degree of entrenched 
global inequality and disintegration, 
and a parcelling up of the global 
commons. Where they can, people and 
companies move to places that suit 
their objectives best.
Implications and 
Outcomes
Though none of the three scenarios 
presented here will occur exactly as 
described, the security landscape 
of the future may manifest multiple 
elements from one or more of the 
scenarios, probably simultaneously. 
Indeed, it can be argued that we have 
already entered the period of “walled 
cities”, as the refugee crisis seems to 
lead some nations to the reflex reaction 
of closing borders – both physical and 
political – as described in Part 1.
The three scenarios may come across 
as somewhat dystopian, because they 
are extrapolations of existing, negative 
trends. The world does not need to 
arrive at these dystopias, however. Our 
collective knowledge, connectedness, 
technological advances and 
social innovations present endless 
opportunities to change the outcome 
and shape a more secure world, 
given strong leadership and the 
right decisions being taken at the 
international level. This last point brings 
us back to the purpose of this Report: 
to cast new light on decisions that need 
to be taken today. The following set of 
recommendations is intended to aid in 
envisaging possible futures and to help 
change control the trajectory we are on 
and improve the outcome.
Overhauling the Social Contract 
Above all, these three scenarios point 
to the need to overhaul the social 
contract between citizen and state. 
Re-establishing trust in governance, 
improving the accountability of 
institutions and leaders, reducing 
social and economic divergences and 
delivering better services should be 
top objectives for policy-makers. In 
these areas,26 technology is not only 
a potential disruptor but also a key 
enabler.
More effective governance alone may 
not suffice, however, without also 
building greater social cohesion. The 
fabric that binds citizens to the state 
and to each other is fraying. A critical 
task for the state is to reinforce notions 
of citizenship and narratives of inclusion 
within national discourse, which can 
pave the way for reconciling political 
and theological differences both 
domestically and internationally.
Rewiring Global Governance 
All three scenarios reflect uncertainty 
around the future role and ability of 
global governance institutions to 
deliver on security. In an ideal world, 
a strong global body would have the 
tools and standing to mitigate conflicts 
involving either terrorism or competition 
between great powers, and to contain 
and resolve peripheral conflicts. At 
present, however, the multilateral 
system appears overwhelmed by the 
number and complexity of issues, and 
international mechanisms are often 
fragmented, co-opted or undermined 
by the special interests of chosen 
member states.
If states want to strengthen their ability 
to take collective decisions on key 
international security matters, they 
need to improve the efficiency of the 
multilateral apparatus. Progress on 
meaningful reform of the United Nations 
and the Bretton Woods Institutions to 
reflect current political and economic 
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realities has been slow and unfocused. 
Piecemeal reform of the system itself 
will not suffice: the choice is between 
implementing comprehensive reform 
to create the right mechanisms and 
responses for future global cooperation 
on security, and allowing the “death 
by a thousand cuts” of the global 
governance system – an outcome that 
would not favour international security.
Fostering Global Leadership 
Today’s world is in clear need of 
strong leadership, new compromises, 
innovative ideas and a capacity for 
long-term thinking. This is not limited 
to government and international 
organizations but also applies to 
civil society and the business sector. 
Because power is distributed among 
many sectors, multistakeholder 
cooperation is more important for 
tomorrow’s security than ever before.
The digital revolution, at times a 
source of disruption, can also be a 
tool for enhanced transparency – and 
transparency, if genuine, offers the 
potential to rebuild trust.
As suggested by the “strong regions” 
scenario, beginning that process at a 
regional level, with new architectures 
that are parallel to the existing 
international system, could ultimately 
strengthen rather than undermine 
global stability.
Enhancing the Role of Cities
Refocusing some security efforts at 
the level of the city could be another 
contribution. As urbanization gathers 
pace, cities will increasingly rival states 
as the most natural level of government 
for harnessing technology to deliver 
public services and security. Cities 
have also proven their advantages 
as sites of innovation, employment 
creation and higher productivity, 
because they, at times, prove to be 
more focused on practical problem 
solving than on the “status and 
prestige” issues that tend to obscure 
interstate relations. Devolving resources 
from national to municipal levels and 
creating new ways for city leaders 
to collaborate on security matters 
may also be faster than reforming 
established mechanisms for multilateral 
collaboration among states.
Promoting Private Sector 
Engagement 
A strong argument could be made 
for increasing the participation of the 
private sector as a stakeholder in 
international security.27 The implications 
of security risks affect companies 
assessing where to invest and do 
business as much as they affect 
governments engaged in trade, 
diplomacy and maintaining the security 
of their citizens. Yet the potential of 
the private sector to contribute to 
peace and security is not reflected in 
global security mechanisms or at the 
multilateral level.
Businesses often see global security 
as a risk management and compliance 
issue. Limited understanding of 
one’s own global, regional and local 
impact might sometimes even lead to 
inadvertently reproducing or confirming 
negative patterns in society and 
governance. The traditional business 
response to geopolitical skirmishes 
has been to view them essentially as 
intractable externalities: companies 
seek to minimize downside risks 
while waiting for a crisis to blow 
over. However, in a hyperconnected 
world, volatility in one place can have 
immediate repercussions on the other 
side of the globe. Avoiding investment 
in known or potentially volatile places 
does not insulate companies from the 
impacts of volatility. In today’s world, 
companies might be well advised 
to understand their own potential to 
influence international developments.
Many companies are already 
dealing with the root causes of 
insecurity, directly or indirectly. From 
inefficient governance to corruption, 
environmental degradation, social 
disparity and unrest in surrounding 
communities, many companies 
have policies in place to protect their 
interests while also addressing these 
drivers of insecurity within their core 
areas of operations. For example, a 
mining company seeking to minimize 
environmental impacts on local 
communities, a telecommunications 
company training local workers in 
the skills they require and thereby 
also empowering those workers, and 
an infrastructure company working 
with local government to improve 
quality and transparency around 
public tenders may all be contributing 
towards addressing the drivers of 
geopolitical instability. Another way 
the private sector can contribute is 
through company norms that forbid 
involvement with corrupt practices; this 
may, over time, spur better governance 
and reduce social resentment.
Encouraging New Behaviour 
Multistakeholder cooperation might 
also be conducive to mitigating the 
security implications of technological 
innovation. Ethical frameworks and 
norms guiding technological innovation 
could be elaborated between those 
actually involved rather than relying only 
on regulators, which will struggle to 
keep up with the pace of change in the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. Likewise, 
common understandings about the 
security dimension of an increasingly 
connected world could involve key 
private and public stakeholders from 
both the emerging technology and 
international security spheres.
Viewing climate change through 
an international security lens also 
suggests several policy options 
where multistakeholder action is 
critical. These include the search 
for new mechanisms to reflect 
externalities related to resource 
scarcity or environmental effects, while 
simultaneously safeguarding social 
stability by guaranteeing affordable 
access to the necessities for survival. 
Public-private partnerships established 
to identify technological solutions to 
improve the efficiency and resilience 
of food production and water use is 
another example.
Conclusion: A Call for a 
Resilience Imperative
If the “new status quo” implies such 
a high presence of global geopolitical 
risks and realignment around interests 
rather than values, then a wider range 
of stakeholders needs to be involved in 
setting the direction of the new global 
security paradigm and implementing 
solutions.
A first step is for private sector leaders 
to place international security firmly on 
their radar screen. International security 
and geopolitical trends are likely to have 
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more influence on the global economy 
in the future, thus demanding greater 
strategic attention from business 
leaders. With a stronger understanding 
of the issues and their own evolving role 
in the geopolitical and global security 
landscape, the private sector can be 
a constructive partner in addressing 
many global security challenges and 
mitigating their driving forces.
A second step is to have the traditional 
security actors – including international 
organizations and governments – 
adjust their own frameworks and 
processes to build in more public-
private participation at the most 
appropriate levels. The Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, action 
taken by technological and social 
media companies to block terrorist 
and violent extremist activity, and 
business alliances for action on climate 
change are promising examples of 
public-private arrangements that can 
strengthen security.
Third, a renewed focus on prevention, 
preparedness and resilience, rather 
than reaction and compliance, would 
likely improve security actors’ ability to 
manage known and unknown security 
risks. There exists important know-how 
and resources in the private sector 
that can improve preparedness and 
mission-critical planning processes in 
a global security context – using data 
to track the progress of risk factors, 
sharing information on where and 
when crimes occur, and establishing 
mechanisms for harnessing industry 
supply chains during complex 
emergencies – are a few examples of 
how security arrangements could be 
updated.
Rather than wait for crises to happen, 
or sleepwalk into the dystopian 
scenarios described above, it is 
critical to identify potential inflection 
points and focus on finding solutions 
rather than just containing problems, 
and adapt relevant structures 
accordingly. Prompting greater pliability 
through a genuine, forward-looking 
multistakeholder process in order 
to ensure against complacency and 
improve the outcomes in a fast-paced 
and interconnected world may be the 
best way to prevent the described 
dystopian futures from materializing.
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community-based organizations and faith-based organizations. Their characteristics 
include sufficient power to shape and cause change, although they are not part 
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Part 3:  
Risks in Focus
The previous sections of this Report 
have explored the ways in which global 
risks are becoming more imminent, 
impacting more people’s lives, 
economies and institutions. This part 
of the Report explores the Global Risks 
Landscape 2016 and the Global Risks 
Interconnections Map 2016 through a 
societal lens. Because well-functioning 
societies are at the core of international 
security and are key to strengthening 
resilience, this section presents an 
in-depth exploration of three distinct 
angles that relate to societies: the three 
Risks in Focus. To motivate action, 
each of the Risks in Focus includes 
examples of practical initiatives that can 
be implemented to build resilience. 
One of the key risks related to the 
advancing digitization of societies 
concerns the tension between 
the ways in which technology is 
empowering citizens and the growing 
sense of political disempowerment 
felt by many of those citizens. Rising 
income disparity and a shortage of 
quality employment opportunities – 
that could be further exacerbated by 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution – along 
with extreme weather events and 
heightened migration flows are among 
the factors that could leave societies 
deeply unsettled. 
Against this background, the first Risk 
in Focus introduces the concept of 
the “(dis)empowered citizen” and 
discusses potential consequences for 
social stability. The second contribution 
explores food security – a necessary 
condition for social stability – which is 
increasingly under threat from failure 
to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change; this Risk in Focus builds on 
the findings of Part 1. Finally, the third 
Risk in Focus discusses the potential 
of future pandemics to threaten social 
cohesion. 
The world has navigated previous eras 
of profound transitions resulting from 
converging economic, technological 
and geopolitical developments. But 
with a faster pace of change and more 
complex interconnections, the stakes 
have never been higher.
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3.1 (Dis)Empowered Citizen
 
Social Stability at Risk: 
Analysis
Social instability has re-emerged in 
recent years as a prominent concern. 
As discussed in Part 1, social instability 
is again the most interconnected 
global risk (see Figure 2), ranking in 
the top 10 over both 18-month and 
10-year time horizons (number 5 on 
the 10-year time horizon; see Figure 
1.1 and number 8 on the 18-month 
horizon, not displayed). Profound social 
instability additionally ranks among the 
three most likely global risks to occur in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and 
the Middle East and North Africa (see 
Figure 3). 
Although statistics related to social 
instability vary – particularly because 
the terminology used to describe 
instability fluctuates widely – data 
suggest there has been a rise in 
protests over the past two decades. 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1.1,  protest 
intensity has reached a new and 
higher plateau since the most recent 
spike, associated with the 2011 Arab 
Spring. The Global Database of Events, 
Language, and Tone (GDELT) Project 
notes “elevated protest activity of the 
last three years” in comparison to the 
previous “two decades of relatively 
reduced protest action.”1 Its data 
suggest we are again approaching 
1980s protest levels, when causes of 
social turmoil ranged from Cold War 
tensions and anti-apartheid sentiment 
to the Tiananmen Square protests.   
Social stability is being challenged by 
multiple and profound transformations 
that affect most countries worldwide. 
These transformations result from 
fast-paced technological progress, 
globalization, wealth and income 
concentration, shifting demographics, 
lack of job opportunities and a 
changing climate. Together they 
are creating new opportunities, 
expectations and sources of frustration. 
Social instability is not per se always 
a negative factor, because it can 
drive towards another and potentially 
better new equilibrium. Ensuring 
that these transformations result in 
positive outcomes will require profound 
changes to institutional and policy 
frameworks – but as citizens’ demands 
become more sophisticated, they also 
call into question the capacity and 
willingness of political and business 
leaders to respond. 
Societal Change Mechanisms under 
Pressure
Many societies try to channel the 
stress associated with societal 
transformations into constructive 
dialogue, enabling those affected to be 
and feel heard by their fellow citizens 
and those in authority. Common 
mechanisms for individuals to raise 
public awareness of issues and ask for 
change include organizing or signing 
petitions, donating to or joining social 
or political groups, and standing for 
election. 
However, not all societies have 
constructive mechanisms in place to 
handle appeals for change. Faced with 
disquiet over societal transformations, 
some respond by closing down 
debate, deliberately or inadvertently 
stifling individuals and groups that 
question existing structures. To some 
extent, social stability is in the eye of 
the beholder: in some societies, a 
peaceful mass demonstration would 
be regarded as threatening, subversive 
Source: Computations and illustration by Kalev Leetaru, 2015, based on the GDELT data set (http://gdeltproject.org/).
Notes: 
The World Protest Intensity score is the total number of protest events divided by all events seen that month. The timeline in this figure is created using data collected from 
print, broadcast, and web news media worldwide from over 100 languages (http://gdeltproject.org/). The data are normalized for the exponential rise in media coverage of the 
past 30 years.
Figure 3.1.1: World Protest Intensity
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Part 3.1 was contributed by Alexandra Lopoukhine, 
Silvia Magnoni and Nicholas Davis, World Economic 
Forum.
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Box 3.1.1: The (Dis)
Empowered Citizen: A 
Definition
The term “(dis)empowered citizen” 
describes the dynamic that is 
emerging from the interplay of two 
trends: one empowering, one 
disempowering. Individuals feel 
empowered by changes in 
technology that make it easier for 
them to gather information, 
communicate and organize. At the 
same time, individuals, civil society 
groups, social movements and local 
communities feel increasingly 
excluded from meaningful 
participation in traditional decision-
making processes and 
disempowered in terms of their ability 
to influence and be heard by 
institutions and sources of power.
and provocative; in others, it would be 
regarded as an example of constructive 
change mechanisms working as they 
should. 
It is not clashing attitudes per se 
that cause social instability – there 
will always be citizens demanding 
change. Rather, social instability can 
emerge when transforming attitudes 
come up against institutions that 
are unsuccessful in their struggle to 
peacefully incorporate them into the 
broader social and political context. 
Around the world, trust in institutions is 
plummeting. The most recent edition 
of the Edelman Trust Barometer found 
that in a higher proportion of the 
surveyed countries than ever before in 
the barometer’s 15 year history, people 
were distrustful of both governments 
and businesses. Even NGOs are not 
immune – although they still command 
more trust than the public or private 
sector, the 2015 Edelman Trust study 
showed a declining sense of trust in 
those entities, too.2  
Social Stability at Risk 
The global risk of social instability 
is heightened by uncertainty about 
whether existing structures will be able 
to constructively resolve pressures 
when (dis)empowered citizens’ 
demands threaten to undermine a 
country’s political stability (see Box 
3.1.1 for a definition of (dis)empowered 
citizen). With more (dis)empowered 
citizens organizing and mobilizing, 
governments and businesses alike 
need to come to terms with the ways 
in which they may be exacerbating 
the root causes of citizen discontent. 
They must understand the risks and 
work out how to adjust to a changing 
operating environment and a new 
societal landscape. 
Beyond economic uncertainty, 
the risks for countries include: 
(1) undermined legitimacy of the 
government mandate; (2) increased 
social polarization; (3) political impasse 
and the impossibility of actuating 
reforms, where relevant; and – 
under more severe circumstances 
– (4) possible disintegration of a 
country’s governmental system and 
other cascading risks that might 
easily emerge in a truly globalized, 
interconnected and complex world. 
An inclusive society with empowered 
societal actors who are aligned behind 
a joint vision for the country is a 
strong signal that a state is stable and 
confident, with greater transparency, 
lower corruption and a stronger rule 
of law – all important factors for doing 
business.3 
From an economic perspective, 
businesses benefit from a stable 
social and political environment for 
running their operations. They operate 
according to forecasts and scenarios 
that factor in socio-political risks, and 
instability increases their operational 
costs, reduces margins on investments 
and undermines local networks. 
Social and political unrest can cause 
losses in revenue, property damage, 
roadblocks, bureaucratic delays, 
overall economic slowdown and an 
unconducive business environment. 
For businesses, more specific risks 
include (1) reputational risk and other 
dangers to brands; (2) potential loss of 
market share; (3) product boycotts; and 
(4) disruption of established business 
models.
Particular risks to businesses may arise 
when local contexts and relationships 
change when people feel unable to 
effect change as citizens and look for 
ways to do so as consumers. Business 
models consequently need to adapt 
to new demands and expectations. 
Increasingly customers want to know 
not only about a business’s own 
performance in areas such as child 
labour and environmental impact, but 
also about the operations of its entire 
supply chain. They expect to have a 
voice in all aspects of its operations, 
from how production processes are set 
up to how distribution operations are 
developed and investment decisions 
around community initiatives are taken.
 
Drivers of (Dis)Empowerment
Social structures around the world 
are being transformed on three levels. 
First, at the individual level there are 
changes in how people feel and how 
they perceive the world and identify 
with particular values; this is combined 
with people’s increased ability to 
express and transmit their views, which 
in turn influences behaviour. Second, 
at a collective level, rapid changes in 
how social groups form and solidify 
have taken place, and in how these 
groups debate and develop common 
values and viewpoints and how they 
interact with other stakeholders. Third, 
often driven by and in response to the 
individual and collective levels, formal 
institutions such as governments, 
businesses, religious institutions, the 
media and civil society organizations 
are also changing the way they relate 
to and interact with both groups and 
individuals.
These evolving structural forces create 
new patterns of communication, 
relationships, collaboration and 
expectations, which in turn – in 
combination with emerging 
technological, economic, political 
and environmental drivers – create 
new structures of empowerment and 
disempowerment.
Economic Drivers
Many countries have recently seen 
mobilizations against inequality, 
persistent unemployment and 
deteriorating economic environments. 
From the Arab Spring to the anti-
austerity protests in Europe, 
people have vocally rejected the 
consequences of what they perceive as 
a distorted and non-inclusive economic 
and political system. Demands for 
reforms to tackle corruption, in both 
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politics and business, are being heard 
across the globe. Policies that neglect 
or deepen inequality can exacerbate 
the combination of less sustainable 
economic growth, weakened social 
cohesion, and citizens feeling 
disenfranchised from democratic 
processes.
Environmental Drivers
Changes in society, regulatory policies 
and business practices are crucial to 
address our changing climate. In recent 
years a “climate justice” movement has 
emerged from frustration with a lack 
of leadership, evident in international 
negotiations characterized by long 
talks, vested interests and the ultimate 
incapacity to curb the effects of global 
warming, despite progress at the 
COP21. Continued sluggish progress 
or a lack of any progress at all will 
increasingly fuel protests, especially 
as extreme weather patterns make a 
progressively greater impact.  
Political Drivers
The last three years have seen more 
elections and government collapses 
in major market economies than in 
all of the previous decade.4 Approval 
ratings of political leaders are sagging, 
and established political parties 
across Europe are facing declines in 
membership and a need to reconsider 
how they engage with the electorate.5 
Labour unions are not doing any 
better: although increasing in Asia 
and South America, membership has 
been declining in Europe and North 
America, particularly in the United 
States, where the unionized workforce 
hit a 97-year low in 2013.6 A proliferation 
of alternative political parties – some 
of them extremist or nationalist – has 
challenged established governance 
systems without necessarily delivering 
the outcomes hoped for by citizens 
in terms of improved transparency 
and equality. Indeed, a high turnover 
of governments or strong separatist 
movements can end up making policy-
making less stable and worsen distrust 
in governance structures.
The perceived inability of governments 
to respond to major global challenges 
– from climate change and internet 
governance to food security – is 
eroding confidence in authorities. 
Combined with a sense of diminishing 
separation between the private and 
public sectors, governments are 
perceived to be either unable or 
unwilling to regulate the activities 
of large corporations, for example 
by closing tax loopholes. Political 
leadership is seen to be colluding 
with, or even interchangeable with, 
business leadership, as “revolving 
door” practices shape the relationship 
between business and government. 
Citizens’ view that their own voices 
are being ignored by political leaders 
is exacerbated – even apparently 
validated – by the perception that the 
wealthy enjoy privileged access to 
decision-makers.7
Technological Drivers
Technology amplifies dissatisfaction 
caused by other drivers. Social 
movements are facilitated by digital 
tools that allow the individual citizen to 
be heard and also allow rapid mass 
mobilization, cyber-activism and 
globally connected social movements 
that span traditional geographic and 
political boundaries (see Box 3.1.2). 
While voter participation rates are 
steadily declining, especially among the 
young, digital technology is providing 
new ways for people to mobilize and 
challenge existing power structures to 
articulate an alternative. This was most 
visible in the 2011 wave of youth-led 
revolts from North Africa to South 
America, but there is general evidence 
of an increase of citizens’ movements 
worldwide in the past couple of 
decades. Studies of online content 
dating from 2010 and 2012 indicate a 
positive relationship between political 
content and youth who were previously 
politically disengaged.8
Online protests, strikes, cyber activism, 
and online petitioning and boycott 
campaigns are increasing. For 
example, the online activist and petition 
network Avaaz.org grew by around 
40 million members in eight years, 
and Change.org now has 80 million 
users. Although some cynicism exists 
around “clicktivism”, which can be seen 
as merely a form of virtue signalling, 
such web-based activist organizations 
have often complemented online 
activism with offline activities,9 thereby 
amplifying their impact. As the world 
becomes more connected, mobile and 
networked, protests that might once 
have been geographically limited can 
spread ever more widely and quickly. 
Repressive Reactions Fuel Social 
Disruption
Clear arguments can be made 
for governments to oppose some 
citizen movements, such as those 
that disregard human rights.10 In 
most cases, however, many different 
perspectives on what constitutes the 
social good can be valid. To establish 
trust and ensure broadly sustainable 
development, a country’s businesses, 
citizens and government need jointly 
to elaborate a common viable national 
vision. 
Rather than looking for ways to win 
back public trust, however, many 
governments have eroded that trust 
further by responding harshly to 
protests: closing down space for civil 
society, demonizing protestors and 
harassing activists. In recent years, the 
space available for citizens’ actions 
has shrunk in many countries. The 
CIVICUS Civil Society Watch Report 
shows that core civil society freedoms 
of expression, association and peaceful 
assembly were violated to a significant 
degree in at least 96 countries during 
2014.11  
Technology is empowering 
governments as much as citizens, 
notably to employ surveillance tools on 
their own populations – and sometimes 
those of other countries. In some 
cases, governments breach their own 
laws, as with the British intelligence 
agency spying on international NGOs 
outside of proper procedures.12 
Increasingly laws are being reformed 
to legitimize data collection and cyber 
oversight, such as Canada’s Bill C-51, 
which originally called for removing 
barriers to sharing security-related 
information. 
Just as protestors are learning 
tactics from one another, anti-
protest legislation is often inspired 
by experiences in other countries. 
A growing number of governments 
have implemented similar measures 
imposing limits on peaceful assembly 
and protest, narrowing the definition 
of what is considered permissible civil 
society and media activity, banning civil 
society organizations from receiving 
foreign funds for certain activities, and 
making new registration inordinately 
complex. CIVICUS has drawn attention 
to the shrinking space for civil society 
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Box 3.1.2: Digital Government Technologies: The (Persisting) Challenges of Inclusiveness and 
Engagement 
The ability to leverage technology to improve relationships between governments and citizens depends on citizens being able to 
use that technology. In OECD countries in 2012, for instance, less than a quarter of people aged 65–74 said they interacted 
electronically (internet portals, social media) with their government, compared to more than half among the 16–24 age group on 
average across the OECD (Figure 3.1.2.1). To fully exploit the potential of digital technologies, governments should take steps to 
address existing digital divides and avoid the emergence of new forms of e-exclusion. As well as age, gaps persist in the level of 
uptake by education level and living area.
The two main reasons for e-exclusion are lack of physical access and limited technological skills. Therefore, alongside the 
development of a well-functioning digital government infrastructure, a crucial component of an effective digital government 
strategy is action to increase the population’s ICT literacy, raise awareness of existing online opportunities and boost the 
comfort and familiarity of all age groups with the use of digital channels to interact with governments. A multi-channel approach 
to service delivery, providing services by various offline (e.g. in-person contact, postal mail) and online means (e.g. websites, 
mobile-based applications) in an integrated way, is more likely to guarantee access to public services to all citizens.
Source: OECD ICT Database; Eurostat Information Society Statistics (database).
Figure 3.1.2.1: Citizens Using the Internet to Interact with Public Authorities by Age Group, 2012
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Figure X: Citizens using the Internet to interact with public authorities by age group (2012)
Governments can take further steps to use digital channels to foster engagement through the full policy-making cycle. Most 
governments still view social media as an additional tool to broadcast traditional communication messages. According to a 
recent OECD survey, fewer than one in four governments try to leverage social media for more advanced purposes such as 
transforming public service delivery or opening up public policy processes to key stakeholders.1 The 2014 OECD’s 
Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies provides principles for governments to harness new 
technologies to increase openness, transparency and inclusiveness of processes and operations, and to foster greater citizen 
engagement and empowerment. Government bodies need to identify and support businesses and citizens who can form a 
digital government ecosystem that promotes dialogue and exchange. 
One important development has been the use of Open Government Data to make public data sets available to citizens to 
enable more informed engagement, greater social accountability of government, and opportunities to create public value by 
putting information into the hands of citizens. The OECD OUR Data Index assesses governments’ efforts to implement open 
data in three critical areas – openness, usefulness and re-usability of government data.2
Notes
1 OECD 2014.
2 OECD 2015; for more on the data, see https://data.oecd.org/.
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organizations seen lately in autocratic 
regimes, emerging democracies and 
democratic countries alike. 
In combination with surveillance 
practices, such measures are creating 
a growing sense of limitation on 
citizens’ freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly. The Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 
reported that, in 2014, 50 countries 
placed restrictions on overseas funding 
for NGOs.13 The Committee to Protect 
Journalists has recorded a disturbing 
number of restrictions of press freedom 
in many countries.14 The combination 
of large commercial interests and weak 
governance can give rise to businesses 
being perceived as complicit in 
government repression of civil society 
– a perception fuelled by action against 
organizations and activists protesting 
against the activities of such large 
industries as construction, extractives 
or agribusiness.15 In Cambodia, for 
example, the government has been 
criticized for arresting and imprisoning 
campaigners against widespread land 
grabs that see subsistence farmers 
evicted from the land they farm to make 
way for large-scale industrial farms.16
In many cases, the repression of 
citizen movements reflects a profound 
uncertainty among governments and 
businesses about how to deal with the 
questioning of established societal, 
economic and political structures. 
Leaders may be unsure of what 
policies to implement, or they may 
be constrained by internal challenges 
from implementing changes in a timely 
manner; either situation can result in 
doing nothing – a response of hoping 
that protests will pass.17 However, any 
kind of failure to respond adequately 
to citizens’ demands merely adds to 
their sense of disenfranchisement from 
traditional change-making methods. 
As the rise of technology enables 
citizens to harness new connections 
and form communities that 
transcend geographical limits, a 
socially destabilizing vicious circle 
could become entrenched: growing 
expressions of anger are met with 
increasingly harsh responses by 
governments, which in turn further fuel 
citizens’ feelings of disenfranchisement 
and discontent.  
What Can Be Done? New 
Approaches and Risk-Resilience 
Strategies  
A range of innovative responses 
by governments, businesses and 
civil society organizations can build 
resilience to the risk of social instability. 
Just as new technologies are playing 
a role in driving the risk, so can they 
also be used to mitigate it, minimizing 
the frustration of individuals and 
groups by creating a transparent and 
inclusive enabling environment with 
responsive forms of governance. 
This section presents innovative and 
emerging developments that can be 
taken by three different stakeholders: 
governments, businesses and civil 
society.  
First, governments have the 
opportunity to re-empower citizens 
politically, opening up space for 
dialogue and participation, embracing 
transparency and accountability, 
and looking to enlist citizens as 
collaborators in public service.18 
Bland “participation washing” 
approaches – described as the 
attitude of listening to requests but 
not actively addressing them – are 
not enough to truly contribute to more 
stable societies. Technology-based 
innovations could offer options to 
modernize public service management 
and delivery, as happened in the 
small Spanish town of Jun, which 
increasingly administers its municipal 
services and communicates with 
citizens through Twitter.19 Equally 
importantly, the creation of a trust-
based space for multistakeholder 
partnerships represents a building 
block for effectively managing 
risks (see Innovative Response 
1) and successfully achieving 
good governance and inclusive 
development.20 The effectiveness 
of such approaches depends on 
successfully tackling e-exclusion (see 
Box 3.1.2).
Second, businesses have opportunities 
to win trust, build resilience and 
minimize the risk of disruption 
by committing to transparency, 
responsibility and higher standards 
along their supply chains in areas such 
as worker rights and environmental 
sustainability, and by collaborating with 
citizens in new ways. 
Under pressure to deliver more 
proactively and effectively on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), businesses 
are going beyond traditional and 
often-criticized CSR models to 
look for economic opportunities 
in socially and environmentally 
conscious business models based 
on innovative and people-centred 
partnership approaches (see Innovative 
Response 2). An example of the recent 
emergence of Hybrid Value Chain (HVC) 
models, representing a complete shift 
in the way businesses and civil society 
interact,21 is the Viste Tu Casa (Dress 
Your Home) programme in Colombia: 
an established tile manufacturer 
worked with the cofounder of a 
human rights organization to create 
employment for women and reach 
new clients by raising awareness of 
the hygiene benefits of tiling kitchens.22  
By leveraging the core assets of civil 
society organizations and businesses, 
HVC partnerships generate risk 
resilience and new revenue sources 
for businesses, improve the livelihoods 
of low-income populations and help 
to meet the basic human needs of 
populations with which civil society 
works. 
Third, civil society has the opportunity 
to find ways to leverage new 
technologies and collaboration models 
to strengthen social fabric; improve 
services and shared spaces; make 
socio-economic frameworks more 
cohesive and inclusive; and improve 
the ways in which stakeholders interact, 
deliberate and act.  
A source of inspiration for engaging 
and empowering citizens could be the 
“citizen science” movement, in which 
scientists have found ways to use 
digital technologies to engage citizens 
in scientific research activity. Popular 
platforms, such as Zooniverse,23 
are taking science out of labs and 
integrating hundreds of thousands 
of knowledgeable volunteers in 
collaborative, people-powered 
research. Citizen science gives 
participants a sense of belonging to 
an effort that creates positive, lasting 
change – it combines advancing 
scientific knowledge with educating 
citizens, raising awareness of issues, 
and encouraging wider participation 
in democratic debates about how 
science-related policy-making is done 
(see Innovative Response 3).
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Conclusion 
Fundamental demands are being 
expressed by people around the world, 
both as citizens and as consumers. 
Their hopes and expectations can 
potentially lead to improvements in 
governance and corporate systems, 
creating momentum to adapt new 
practices, norms and government 
policy. When other stakeholders listen, 
citizens can be enlisted to co-create the 
future they desire. That is the promise 
of the empowered citizen – but it is a 
promise that can be met only when the 
rate of transformation and innovation 
in government, business and civil 
society structures matches the rate of 
transformation in society itself. 
Three Innovative 
Responses to Encourage 
Inclusive and Stable 
Societies
When people mobilize and social 
stability is threatened, resilience 
becomes critical. In a world facing huge 
challenges, it is imperative to ensure 
that institutions, communities and 
individuals are prepared and able to 
respond to unexpected disturbances. 
The relationship between citizens, 
governments and businesses needs to 
be designed to create a more inclusive 
and stable environment. 
While recognizing that much more can 
be done in this space, the following 
pages explore three types of innovative 
response aimed at creating more 
transparent and open societies: re-
empowering individuals, introducing 
citizen-centric business innovations 
and paving the way for critical 
grassroots activism. These responses 
intend to provide a source of inspiration 
for pioneering and original ways to 
promote social inclusion and ensure 
stable societies.  
1. Innovative Finance for Social 
Outcomes 
As governments struggle to reconcile 
budgetary pressures with increased 
social demands, innovative models of 
collaboration have been put in place 
to tackle major societal challenges. 
The recent rise in impact investing 
and social impact bonds (SIBs) 
sees businesses and governments 
partnering to address pressing issues 
that prevent citizens from enjoying 
stable, equal and diverse societies. 
The SIBs funding concept is a type 
of “pay for success” model where 
financiers invest capital in public 
projects, usually aimed at measurable 
improvements in social outcomes 
for at-risk individuals, with the goal of 
reducing government spending in the 
long term.24 SIBs create a coalition of 
actors willing to share the investment 
risk to deliver projects that address 
social and environmental problems that 
might otherwise generate significant 
risks for companies, governments and 
individuals. 
SIBs have been particularly useful 
for pioneering new approaches to 
persistent and costly social ills. From 
partnering vulnerable young people 
with toddlers to mentor as a way 
to address youth unemployment 
through personal empowerment to 
tackling homelessness by providing 
accommodation,25 employment 
and medical support, SIBs have 
fundamentally shifted how social 
service programmes are structured, 
impacting both governmental 
authorities and non-profit organizations 
operating in the social sector. 
Inspirational stories abound, with the 
£5 million Peterborough SIB in the 
United Kingdom in particular heralded 
as an example of fruitful public-private 
financial collaboration.26 Launched in 
2010, the United Kingdom’s first SIB 
was designed to reduce reoffending 
among short-sentence male prisoners. 
Private investors face the upfront 
investment costs – and associated 
risks – of providing a not-for-profit 
organization with capital to carry out 
interventions. They are paid back a 
financial return by the government if 
social outcomes are improved based 
on some standard measurement; 
recently released evaluation results 
indicate that investors are on track 
to receive returns in 2016.27 The 
Peterborough project – as is often 
the case for pilots – has gone 
through alternate phases of progress 
and hindrance, while overall being 
recognized as a key test for opening 
the way to the SIBs market to come. In 
November 2015, the UK government 
expanded its commitment to SIBs 
by announcing an allocation of 
£105 million for new SIBs aimed at 
enhancing financial support for locally 
designed schemes.28
Positive quantitative results for the 
Peterborough pilot, which generated 
global attention for the SIB model, 
affirm that private investment in critical 
social service programmes can be an 
effective way not only for a vulnerable 
population to receive services but 
also for investors to diversify their 
investment portfolio to make financial 
as well as social returns.
SIBs hold substantial potential for 
many developing and emerging 
markets around the world. In India, 
an empowering girls programme 
is currently being piloted in 200 
schools.29 In Mozambique, the malaria 
performance bond has been designed 
to increase funding for malaria 
interventions over 10 years and protect 
up to 8 million people from infection.30 
Several states in Latin America are 
experimenting in this area: for example, 
the Mexican state of Jalisco has been 
working on the design of a programme 
to move single mothers out of poverty, 
while Brazilian states such as Minas 
Gerais and Cearà are exploring SIBs 
to address prison reform and improve 
school completion rates.31 The 
Israel Arab Workforce Development 
SIB, currently in the development 
stage, aims to increase employment 
opportunities for Arab citizens of Israel, 
who are expected to represent 20% of 
the state’s population by 2020.32 
Many private sector investors, however, 
still believe that SIBs entail too much 
risk for too little potential pay out. With 
this in mind, incentivized crowdfunding 
has been emerging as an option for the 
next generation of SIBs. Crowdfunding 
platforms such as Ethex, MicroGenius, 
Abundance and Trillionfund already 
have the technical profile and access to 
investors to facilitate the crowdfunding 
process and engage citizens in impact 
investing.33 
By involving people more directly 
in funding social investments, this 
crowdfunded SIBs model has an 
even greater chance of revamping 
public service delivery structures 
towards more effective and responsive 
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approaches – citizens who invest in 
the initiatives gain an incentive to raise 
public support for them, and volunteer 
their time to help them succeed. 
Rigorous, increasingly crowdfunded 
SIBs could transform government, 
putting people in charge for the benefit 
of citizens and society. 
2. Citizens beyond Consumers: 
Business Innovations for Social 
Change
Companies have developed many 
ways to give individual customers 
incentives to be loyal to their brands, 
such as reward cards or money-off 
coupons for repeat purchases. Many 
companies also see value in spending 
to position their brands as socially or 
ecologically conscious, for example by 
supporting community development 
projects. 
Technology is increasingly making 
it possible to combine these ideas, 
which enables companies to provide 
incentives for individual customers 
to perform actions that benefit the 
community or environment. This is 
a way for individual businesses to 
profit by improving brand image and 
enhancing customer loyalty, while 
at the same time contributing to 
community or environmental resilience 
and engaging consumers in their own 
sustainability policies. These win-win 
situations lead to more accountable 
and transparent practices. 
The apparel retailer Patagonia is an 
example. The company has reinforced 
its brand identity and image with a 
well-received campaign encouraging 
consumers to repair more frequently.34 
By trading the risk that customers 
might buy a bit less of their product, 
Patagonia is betting on gaining a 
bigger market share by attracting 
values-oriented buyers who want to 
shop at values-driven companies. By 
asking people to keep products longer, 
the company has made manifest its 
values and involved customers in the 
achievement (and watchdogging) of its 
own sustainability goals.
Similarly, the US-based Recyclebank 
is paving the way for environmental 
behaviour change. By recycling, its 
4.4 million members in the United 
States and the United Kingdom can 
earn discounts from over 3,000 major 
consumer brands. Sensor technology 
on recycling containers and trucks 
enables the company to track how 
much recycling households are putting 
out for curb-side collection, and reward 
community members accordingly.35
Increasingly, it will be possible to move 
beyond education, individual actions 
and pledges and to use the Internet of 
Things to reward verified behaviours. It 
is possible to imagine citizens signing 
up to have data collected by their 
appliances and utility companies. 
These data would be shared with 
consumer brands prepared to offer 
rewards for eco-friendly behaviour 
such as using less water, turning the 
thermostat down or switching off lights 
in unused rooms. Sensors could be 
fitted to a household’s cycles and cars, 
and rewards offered when data show 
that the bicycle, not the car, is being 
used during rush-hour periods.
For small and medium-sized 
enterprises, in particular, another 
emerging opportunity to win business 
by contributing to more cohesive 
and sustainable societies is offered 
by community currencies such as 
the Bristol Pound in Bristol, United 
Kingdom;36 the TradeQoin in the 
Netherlands;37 and Berkshares in 
Massachusetts, United States.38 The 
motivation behind such currencies is 
typically to encourage citizens to spend 
locally and to reward them when they 
do, thereby strengthening the local 
economy by making it more diverse 
and resilient.  
An estimated 250 community 
currencies are available at the global 
level, from Kenya and Brazil to Japan, 
with more to come.39 For local small 
and medium-sized enterprises, active 
participation in community currencies 
represents an opportunity to stay 
relevant through changing consumer 
markets and to demonstrate solidarity 
with local authorities and citizens’ 
organizations, which are typically the 
driving forces in their establishment.
Although local currencies are a less 
obvious fit for major consumer brands, 
it is possible to imagine incentives for 
environmentally conscious behaviour 
being offered to consumers in the form 
of local currency rather than discounts 
– thereby associating the brand not 
only with ecological issues but also 
with attempts to strengthen local 
communities. 
With the growth of smart technology 
and social media, behaviour-change-
focused business models will 
become more mainstream. These 
models represent a new approach 
for businesses and citizens that 
encourages dialogue and interaction 
and that strengthens a relationship 
based on collaboration, trust and 
transparency. By serving customers 
and engaging citizens – as individuals 
with specific values, ambitions and 
aspirations, regardless of their age, 
geography, education, income or social 
status – businesses can potentially 
build their brands while simultaneously 
creating positive social impact.
3. Novel Ways to Engage Citizens: 
Putting Them in Charge through 
Science
In recent years, “citizen science” has 
been gaining attention as a way to 
engage citizens in scientific activity, 
with endeavours ranging from air 
pollution assessments in Europe to 
chimpanzee counting in Tanzania. The 
proliferation of digital technologies 
has provided scientists with innovative 
ways to engage the wider public in 
science and expand resources for 
research. Similarly, it has provided 
citizens with new venues for developing 
online collaborative projects aimed at 
collecting quantitative analytical data to 
improve transparency and outcomes in 
public decision-making mechanisms.
A great many aspects of daily life 
are amenable to a citizen science 
approach because science and data 
impacts everything from the food we 
eat to the policies we try to influence. 
Although many of the highest-profile 
citizen science projects are limited to 
“crowdsourcing” – that is, to citizen 
participation in data gathering or 
monitoring exercises led by scientists 
– citizen engagement occurs on an 
ascending scale (see Figure 3.1.2). In 
recent years a number of “extreme 
citizen science” initiatives have 
emerged in which citizens take the lead 
in pursuing locally important goals by 
asking research questions, collecting 
and analysing data and using them to 
influence policy-making.40
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Source: Based on Haklay 2012.
Figure 3.1.2: Participatory Levels of Citizen Science 
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Level 4 - Extreme Citizen Science
Citizen science is more than just 
a new outlet that engages public-
spirited citizens who have an existing 
interest in science. It is increasingly 
seen as a tool that could enable 
a more participatory democracy 
by empowering individuals and 
communities to analyse, understand 
and ultimately take ownership of the 
issues that affect them, enabling them 
to propose concrete and actionable 
solutions to decision-makers.41 Citizen 
science projects have the potential to 
keep public authorities accountable, 
influence the way they spend public 
funding, and inform them about 
community priorities and needs. 
“Factivism” – evidence-based 
activism42 – can come in many 
forms. Recently, an open research 
investigation of the New South 
Wales pecuniary interests register 
for the 2013–2014 fiscal year has 
forced political figures to correct their 
disclosures of interests to the Australian 
parliament and thereby comply with 
current regulation, which requires the 
declaration of all directorships and 
shareholdings.43 In Iceland, a group 
of enthused citizen scientists parsed 
a huge database of documents and 
sentences to investigate for bias by 
assessing a potential link between the 
way judges vote and how often they 
incarcerate.44 The analysis showed 
that a particular judge suspected for 
bias with his conviction rate of 95% 
was instead within the statistical 
norm vis-à-vis all other colleagues 
of the Reykjavik district court. Other 
examples include crowd-reading of 
published oil contracts to promote 
more transparency in the extractive 
industries,45 and leveraging open 
data by re-calculating the published 
accounts of municipalities to explain 
arcane budgets more clearly to 
citizens.46 
A key citizen science initiative running 
in conjunction with the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
is the Open Seventeen Challenge, 
through which citizens can pitch 
crowdsourcing projects to tackle SDGs 
via the use of open source data.47 By 
unlocking the power of the grassroots 
efforts of citizens around the world, 
the challenge aims at identifying ideas 
and proposals to hold all stakeholders 
– including businesses, governments, 
NGOs, media and international 
organizations – accountable, while 
also delivering on the UN global 
goals. This initiative sets a precedent 
for a new way to interpret monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms, by 
entrusting citizens to play a role in these 
processes while leveraging the power 
of hyperconnectivity. 
These examples show how a citizen 
science model of grassroots activism 
can create new ways for citizens to 
engage, facilitate a wider range of lay 
participation, and enable bottom-up 
community participation. More and 
more often, fact-based debates and 
activities precede street action and 
complement conventional activism 
with increased general awareness 
and understanding of the policies and 
interests at stake. While recognizing 
the intrinsic limits of data and statistics 
(they can be “based on a firm 
foundation of wet sand”),  and the need 
for citizens to interpret them reasonably 
and accurately, citizen science is 
pushing citizens closer to deliberation 
mechanisms and decision-making 
authorities.
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3.2 Climate Change and Risks 
to Food Security 
The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC)’s Fifth 
Assessment Report reaffirmed that 
warming in the climate system is 
unequivocal and that it is “extremely 
likely” that human influence has been 
the dominant cause. The climate is 
changing already1 – and, as the World 
Bank’s Turn Down the Heat report 
explains, failure to limit warming to 2°C 
will create a high risk of that change 
becoming catastrophic.2 There is 
growing realization that failure to act, 
quickly and effectively, could reverse 
many of the advances of the 20th 
century.
Risks to Food Security: 
Analysis
The risk to food security is especially 
great because agriculture is already 
straining to meet a rapidly growing 
demand from a finite resource base. 
The combined impact of a rising 
population and growth of the middle 
class – wealthier people eat more 
cereal-intensive meat – is set to drive 
a demand increase of 60% by 2050.3 
Yet the global average yield growth for 
cereals has slowed in recent years; it 
already lags behind demand growth. 
This gap cannot be covered by an 
expansion of cropland because of 
the need to protect forests and other 
areas of high value for conservation 
and carbon sequestration. Agriculture 
is increasingly competing with other 
uses for land – such as urbanization, 
transport, bioenergy, forestry and 
mining – and so crop production is 
pushed towards ever more marginal 
soils.4 
Yet more worrying is the fierce 
competition for water, the lifeblood of 
agriculture. Water withdrawals have 
increased threefold over the last 50 
years, and demand is anticipated 
to rise by a further 40% by 2030.5 
With a shift in global production 
towards intensive systems that rely on 
groundwater resources for irrigation, 
along with the current growth in 
demand for water-intensive animal 
products, agriculture becomes even 
thirstier. At the same time, urbanization 
and industrialization in emerging and 
developing economies are also driving 
up demand for fresh water in energy 
production, mineral extraction, and 
domestic use, further stretching the 
already tight supply.6
Against this backdrop of tightening 
constraints, climate change seriously 
threatens food security in two ways. 
First, it will harm agricultural production: 
rising temperatures and changing 
rainfall patterns will slow yield gains, 
contributing to higher food prices and 
an increasingly precarious supply-
demand balance that will make 
markets more prone to volatility. 
Second, it will increasingly disrupt 
food systems: more extreme weather 
will destabilize tighter markets and 
exacerbate volatility, imperil transport 
infrastructure and trigger local 
food crises. As a result, the risks of 
humanitarian emergencies, national or 
regional instability and mass migration 
will increase. In the words of a former 
Executive Director of the World Food 
Programme, “without food, people 
have only three options. They riot, they 
emigrate, or they die.”7 The security 
implications will be felt by developing 
and developed countries alike.
Climate Impacts on Agricultural 
Production
Climate change will slow global yield 
growth because higher average 
temperatures result in shorter growing 
seasons and lower yields. Shifting 
rainfall patterns can also reduce yields 
because lower rainfall reduces soil 
moisture or increased rainfall waterlogs 
soils. Climate trends are already 
believed to be diminishing global yields 
of maize and wheat.8
As climate change gathers pace, the 
negative impacts on yields will become 
more pronounced.9 This is unlikely 
to be a steady deterioration. Yield 
responses to biophysical stresses 
are highly non-linear – once critical 
thresholds for temperature or water are 
breached, plants suffer severe damage 
and yields can fall precipitously. If 
climate change is allowed to reach 
a point where these biophysical 
thresholds are exceeded routinely, crop 
failure will become the norm.
A global temperature increase of 
4.7°C – consistent with what might be 
expected by the end of the century on 
current emissions trajectories – would 
see sharp increases in the risk of 
critical temperatures being exceeded. 
The risk of failure will vary by crop and 
location. For example, researchers 
estimate that for maize in Illinois, in 
the Midwestern United States, the 
likelihood of temperature exceeding 
a critical threshold currently has a 
recurrence interval of 1 in 100 years; 
this would increase to a 1 in 6 year 
return period. For single-variety rice in 
Jiangsu on the eastern coast of China, 
the return period would increase from 1 
in 100 years today to as often 1 in every 
4 or 5 years.10
At lower levels of warming, yield losses 
may be offset by higher concentrations 
of atmospheric carbon dioxide, 
resulting in a beneficial CO2 fertilization 
effect. However, the extent of this effect 
has recently been questioned.11 Other 
factors associated with climate change 
– such as elevated tropospheric 
ozone,12 as well as increased biotic 
stress from weeds, pests and disease 
– represent further downside risk to 
yields.13 
Some of the most severe risks are 
faced by countries or regions with high 
levels of existing poverty and food 
insecurity, which are highly dependent 
on agriculture for livelihoods. Even 
at low levels of warming, the most 
vulnerable countries will suffer serious 
impacts. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, 1.5°C of warming globally by 
the 2030s could bring a 40% loss in 
maize cropping areas. A world warmer 
by 2°C would bring unprecedented 
heat extremes in summer across 
Part 3.2 was contributed by Rob Bailey, Chatham 
House as well as Bernice Lee and Florian Reber from 
the World Economic Forum. 
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Source: WRI 2013.
Note: –50% change = half as productive in 2050 as in 2015; +100% change = twice as productive in 2050 as in 2015.
Figure 3.2.1: Projected Impacts on Crop Yields in a 3°C Warmer World
60–70% of South-East Asia. Warming 
of 4°C would likely bring increasing 
extremes in rainfall patterns in South 
Asia – up to a 30% decline in the dry 
season and a 30% increase during the 
wet season – increasing the risk of both 
flood and drought.14 
As the map in Figure 3.2.1 indicates, 
the most severe yield impacts are not 
confined to poor and food-insecure 
countries. Agricultural productivity 
is also at risk in key exporting 
breadbasket regions such as North 
America, South America, the Black 
Sea area and Australia. The same 
is true for India and China – the two 
most populous nations on Earth, both 
currently committed to self-sufficiency 
(in practice, trade neutrality) in 
cereals. Should they have to abandon 
these policies of self-sufficiency, the 
consequences will be felt globally in 
the form of tighter international markets 
and higher prices. Reducing the risk 
of climate change to crop yields will 
necessarily encompass adapting 
agriculture to new regions (Box 3.2.1).
M3.3 Climate change will depress agricultural yields in most countries by 2050 given current 
agricultural practices and crop varieties
World Development Report 2010
Source: Müller and others 2009.
Note: The figure shows the projected percentage change in yields of 11 major crops (wheat, rice, maize, millet, field pea, sugar beet, sweet potato, 
soybean, groundnut, sunflower, and rapeseed) from 2046 to 2055, compared with 1996–2005. The values are the mean of three emission scenarios 
across five global climate models, assuming no CO2 fertilization (see note 54). Large negative yield impacts are projected in many areas that are highly 
dependent on agriculture.
Several attempts have been made to 
model the impact of climate change 
on future food prices.15 The modelled 
impacts vary considerably, depending 
on the underlying model parameters, 
climate scenarios, adaptation 
responses, and data employed. 
However, in the vast majority of cases 
the models find higher prices with 
climate change than without. Taking 
the mean of nine different models all 
using the IPCC “business as usual” 
emissions pathway finds that global 
crop prices will be 20% higher in 2050 
than they would have been without 
climate change.16 These models show 
that oil seed prices typically increase 
the most under climate change (up 
to 89% above a scenario with no 
climate change), though the largest 
single climate-induced price increase 
modelled is for coarse grains, at 118% 
above the 2050 baseline.17 
Extreme Weather and Disruption of 
Food Systems 
Some of climate change’s most serious 
risks to food security arise from more 
frequent and extreme weather events 
such as droughts, heat waves and 
floods. These can trigger local food 
crises, disrupt trade infrastructure 
and have cascading systemic 
consequences – for example, crop 
failure in a major breadbasket region 
can precipitate international food price 
spikes.
Food Crises and Humanitarian 
Emergencies
Droughts or floods can have 
catastrophic localized consequences in 
regions where food insecurity is already 
high and markets do not function 
well. Recent history provides some 
tragic examples. The 2010 Pakistan 
floods, caused by a wetter monsoon 
consistent with climate change 
predictions, devastated croplands and 
led to a collapse in rural incomes and 
sharp deterioration in food security. 
One year later, a drought in East Africa 
– since linked to climate change18 – 
triggered a regional food crisis affecting 
13 million people; in war-ravaged 
Somalia, over a quarter of a million 
people died in the resulting famine.  
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Box 3.2.1: Adaptation and Its Limits 
The adaptation of agriculture is critical to reduce the risk climate change poses to food systems. A number of strategies and 
technologies have emerged to increase resiliency in individual livelihoods and the systems supporting agricultural value chains. 
These can be exercised at the farm level through techniques such as changing the cropping calendar, breeding plants that 
have increased tolerance to extreme conditions, or shifting crop production to new regions – however, such approaches are 
not without their challenges. Plant breeding takes time and is ultimately subject to biophysical limits that exhibit little genetic 
variation within or across crops; it is hard to selectively breed for tolerance to extremes. In addition, the limited availability of 
suitable land means crop production cannot always migrate as desired (for example, the poor quality of soils to the north of 
Russia’s wheat crop means production cannot simply track northwards as temperatures rise). 
Therefore adaptation is also critical at the landscape level through economically viable strategies that protect biodiversity and 
enhance land and forest management. Market systems have a critical role to play too, especially through products such as 
index-based weather insurance or information systems. Finally, enabling policies for the careful management and use of food 
reserves, early warning systems, open trade arrangements and price stabilization can help address volatility in the system.
Distribution and Transport 
Infrastructure
Extreme weather events pose a risk not 
only to the production of crops but also 
to the distribution of globally traded 
supply. Critical transport infrastructure 
in many of the world’s largest cereal 
exporters is increasingly at risk of 
disruption from acute and chronic 
climate stresses.19
In July 2012, for example, Russia’s 
Black Sea ports were struck by flash 
floods, damaging key grain export 
infrastructure and interrupting trade in a 
year when drought had already brought 
a 25% drop in production.20 In the 
United States, the ageing network of 
locks and dams along the Mississippi 
River – a key artery for wheat, maize 
and soybean exports – has struggled 
to cope with rainfall extremes: in 2011, 
flooding led to delays in barge traffic 
and rerouting of freight via road and 
rail; the following year a severe drought 
saw water levels fall to levels that were 
almost unnavigable.21 More frequent 
heatwaves and floods are also exerting 
increasing stress on the country’s 
railways and roads.22 If sea levels rise 
by 4 feet by 2100 as projected in recent 
climate models,23 around two-thirds of 
port facilities along the US Gulf Coast – 
out of which 20% of the world’s maize 
and soy exports are shipped24 – will be 
at risk of water damage or inundation.25
Damage to port infrastructure following 
an extreme climate event further 
exacerbates disaster situations, 
hindering the delivery of critical food 
supplies to affected populations and 
limiting the rate of economic recovery 
in the longer term. When Cyclone Pam 
hit Vanuatu in March 2015, maritime 
services to the islands were interrupted 
for 10 days and 80% of the country’s 
roads were blocked by debris.26
 
Preparedness for disruption to 
transport infrastructure along food 
supply chains is often low. Climate 
proofing transport infrastructure 
brings higher maintenance costs 
while diverting investment away from 
the expansion of network capacity.27 
Yet as competition for capacity 
heightens, and just-in-time business 
models favour cost-efficiency over 
system redundancies,28 the potential 
impact of climate events on transport 
infrastructure will rise, signalling an ever 
more severe risk to food security in 
import-dependent regions. 
Systemic Crises
Although developed economies may 
be largely untroubled by food price 
spikes, they are vulnerable to knock-
on effects – such as instability and 
migration – arising from the impacts of 
price spikes in less resilient countries. 
Recent years have witnessed a series 
of spikes in international cereal market 
prices triggered by extreme weather 
since linked to climate change – most 
notably the 2010 Russian heatwave 
and 2012 US Midwest drought.29 Price 
rises can be amplified if governments 
prioritize domestic food security at 
the expense of global food security 
by panic-buying, hoarding and 
unilateral export controls. In 2008, 
international cereal markets reached 
a crisis point when 40 governments 
imposed export restrictions on their 
agriculture sectors in a vicious circle of 
collapsing confidence and escalating 
prices.30 Global governance was 
found wanting: while trade rules exist 
to limit restrictions on imports, there is 
nothing comparable to prevent limits on 
exports.
Once again, the poorest countries are 
most at risk. The 2008 crisis meant 
33 net food-importing developing 
countries saw an increase in their 
total food import bill of 0.8% of GDP, 
contributing to deteriorations in the 
balance of payments and inflation.31 
Because of a high reliance on 
unprocessed staples, the poorest 
households are particularly exposed 
to rises in primary commodity prices. 
The World Bank estimates that the 
2008 crisis put 100 million more people 
into poverty globally.32 Among these 
households, food expenditures may 
account for more than half of income, 
leaving families in a very difficult 
situation if prices spike.
High food prices in turn increase the 
risk of riots and instability, particularly 
in countries that are politically fragile.33 
During the 2008 food crisis, protests 
erupted in 61 countries and riots 
in 23.34 Such events can lead to 
cascading risks that move rapidly 
through markets and polities with 
near- and long-term consequences. 
The spike in international wheat prices 
after the 2010 Russian heatwave was 
felt keenly in North Africa – the largest 
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wheat-importing region in the world 
– where the price of bread was the 
subject of initial protests that became 
the 2011 Arab Spring. 
In the same year, a prolonged drought 
in Syria – since linked to climate change 
– contributed to rural-urban migration 
that heightened tensions in the nation’s 
cities before conflict erupted, leading 
to a civil war that remains in progress.35 
The long-term consequences of the 
sequence of events, beginning with 
extreme weather and ending with the 
Arab Spring and Syrian civil war, are still 
playing out through ongoing conflict, 
mass migration and increased risk of 
terrorism.
Droughts, floods and heatwaves will 
become increasingly severe as climate 
change accelerates. Extreme El Niño 
events, which can wreak havoc with 
harvests in breadbaskets and food 
insecure regions alike, are expected 
to become more common.36 The risk 
of production shocks with systemic 
consequences is increasing, with 
profound implications for the stability of 
international markets: one recent study 
found that what would have been a 
1-in-100 year global production shock 
over the second half of the 20th century 
may have become a 1-in-30 year 
event by 2050 – a more than threefold 
increase in risk.37 A double breadbasket 
failure, in which two critical harvests are 
lost, now represents a plausible worst-
case scenario that could precipitate 
a systemic crisis of unprecedented 
magnitude.38
 
Conclusions 
Climate change presents a profound 
threat to food security because 
biophysical stresses mean it will 
become increasingly difficult for 
agriculture to meet demand, and 
more extreme weather increases the 
risk of both local and systemic food 
crises. The poorest countries are 
most vulnerable, but crop failures in 
systemically important production 
regions will have global consequences 
that may extend beyond food systems.
Box 3.2.2: Reducing Food Waste  
Current estimates suggest around one-third of all food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted along the food 
value chain, with a direct economic cost of US$750 billion per year. Excluding land-use change, the annual emissions 
footprint of food produced but not consumed is around 3.3 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), more than 
the total national emissions of India; the land requirement is almost 1.4 billion hectares, close to 30% of the world’s 
agricultural land area; and the blue water (surface and groundwater) consumption is approximately 250 cubic kilometres, 
three times the volume of Lake Geneva.1
Approximately half of this volume (54%) is lost in upstream processes including agricultural production (a third of the total 
alone) and post-harvest handling and storage; the other half (46%) is wasted in downstream activities such as processing, 
distribution, and consumption. Consumption wastage is much higher in high- and middle-income regions (31–39% of total 
losses) than in low-income regions (4–16%). Significant low-income losses at the post-harvest stage result from a lack of 
adequate infrastructure to prevent spoiling.2 
Compounding the problem of direct losses are wasteful, or resource-inefficient, forms of food production: grain-fed 
livestock production, for example, results in significant losses of edible calories along the food chain from those available 
from plants to those ultimately consumed by humans. This inefficiency is expected to become increasingly significant as a 
growing global middle class consumes more meat. 
The cost of food wastage is significant not only in economic terms, but also for current and future resource and food 
security. Addressing food wastage offers significant potential to alleviate pressures on natural resources and the tightening 
balance of supply and demand: it is estimated that halving the current rate of wastage could meet over a fifth of caloric 
needs by 2050,3 reducing required cropland by 14% and agricultural greenhouse gas emissions by 22–28% (saving 
approximately 4.5 GtCO2e per year) relative to the counterfactual of no reduction in food wastage.4
Currently the environmental costs of food waste are externalized and the market incentives to reduce waste are minimal. 
Maintaining supply chains that deliver year-round uninterrupted supplies of produce are inherently wasteful because 
retailers depend on over-ordering and suppliers on over-producing. But currently the economic benefits of this model 
outweigh the costs. Exacting retail quality and presentation standards, consumer expectations, and legislation governing 
food re-use all exacerbate the problem by rejecting perfectly edible but non-aesthetically pleasing produce. Minimizing 
waste will therefore require technical innovations, legislative reform, and a recalibration of consumer expectations.5
 
Notes
1 FAO 2013.
2 FAO 2013.
3 Lipinski et al. 2013.
4 Bajželj et al. 2014.
5 FAO 2014.
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Trade will be critical to managing 
short-term production shortfalls and 
matching long-term changes in supply 
and demand as the impacts of climate 
change on production accelerate 
and demand for food increases in 
developing countries. However, 
as markets become increasingly 
vulnerable to destabilizing production 
shocks in breadbasket regions, they 
will become a source of risk as well as 
a means of managing risk.
Adaptation of agriculture is a priority 
for both public and private sectors, 
but it is not a panacea (see Box 3.2.1). 
Agriculture is only one part of the global 
food system. Transport infrastructure 
must also be climate-proofed. System 
resilience requires new rules to militate 
against export controls and may 
necessitate efficiency trade-offs such 
as increased strategic storage.
More fundamentally, there are limits 
to what agricultural adaptation can 
achieve and significant uncertainty 
about where, and when, these limits 
will be reached. The longer climate 
change continues, the more likely 
it is that these limits will be found. 
According to the IPCC, “there may 
be a threshold of global warming 
beyond which current agricultural 
practices can no longer support 
large human civilizations.”39 Without 
ambitious, determined action to reduce 
emissions and contain climate change 
at manageable levels, long-term food 
security cannot be guaranteed.
Spheres of Action to 
Mitigate the Climate Risk 
on Food Security
This section addresses three spheres 
in which action can be taken. These 
include the use of big data to boost the 
efficiency and specificity of climate-risk 
information; the provision of insurance 
innovations that can reduce risk to 
small farmers, who are an essential 
and fundamental aspect of agricultural 
success; and the incentivization 
of climate-resilient, low-carbon 
investments.
1. Big Data and Improved Climate-
Risk Information Services
Timely, accessible and actionable 
climate and weather information 
enables farmers, communities and 
local authorities to identify their specific 
vulnerabilities to climate variability and 
to develop response strategies. This 
information is also key to any design 
of the kind of efficient and effective 
insurance schemes further explored 
below, which could help reduce 
exposure to economic losses.
Tailored information is critical, given the 
complexity and geographic specificity 
of climate change impacts. One 
example is high-resolution topographic 
data, which will be made available by 
the US Geological Survey following 
a White House announcement last 
September. The data, generated from 
NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography 
Mission (SRTM) in 2000, previously 
covered only the United States; it 
is now also available for Africa, and 
next year will expand to include Latin 
America and the Caribbean. This kind 
of topographic data could greatly 
enhance agricultural planning for 
drought, glacial retreat, inland flooding, 
landslides and coastal storm surges.40 
However, enhanced information alone 
is not enough. Equally essential is the 
capability to model potential impacts on 
interconnected environmental, social 
and economic systems if vulnerable 
communities are to develop the better 
capacities and integrated policies 
needed for long-term resilience. It 
is challenging, however, to develop 
actionable information from a large 
range of data gathered from different 
sources. Data are mostly insufficient 
to meet the information needs for 
evidence-based climate adaptation, 
especially in vulnerable developing 
regions that have large agricultural 
sectors exposed to increased climate 
risk.
Consequently, attention is increasingly 
turning towards broad-based 
partnerships that bring together 
information services, policy resources, 
technological and modelling skills 
and capacity building and training. 
Many of these partnerships cut across 
public and private sectors to leverage 
increased data analysis and modelling 
capabilities. For example:
– For many least-developed 
countries and small island 
developing states, improved 
early-warning systems for natural 
disasters are a key enabler of 
sustained and climate-resilient 
growth and development. 
Responding to that need, the 
government of France proposed at 
the Third UN World Conference on 
Disaster Risk Reduction in March 
2015 in Sendai, Japan, to mobilize 
the international community to 
improve the climate resiliency of 
vulnerable countries, namely Small 
Island Development States and 
Least Developed Countries. During 
the COP21 meetings in Paris, 
the Climate Risk Early Warning 
Systems (CREWS) initiative 
was officially launched by the 
governments of Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. Collectively, 
the six countries pledged over 
US$80 million to scale up improved 
climate-risk early warning systems 
across 80 countries. 
 
– UN Pulse is the response to a call 
from the United Nations’ High-
Level Panel on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda for data 
to “improve accountability and 
decision-making, and to meet 
the challenges of measuring 
sustainable development 
progress.”41 Labs in New York, 
Jakarta and Kampala are 
bringing together government, 
UN agencies, academia and the 
private sector to pioneer new 
approaches to using big data for 
development.
 
– The Climate Services for 
Resilient Development 
Partnership was launched by 
the United States during the 
Climate Summit in partnership 
with the United Kingdom, the 
Asian Development Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, 
Google, the Skoll Global Threats 
Fund, the American Red Cross, 
and the GIS software company 
Environmental Systems Research 
Institute (ESRI).
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– The World Resources Institute 
developed Global Forest Watch 
is an online system to monitor 
forests and provide information to 
improve their management (see 
http://www.globalforestwatch.org/
about/awards_and_testimonials). 
It combines satellite data 
with modern mapping and 
information and communication 
technologies to enable a new kind 
of environmental monitoring and 
decision-support tools.
 
– A partnership between Google and 
the Brazilian environmental NGO 
Imazon, Google Earth Engine 
integrates satellite measurements 
dating back decades with other 
data feeds such as weather 
information to map changes such 
as deforestation in remote areas. 
Future applications will enable 
monitoring of sea ice change and 
illegal fishing.
 
– IBM’s Insight Cloud Service, a 
partnership with Twitter and the 
Weather Company, combines 
open data with private data to 
produce analytics enabling, for 
example, insurance companies to 
issue weather warnings to policy-
holders.
Such programmes illustrate how large-
scale collaborative efforts that leverage 
large data sets, scientific modelling, 
computational power and capacity-
building programmes can improve local 
decision-making to increase resilience 
and reduce exposure to important food 
security-related risks.
 
2. Reducing Economic Exposure 
through Insurance Innovations
Crop insurance schemes do not 
always deliver sufficient protection 
for small farmers against potential 
losses – either because they are too 
expensive for low-income smallholder 
farmers or because they provide 
perverse incentives that discourage 
policy-holders from investing in crop 
productivity. International aid for 
disaster relief financing has often 
proved to be slow, ad hoc and 
expensive. Innovative climate-informed 
insurance schemes can help to 
address the shortcomings in these two 
models, efficiently reducing exposure 
to economic losses and thereby food 
insecurity.
Robust and affordable weather 
insurance depends on the availability of 
accurate data, together with improved 
capabilities to forecast weather 
variability and extreme events such 
as droughts. Today a combination of 
data provided by weather stations with 
remote sensing and satellite imagery 
are helping scale innovative insurance 
schemes across developing countries.
Weather index insurance schemes, 
also known as “index-based financial 
risk-transfer mechanisms”, pay 
out based on weather rather than 
crop losses. They use an index of 
productivity-relevant weather variables 
such as precipitation onset and 
intensity, streamflow and temperature: 
the insurance pays out, for example, if 
measured rainfall falls below a specified 
level.
One advantage of weather index 
insurance is that it removes the need 
for expensive field visits to assess crop 
damage, reducing costs and improving 
accessibility of insurance for low-
income smallholder farmers. Having 
such insurance coverage can create a 
virtuous circle: it often is a necessary 
condition for accessing bank loans or 
other credit, which in turn can be used 
to invest in improved agricultural inputs 
for increased productivity and reduced 
risk exposure. Weather index insurance 
schemes also remove the possibility of 
poorly designed crop failure insurance 
schemes that effectively incentivize 
farmers to allow crops to fail.
With nearly two-thirds of its population 
working in agriculture – 80% as 
smallholder farmers – Sub-Saharan 
Africa is especially vulnerable to food 
insecurity caused by droughts and 
temperature rises. World Bank data 
suggest that Sub-Saharan countries 
will need between US$14 billion and 
US$17 billion per year from 2010 to 
2050 to adapt to climate change.42 
The Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) is 
an innovative African Union initiative, 
launched in 2014, to help close the 
financing gap by improving insurance 
for climate-related risks.
ARC combines several risk transfer 
mechanisms to reduce the cost 
of insurance while increasing its 
effectiveness. For example, because 
not all parts of the continent will be 
affected by drought at the same 
time, by pooling drought risk across 
all member countries ARC can 
reduce individual premiums paid 
by governments by up to 50%. To 
be eligible for insurance through 
ARC, governments have to develop 
evidence-based contingency plans.
In addition to regular ARC insurance 
schemes covering the costs for 
immediate responses to weather 
disasters, the ARC Extreme Climate 
Facility will issue data-based climate 
change catastrophe risk bonds to 
participating countries.43 These bonds 
are structured as concessional finance 
that must be used to reduce risk 
exposure and vulnerability. This not 
only provides countries with incentives 
to invest in climate-smart agriculture, 
but also improves long-term planning 
and reduces investment risks for the 
private sector. By blending public and 
private finance, ARC hopes to generate 
over US$1 billion in additional finance 
over the next 30 years.
3. Financial System Shift to Unleash 
Climate-Resilient, Low-Carbon 
Investments
Effectively tackling climate-induced 
risks will require new ways to incentivize 
climate-smart investment. Despite 
increasing recognition of the economic 
risks, global financial systems are 
yet to incorporate them into financial 
decision-making. Finding ways to 
adapt established risk assessment 
analytics, models and reporting 
frameworks could unleash larger flows 
of capital towards climate-friendlier 
investments.
For many executives and boards of 
directors, climate risks seem less 
immediate than other issues. Even 
where Environment, Social and 
Corporate Governance (ESG) data 
are disclosed, investors often remain 
unaware of the severity of the threat: 
these data tend to be appended in an 
annex rather than integrated into core 
financial statements, and they do not 
make clear the materiality of specific 
climate and regulatory risks. The sheer 
number of ESG criteria is a barrier 
to comparability and identification of 
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material risk. Most analysts do not take 
opportunities such as earnings calls to 
raise questions on material climate risk.
Finding ways to factor climate and 
regulatory risks into short-term 
decision-making processes and related 
financial metrics is essential for driving 
climate risk–informed investments. This 
requires not only using better, forward-
looking data and metrics, but also 
mainstreaming these elements in core 
financial processes and indicators. One 
major step in that direction is the recent 
announcement of Mark Carney, the 
Governor of the Bank of England and 
Chair of the G20’s Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), for the FSB to support 
global efforts for voluntary standardized 
reporting on financial risks associated 
with climate change.
Corporate commitments and domestic 
regulatory reform can also be important 
drivers of change. At the COP21 in 
Paris a number of new corporate 
commitments to decarbonize 
portfolios, issue green bonds, or 
support more robust carbon pricing 
were made. They send important 
signals to the broader business and 
investment communities and help 
to win the trust of governments in 
corporate support for improved 
climate-friendly regulations. China’s 
Green Credit Policy, launched in 2007, 
is an example of how regulators can 
tip markets towards more sustainable 
investment.
Understanding how regulatory reform 
across sectors can help align financial 
markets with sustainable development 
is the objective of the United Nations 
Environment Programme’s Inquiry 
into the Design of a Sustainable 
Financial System. Other recently 
launched initiatives seek to align 
various aspects of the financial markets 
with climate-associated financial risk 
and sustainable development:
– The AR!SE Initiative (Private 
Sector Alliance for Disaster 
Resilient Societies), a global effort 
led by the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), 
aims to provide a new vehicle for 
collaboration between the private 
and public sectors that can unlock 
enormous potential at the local, 
national, regional and global levels 
to contribute to achieving the 
outcome, goals and targets of the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015–2030.44 
By engaging and expanding 
the number of private sector 
organizations and others involved 
in supporting the implementation of 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster, 
AR!SE will provide a robust and 
effective mechanism to allow 
the private sector to implement 
tangible projects and initiatives 
that deliver results critical to the 
achievement of the outcome and 
goal of the Sendai Framework.45
– The Investor Confidence 
Project, led by the Environmental 
Defense Fund, seeks to create a 
marketplace for energy efficiency 
by standardizing energy efficiency 
protocols. Standards are an 
important enabler for growing 
investments in emerging industries 
because they provide the 
transparency, comparability and 
security required by underwriters 
and investors. Retrofitting buildings 
to be more energy efficient is 
one example where lack of 
standardization is a barrier to 
scaling up investment, despite the 
clear economic benefits.
– The Banking Environment 
Initiative (comprising Barclays, 
BNP Parisbas, BNY Mellon, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, 
Lloyds Banking Group, Northern 
Trust, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), Santander, SMBC, 
Standard Chartered, Westpac) 
has led the development of new 
trade finance instruments, such 
as Sustainable Shipment Letter 
of Credits, intended to incentivize 
sustainable land use and to 
preserve forests when working in 
developing tropical nations.
– The 1-in-100 Initiative seeks 
to stimulate and reward 
climate-resilient investment 
through collaboration involving 
insurance companies, regulators, 
scientists, modellers, accounting 
professionals, investors and 
other stakeholders. The initiative 
focuses on adapting lessons 
from the insurance industry about 
how regulatory reform for capital 
requirements and accounting 
procedures can be applied to other 
economic sectors to increase the 
resilience of balance sheets to 
climate shocks, while increasing 
the transparency of a company’s 
exposure to climate risk.
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3.3 Global Disease Outbreaks
 
Risk of Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks: Analysis
The recent Ebola crisis will not be the 
last serious epidemic the world faces; 
indeed, public health outbreaks are 
likely to become ever more complex 
and challenging. Despite progress in 
some aspects of public health over the 
past two decades, endemic infectious 
diseases remain a major problem, and 
new or resurging infections, the spread 
of drug resistance and the rise in 
non-communicable diseases all pose 
enormous challenges to often fragile 
health systems.1
Infectious diseases, which are 
among the leading causes of death 
worldwide, do not confine themselves 
to national borders. Their capacity to 
spread rapidly across geographies 
– jeopardizing social and economic 
security as well as challenging human 
health and well-being – is amplified by 
ever-growing globalization, increased 
trade and travel, the rise in urbanization, 
and changes in the environment, 
behaviour and society. Some threats, 
such as influenza, are known. Others 
are not. Unknown just a few decades 
ago, HIV/AIDS has killed more than 30 
million people from all socio-economic 
backgrounds. What might be the 
next HIV/AIDS, and are we sufficiently 
prepared for its arrival?
At the same time, new opportunities 
to predict, prevent, detect and 
treat diseases are emerging from a 
better understanding of the social 
determinants of health and from trends 
including new technologies in real-time 
diagnosis, data analysis (including 
in the field of genomics), biomedical 
research, the internet and mobile data 
and communications, often developed 
outside the traditional health sector. 
More innovative ideas, partnerships, 
and ways of working and financing will 
be critical for containing the dynamic 
threat of outbreaks in the 21st century. 
Causes for Concern 
By 2050, the world’s population will 
have risen to 9.7 billion.2 Cities will 
become increasingly dense and shanty 
towns – with inadequate housing and 
a lack of basic services such as water, 
sewerage and waste management 
– will swell. A combination of high 
population density, poverty, changes 
in social structures, and a lack 
of public health infrastructure will 
create progressively more favourable 
conditions for communicable diseases. 
Meanwhile the increasing transnational 
flow of commodities, people and 
animals coupled with increased spatial 
density will magnify the transmission 
of these diseases, both between 
people and across the human-animal 
barrier.3 Most large cities have airports 
through which millions of passengers 
travel: over 2 billion global passengers 
travelled annually by air in the first 
decade of the 21st century, compared 
with just 68.5 million in the 1950s.4 
Continued growth in the movement 
of people and commodities between 
urban centres intensifies the risk 
of infectious transmissions across 
geographies and diminishes the ability 
to respond to, and effectively prepare 
for, a global disease outbreak.
A recent study led by the University 
of Cambridge identified 20 known 
infectious diseases that have re-
emerged or spread geographically, 
including dengue, chikungunya, 
typhoid, West Nile, artemisinin-
resistant malaria and the plague.5 Other 
known threats – such as influenza 
(i.e. H1N1 Swine Flu), MERS-Cov, 
and Ebola – continue to raise fears, 
especially when they take hold in 
densely populated areas and when 
treatment and prevention measures 
are not necessarily available. Even 
when known infectious diseases can 
be mitigated by existing treatments or 
vaccines, we face the risk of emerging 
resistant strains, mutating viruses, or 
a pandemic that is so large it renders 
response supplies inadequate.
Advances in research and the 
discovery of diagnostics, drugs and 
vaccines have saved millions of lives, 
but these gains remain very fragile 
and are under threat from the growing 
resistance of microorganisms to the 
most effective known medicines. The 
number of deaths in the European 
Union and the United States as a 
direct result of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria is increasing every year, 
and the burden in low- and middle-
income countries is much higher.6 
The emergence and spread of strains 
of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria that 
have evolved resistance to current 
medicines are of particular concern, 
as they could overturn much of the 
progress made against these diseases 
in recent years. An independent review, 
funded by the Wellcome Trust and 
the UK government, estimates that 
by 2050, if no action is taken, these 
drug-resistant strains could cost an 
additional 10 million lives each year and 
around US$100 trillion in lost output; 
approximately the equivalent of losing 
the UK economy from global output 
every year.7
Infectious diseases that are not 
currently on the radar are also a cause 
for concern. The greatest potential 
threats among unknown pathogens 
are those that spread easily – through 
the air, for instance – and to which 
humans have little or no immunity. The 
2002–2003 SARS pandemic provides 
one recent case study: ultimately 
governments, businesses and people 
came together to overcome the 
outbreak, although not before it had 
caused nearly 8,000 infections and 800 
deaths across 29 countries.8 The death 
toll would have been much higher had 
the virus been more easily spread: 
infectious disease experts believe that 
if SARS had been more contagious, it 
could have become one of the worst 
pandemics since the 1918 influenza 
outbreak that killed 50 million people.9
The SARS crisis demonstrates the 
socially destabilizing potential of 
unfamiliar new diseases. As affected 
Part 3.3 was contributed by Jeremy Farrar, The 
Wellcome Trust, Stéphanie Cristin, World Economic 
Forum and Priya Basu, The World Bank. 
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areas came to a standstill, in cities 
such as Beijing, Singapore and Toronto 
people stayed home, public places 
emptied and health workers were 
shunned.10 Next time an unfamiliar 
disease causes panic, there is no 
guarantee that it will occur in a 
geography where effective solutions 
can be initiated as quickly as in this 
instance. Furthermore, the risk posed 
by the immediate effects of outbreaks 
must not minimize the long-lasting 
effects on society as a whole. The 
recent Ebola crisis in West Africa 
points to the intensified nature of the 
risk and its heightened complexity 
in places where health systems are 
vulnerable and lack diagnostic or 
response measures. Over the course 
of the crisis, more than 11,000 people 
died and more than 16,000 children 
were orphaned.11 Basic health services 
such as prenatal consultations, routine 
vaccinations, antiretroviral therapies 
and treatment of endemic diseases 
in the region were sharply reduced. 
As stigma rose, schools closed while 
growing distrust and fear shifted 
community interactions. The hours of 
schooling lost, the reconfiguration of 
families, and decreased food security 
and employment, to name only a few of 
the epidemic’s effects, will impact the 
affected region well beyond the halt of 
the outbreak.12
Economic Risks
Beyond direct effects on health, 
infectious diseases impose significant 
economic costs. Adding to the direct 
costs borne by sufferers and their 
households, infectious diseases – 
particularly those that are relatively fast-
spreading or poorly understood by the 
general population – have an additional 
economic impact through a response 
called “aversion behaviour”. This was 
demonstrated when Singapore came 
to an economic standstill over SARS, 
as well as in responses to Ebola in 2014 
and HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s.
Aversion behaviour includes actions 
taken by individuals to avoid any 
exposure to the illness, as well as 
actions taken by investors as they 
anticipate those individual decisions.13 
Even individuals who have no direct 
contact with the disease will take a 
range of actions to avoid any risk of 
contracting the disease. As shown 
by the recent Ebola outbreak, these 
reactions can be rational or they can 
dramatically overestimate risk, leading 
to a wide variety of factors that can 
negatively impact the economy, from 
stress to labour and supply scarcity, 
financial market instability, and price 
increases.
The economic impact of aversion 
behaviour may be significantly greater 
than the direct economic impact from 
sickness and death. In the Ebola crisis, 
the loss of life in Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone was accompanied by 
the closure of businesses, dramatic 
reductions in travel and tourism, 
and trade slowing to a trickle. At the 
beginning of 2014, expected economic 
growth for the year was 5.9% in Liberia, 
11.3% in Sierra Leone and 4.5% in 
Guinea. By the end of the year, actual 
growth was only 2.2% in Liberia and 
4.0% in Sierra Leone, while in Guinea 
the economy shrank.14 In Liberia, more 
than 70% of households reported 
having insufficient money to buy 
food.15 The adverse impacts were not 
restricted to countries that experienced 
cases of Ebola: Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire and the Gambia all experienced 
adverse impacts on GDP.16 For 2015, 
the World Bank estimated a potential 
loss in GDP of more than US$1.6 billion 
in the three most affected countries, 
and more than US$500 million across 
the rest of the continent.
Any fears about an inability to 
contain a major epidemic will have 
economic effects outside the affected 
areas because of the increasingly 
interconnected nature of the global 
economy. The economic impact of 
the Ebola epidemic could have been 
much worse: at its height, the most 
pessimistic epidemiological projections 
of how the disease could spread, 
combined with economic modelling, 
suggested a potential impact of tens 
of billions of dollars in West Africa 
alone.17 During the SARS outbreak in 
2003, estimates of the potential impact 
ranged from US$30 billion to US$100 
billion. In the case of SARS, too, the 
actual impact was likely lower because 
the epidemic was contained – but the 
economic damage was still significant.18
Challenges in Containing the Risks
To know where to channel resources 
most effectively, stakeholders face 
the challenges of preparing for 
and responding to known threats 
and anticipating the source of new 
ones. The lack of adequate, resilient 
public health surveillance systems, 
infrastructure to effectively deploy 
resources and a health workforce to 
provide accessible, quality care where 
needed leaves us vulnerable to regional 
and global spread. Many emerging 
infections and antibiotic-resistant 
strains of common diseases originate 
in one location and then disseminate to 
new places at often alarming speeds: 
societies are only as strong as the most 
fragile health system (see Initiative 1).
Preparedness and response measures 
must therefore address three key 
areas: behaviour; diagnostic, drug and 
vaccine research and development 
(R&D); and regulatory and financial 
environments.
Behaviour
The multifactorial nature of broader 
global health issues poses an 
enormous challenge to all stakeholders 
– governments, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), industry and 
citizens. Changing demographics, 
climate change, urbanization, travel, 
political instability, war and terrorism 
are only a few of the factors challenging 
our preparedness for and response 
to endemic and emerging infections 
and the spread of non-communicable 
diseases.
There is an urgent need for society 
to value and invest more in evidence-
informed public health strategies. 
Despite major advances in the global 
economy over the past 50 years, 
millions of people worldwide still cannot 
access basic needs, such as improved 
tap water and toilets.
Even with political interventions to 
provide the necessary infrastructure, 
halting the spread of infectious 
diseases will require addressing 
individual and collective human 
behaviours. Proper prevention 
and responsible, fact-based 
crisis communication, including 
educational campaigns and behaviour 
change strategies to facilitate the 
long-term adoption of health-
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maintaining behaviours, need to be 
carefully designed, field-tested and 
implemented (see Box 3.3.1).
Understanding the social and cultural 
contexts that may contribute to 
epidemics, such as burial practices 
or misconceptions about how a 
disease is transmitted, is also critical. 
To increase trust in evidence-based 
medical interventions, it is essential to 
gain insight into cultural sensitivities 
and work in partnership with local 
communities.
Diagnostic, Drug and Vaccine 
Research and Development
It can take 20–30 years to develop a 
new drug or vaccine, and the costs 
and risks are high. R&D efforts are not 
coordinated to achieve their greatest 
impact: the current model prioritizes 
the development of profitable products 
that can generate maximum sales, 
usually through volume rather than 
benefits, instead of focusing on unmet 
public health priorities. There is a lack 
of mechanisms that incentivize and 
stimulate the development of novel 
Box 3.3.1: Health Communication 
Health communication often receives less attention and fewer resources than 
medical, scientific or policy areas. However, failure to convey the right information 
risks costly consequences at the individual and societal levels. In a crisis situation, 
panic can spread quickly and the way communication is handled can either cost 
or save lives. Models that combine thinking from theories of complex systems, 
crowd dynamics, group psychology and information are being used to assess the 
impact and effectiveness of mass communication in the event of a major health 
outbreak.
Prevention is another area in which communication must be handled with care. For 
decades, governing bodies have considered that simply providing the most 
accurate information to people was the best way to improve public health 
prevention. However, evidence for this approach has not been encouraging – 
messages on the dangers of smoking, for example, have had relatively little effect 
on behaviour. As understanding grows about the circumstances in which 
individuals do not make rational choices, a more subtle form of prevention is 
getting momentum. As well as providing information, this involves “nudges” – 
evidence-informed strategies that, rather than forced compliance, encourage the 
adoption of behaviours and habits that are good for people and social groups.
The incentives employed are not necessarily monetary; they could be compliance 
with social norms or aversion to risk, drawing on insights from behavioural 
economics, psychology, anthropology and neuroscience. After the British 
government led the way in the late 2000s, many countries have set up behavioural 
insight units that have led to significant improvement in the effectiveness of public 
health prevention. On 15 September 2015, President Obama signed an executive 
order to further the use of behavioural insights in improving policy-making.
diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines and 
compliance with treatments.19
The recent Ebola outbreak arguably 
illustrates the human cost of the 
current development model in the 
face of potential public health threats. 
Recent tests on an Ebola vaccine in 
Guinea seem to show that it provides 
remarkable and immediate protection; 
however, the same vaccine had 
been tested on monkeys a decade 
ago, but subsequently languished in 
scientific limbo (see Box 3.3.2).20 Had 
resources been devoted to following 
through earlier, the development of a 
vaccine could have been accelerated, 
potentially saving many of the 11,000 
casualties.
Regulatory and Financial Environments
Despite the progress that has been 
made in the last two decades, more 
needs to be done to create enabling 
regulatory environments. Development 
of the aforementioned Ebola vaccine, 
for example, could conceivably have 
been accelerated more quickly as the 
epidemic took hold, but a number 
of barriers hindered the ability to 
expedite clinical trials. Mobile data is 
another area where regulations on 
privacy need to be balanced with 
public health imperatives, as it has 
increasing potential to track the spread 
of epidemics (see Initiative 3).
The sluggishness of progress towards 
a regulatory environment specifically 
targeted to epidemic crisis situations 
is a matter of growing international 
concern. This work needs to be 
coordinated by an empowered and 
properly funded global health body: 
the World Health Organization (WHO). 
A collaborative framework exists – 
the International Health Regulations, 
originally created in 1969 to contain 
cholera, smallpox, yellow fever and the 
plague, and since expanded to cover 
more diseases – but it does not provide 
adequate reassurance that countries 
are putting in place what is needed to 
prepare for, and respond to, emerging 
crises.
Countries need to be empowered to 
allow a timely and robust response so 
they can request and expect speedy 
international assistance when needed. 
Incentives and financing mechanisms 
need to be generated to encourage 
investments in public health, and 
countries need to be held accountable. 
Platforms such as the Global Health 
Security Agenda and the WHO’s Global 
Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System have had some success and 
aim to complement current regulations 
and mitigate threats, but they fall short 
of constituting a comprehensive, 
robust global system with the flexibility 
to defend against both known and 
unknown biological threats.
The Future of Collaboration
From logistics to communications, from 
financial services to pharmaceuticals, 
the private sector has capabilities and 
expertise that can be truly beneficial in 
a public health outbreak. To leverage 
them most effectively, however, 
requires common ground and trust-
based cooperating mechanisms at 
local and global levels with the public 
and non-government sectors that have 
been established in advance of an 
emergency (see Initiative 2).
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Box 3.3.2: Developing an Ebola Vaccine: Reflections on the Current Regulatory Environment 
In the 38 years between the first Ebola epidemic in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and its December 2013 
emergence in Guinea, methods for containing Ebola were standardized but few advances were made in the development of a 
vaccine.
By 2009, at least seven Ebola vaccines had been tested in monkeys.1 Yet by 2014 none had been through phase I safety 
testing in healthy human volunteers. There were no existing study protocols for evaluating experimental vaccines or treatments 
in an epidemic setting, which meant that it took time to design and agree on the way forward and gain ethical approval. Even 
when protocols were agreed, some organizations delayed supplying their therapeutics – not from lack of enthusiasm, but 
because they did not have pre-agreed frameworks in place to allow them to do so. As the crisis neared its peak in August 
2014, three candidate vaccines were in development with the potential to be used in clinical trials: 
1. Merck (Newlink) had VSV-EBOV, originally developed in partnership with the Canadian government. Merck had preclinical 
data, but the vaccine had not been tested for safety in phase I human trials. Safety trials commenced only in October 
2014.
2. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) had ChAd3-ZEBOV, originally developed by Okairos, but again with no human safety data. Phase I 
trials began in September 2014.
3. Johnson & Johnson’s phase I clinical trials began in January 2015. 
Despite these delays, infectious disease experts argue that in some ways the world was relatively lucky with Ebola – vaccines 
had already been in development because the pathogen had been earlier identified as an infection with bioterrorism potential. 
This is not the case for other known diseases, such as MERS-CoV, chikungunya and West Nile, which will require a focused 
and coordinated R&D effort. 
The current development model in vaccinology could be improved in three main ways. First, there should be leadership and 
coordination of clinical trial activities in epidemics by a neutral body to ensure that they are efficient and properly prioritized. As 
the Ebola outbreak took hold, a multitude of countries and research consortiums planned phase I and II/III clinical trials, but 
there was little coordination of these efforts. The WHO, working with member states, philanthropists, industry, NGOs and 
academia, should coordinate this priority-setting and ensure equitable access. 
Second, phase I clinical trials must be conducted in the inter-epidemic period, at least for known diseases where a vaccine/
treatment is feasible or already in development. We must also develop novel platforms to allow for an assessment and 
preparation for hitherto unknown infections. Finally, agreed trial protocols, contracts and initial ethics approvals for phase II/III 
studies should be drawn up so that, when an outbreak begins, trials can start within days or weeks, not in months. 
Note
1 Plotkin, Mahmoud, and Farrar 2015.
There is a long history of public-private 
cooperation in response to infectious 
diseases. The Medicine for Malaria 
Venture (MMV) and the Global Alliance 
for Vaccine Initiative (GAVI), for instance, 
are long-standing examples of cross-
sector partnership that came out of a 
projected public health disaster that 
was the result of escalating antimalarial 
drug resistance in the late 1990s and 
the need for greater equitable access 
to vaccines.
Despite these and similar advances, 
new collaborative approaches are 
needed as the danger of outbreaks 
grows. Such approaches could 
explore:
– Ways to harness the data being 
generated by businesses in a 
range of sectors to strengthen 
predictive models and improve 
early detection and monitoring of 
epidemics;
– Ways to drive forward the research 
agenda by pairing private vaccine, 
drug and diagnostic researchers 
with public health experts and 
policy-makers;
– Ways to improve regulatory 
frameworks and policies across 
nations;
– Ways to provide stable and flexible 
long-term financing to deliver the 
necessary interventions;
– Ways to optimize in-country 
operators in source regions 
who can provide on-the-ground 
capabilities for building stronger 
health systems and early-stage 
logistical support in a crisis, and 
who can undertake emergency 
response measures; and
– Ways to promote responsible 
media engagement as part of crisis 
management communications, 
with the identification of trusted 
sources of information and the 
dissemination of messages 
targeted to the right audience, 
using the most appropriate local or 
global information channels.
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Box 3.3.3: The Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) 
The world’s Ebola response has highlighted the need for new financing mechanisms that can quickly deploy emergency 
funding and rapid response teams at the first sign of a crisis.
The World Bank Group is working with the WHO and other partners, including Munich Re and Swiss Re, on one part of the 
solution: the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). The PEF would respond to the G20 Brisbane Leaders Statement 
on Ebola, and it received the endorsement of G7 leaders in Germany in June 2015. Its open platform structure will be able to 
function effectively within the evolving global pandemic financing architecture.
Simply put, the PEF would purchase private sector insurance coverage for developing countries to cover the immediate costs 
of crisis response. It would deliver financing swiftly to governments and international partners, once a pre-agreed parametric 
trigger is invoked. The payouts to the affected countries would come from the bond markets and (re)insurance companies. In 
both cases the insurance premium would need funding from donors, although potential beneficiaries could also contribute. 
Over time, the PEF would grow in terms of size, geography and events covered, as the market for pandemic risk insurance in 
developing countries grows. Governments have already used this model to successfully manage climate and natural disaster 
risks.
Preventing future infectious disease outbreaks from becoming human and economic tragedies requires action on several 
fronts. First, countries must invest in better preparedness, which starts with focusing on core public health functions and 
strengthening health systems. Second, there is a need for a smarter, better-coordinated global epidemic preparedness and 
response system that draws on the expertise of many more players; in this context, more effective public-private partnerships 
are critical, particularly around logistics and communications. Third, a better-resourced and empowered WHO that is 
equipped to work with countries in monitoring outbreaks, identifying potential threats and mobilizing on-the-ground support is 
an imperative.
Because assessing insurance premiums creates incentives to quantify the risks, a financing mechanism such as the PEF could 
help on all the above fronts. It could create two important differences the next time there is a potential pandemic:
– Financing would be available quickly (within days) from the PEF, bringing discipline and rigour to the whole system 
because a response strategy is thought out pre-emptively.
– The PEF’s design and in-built contingencies would drive the various concerned national and international players to work 
together more effectively and coherently in advance, thus ensuring the appropriate highest level of crisis preparedness 
and response readiness.
New predictive models, financing 
mechanisms and leadership for the 
preparedness and response of future 
outbreaks and antimicrobial threats are 
key to reducing the risks we face in the 
short, medium and long term.
The Ebola response was financed by 
contributions from a range of non-
governmental organizations, notably 
Médecins Sans Frontières, philanthropy 
(the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation, 
the Skoll Foundation, and the 
Wellcome Trust), governments, social 
sector organizations, private sector 
companies and individuals. However, 
new models are needed if future 
response is to be faster, more stable, 
flexible and long term. To enable such 
models, the private and public sectors 
must jointly develop new financing 
options, such as draw-down facilities, 
insurance programmes and bonds. 
The World Bank Group, in collaboration 
with the WHO and private sector 
players, including Swiss Re and 
Munich Re, is developing an insurance 
product that will provide early financing 
to affected countries to respond to 
future epidemics (see Box 3.3.3). 
Such initiatives and incentives could 
be linked with the willingness of 
governments to invest sustainably 
and in a verifiable way in critical public 
health infrastructure.
Conclusion
The Ebola crisis has put the spotlight 
on the importance of reducing the 
vulnerability of societies to infectious 
disease threats. As public health 
becomes ever more complex and 
our interdependency grows, it is 
clear that new equitable approaches, 
technologies and innovative community 
and business models, and response 
strategies and financing mechanisms 
will increasingly be needed to contain 
known and unknown threats that 
endanger social and economic stability 
worldwide. There must also be better 
mechanisms in place to manage risks 
through international cooperation, 
involving both the public and private 
sectors beyond the traditional 
healthcare industry.
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Three Initiatives to Mitigate 
the Risk and Impact of 
Global Disease Outbreaks
1. Building Resilient Health Systems
As highlighted most recently by the 
Ebola crisis, a single and localized 
outbreak can put national and even 
international health systems at risk if 
they are unprepared to react quickly. 
The world will remain vulnerable to 
public health emergencies until every 
state has comprehensive primary 
care services, an adequate number 
of healthcare workers, available 
medicines, robust health information 
systems, infrastructure, public financing 
and a strong government to deliver 
equitable and high-quality services to 
all its citizens.
During and in the aftermath of an 
outbreak, health systems become 
more vulnerable to new crises. For 
example, in November 2014 fewer than 
half of the health facilities in Liberia 
were seeing patients; the government 
estimates that from May to August 
2014, skilled birth attendance was 
27% below 2013 levels, measles 
immunization was down 50% and 
overall health services were operating 
at 40% lower capacity. Even in areas 
where essential health services 
have begun to resume, the loss of 
these services during the height of 
the epidemic continues to have an 
impact.21
During the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP)’s International 
Ebola Recovery Conference in July 
2015, the international community 
pledged funds to build robust health 
systems to “get to zero and stay at 
zero” in the Ebola-affected countries. 
However, it took a global health threat 
and close to 11,000 deaths to create 
this momentum.
One challenge to strengthening health 
systems is that very few programmes 
address the entire system. No single 
innovation or player can allow an entire 
system to leapfrog in the way that, 
in the telecommunications industry 
for example, mobile phones made it 
unnecessary to establish expensive 
infrastructure for landlines.22 The WHO 
has identified six building blocks of 
health systems; most strengthening 
interventions address only one of these 
blocks. Some target health worker 
training; others focus on demand 
financing and insurance schemes; 
still others aim to improve service 
delivery and access to medicines and 
technologies. Although all these efforts 
lead to meaningful improvements, their 
impact remains limited because they 
do not address all dimensions of the 
health system in a synchronized and 
synergistic way.
It is critical to understand the most 
efficient way for all health stakeholders 
to collaborate. An extensive 
analysis of successful innovations 
in emerging economies has shown 
that well-thought-out ecosystems of 
partnerships can significantly improve 
the impact and financial sustainability of 
health initiatives.
Ogun State in Nigeria, for instance, 
is pioneering an ecosystem of 
partnerships that synchronizes all 
projects and programmes in primary 
service delivery, creating a model that 
will increase low-income individuals’ 
access to basic healthcare that can be 
replicated in other Nigerian states. 
The World Economic Forum supported 
the state’s Commissioner of Health in 
convening private and public sector 
stakeholders that together defined the 
priorities and mapped out partners 
that could contribute in a synergistic 
way. Projects include a state-
subsidized insurance scheme, work on 
modernizing transport and logistics, 
upgraded equipment, improved 
sourcing of basic medical products, 
and a community-based primary care 
facility model with elements of public-
private partnership. The intervention is 
coordinated by a project management 
unit funded and managed by African 
Health Markets for Equity in partnership 
with governments, foundations and 
private sector players from across 
industries.
The programme is the first of its kind 
in aiming to build the resilience of an 
entire health system. Although still in 
its early stages, it has already won 
Nigeria’s Excellence Award for 2015, 
which recognizes efforts in healthcare 
delivery.
2. Harmonizing Public-Private 
Networks: The Key for Early 
Detection and Response
Coordination and time are invaluable 
assets in an emergency, so 
mechanisms that bring together 
public and private players in high-risk 
geographies to address emerging 
epidemics are likely to pay dividends. 
Although response measures remain 
primarily international, harnessing the 
potential of national and local actors to 
optimize early detection and response 
on the ground is also critical.
Local actors or in-country operators 
(multinationals and small or medium-
sized enterprises) have the greatest 
incentive to act swiftly in any outbreak 
or epidemic.23 They are motivated 
not only by responsibility to their 
communities but also by a desire to 
protect their operations, maintain 
business continuity and reduce 
business risks. Embedded in their 
communities, and often operating 
in remote areas with little public 
infrastructure, they are likely to see 
emerging public health issues at 
an early stage. They also have the 
capacity to raise an alert in the event of 
an emerging threat.
The potential of private sector actors 
to contribute in an emergency was 
prominently witnessed in the Ebola 
crisis. Although several multinationals 
chose to shut down their operations 
and leave the area, many others – 
along with domestic businesses 
– maintained their presence and 
contributed meaningfully to the 
response through channels such as the 
Ebola Private Sector Mobilizing Group 
(EPSMG). In-country operators such as 
ArcelorMittal conducted initiatives on 
community awareness and screening 
programmes, and used their machinery 
and capacity to construct Ebola 
Treatment Centres. Alcoa educated 
its employees and their families on the 
transmission of Ebola and taught them 
how to protect themselves. Firestone 
built its own isolation and treatment 
centre in its facility after a case was 
detected and nearby hospitals were 
unable to accommodate the patient. 
Beyond funding and in-kind donations, 
local actors also played an important 
role in influencing decision-makers 
and mobilizing each other: the Sierra 
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Leone EPSMG chapter successfully 
lobbied to keep national ports open, 
which enabled crucial supplies to be 
shipped in as well as minimized the 
loss of livelihoods through disruption to 
economic activity.
Although these and many similar efforts 
deserve and have received recognition, 
a lack of coordination limited the ability 
of the private sector to apply its full set 
of capabilities, and their interactions 
were not aligned with public sector 
efforts on a day-to-day basis. Local 
companies did not always know how 
best to contribute to the response, and 
national governments and responding 
agencies were not always aware of 
potential opportunities to partner with 
the local private sector.
Building on the flexible partnership 
responses that complemented 
the channels of official assistance 
to Ebola-affected countries, the 
Forum has drawn up a wide set of 
recommendations for public-private 
cooperation models to manage 
any potential future outbreaks more 
effectively and reduce the risk of their 
occurrence. The study disaggregates 
private sector interventions into three 
categories – in-country operators, 
expert capability companies and 
greater private sector contributors – 
and makes specific recommendations 
for each category to enhance 
collaboration. At a high-level dialogue in 
Cape Town, senior leaders expressed 
a desire to home in on optimizing local 
actors in early detection and response 
plans.
With subsequent endorsement from 
partners including the United Nations, 
the African Development Bank and 
the Wellcome Trust, the Forum has 
launched a 12-month initiative to 
mobilize in-country business operators 
and facilitate dialogue with ministries 
of health for the local implementation 
of networks in national preparedness 
and response schemes. This entails 
the creation of country-wide playbooks 
and communication platforms between 
local actors across sectors to develop 
a rapid and efficient response in the 
event of an epidemic. Networks and 
their implementation roadmaps will 
be designed for specific high-risk 
geographies including Mali, Guinea, 
Liberia and Nigeria, with the vision 
of defining a broader coordination 
mechanism to expand regionally and 
apply globally.
3. Big Data and Infectious Diseases: 
Mapping the Outbreak
One key to determining how viruses 
spread is to understand how people 
move around and interact with one 
another on a daily basis. Big data 
allows the modelling of how a virus 
spreads, and the potential for it to 
be contained by various possible 
interventions.
The 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu pandemic 
response in Mexico is an early 
example of how mobile phone data 
can be used. As the outbreak began 
to spread, the Mexican government 
acted to limit the movement of people, 
advising them to stay away from public 
places such as airports, hospitals and 
universities. A digital research team 
in Telefónica, one of Mexico’s largest 
mobile network providers, saw an 
opportunity to test the effectiveness 
of the advice by analysing patterns of 
movement. Drawing from anonymized 
mobile phone call records of 1 million 
customers in one of Mexico’s most 
affected cities, the team found that call 
traffic was lower or stable in hospitals 
and universities but increasing at the 
airport, suggesting that people were 
ignoring government advice and trying 
to leave the area.
Next, the team created a model to 
simulate what would have happened 
if the government had not intervened. 
Analysing more than five months of 
encrypted call records, including the 
period of government interventions, 
the research team found that the 
intervention had resulted in between 
a 10% and 30% drop in movement, 
postponed the peak of the epidemic 
by nearly two days and reduced the 
number of infections by 10%.24
A more recent intervention has 
been witnessed in the use of GPS 
technology in the roll-out of treatment-
as-prevention to control the HIV 
pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
construct predictive prevalence maps 
for migrating populations.25 Health 
workers can immediately report newly 
identified cases through solar radios 
or a new mobile application, facilitating 
social network analysis. The resulting 
communications and data collection 
system allows for faster identification 
of transmission chains, which in turn 
allows for faster isolation of potentially 
contaminated individuals and a more 
effective implementation of ring 
vaccination when necessary.
The Ebola crisis also saw innovative 
attempts to use technology to predict, 
detect and prevent new cases, such 
as the mHero platform – supported 
by a consortium of partners including 
UNICEF, UNAIDS and IntraHealth – 
to connect ministries of health with 
frontline workers using text messaging 
services and analyse the resulting data. 
However, the lack of interoperability 
of data information systems between 
responders in the crisis highlighted the 
need to review new fabric architecture, 
diagnostics and logistics. The mHero 
platform is under development to 
overcome these barriers.26
Finding the fastest and most efficient 
channel to disseminate information is 
key to fighting an infectious disease 
outbreak, and access to data for real-
time monitoring, multi-path surveys 
and detailed analysis is essential. 
The better the information, the more 
sure decision-makers can be of their 
strategy. Real-time sharing of data in a 
coordinated and collaborative manner 
can make responses more efficient. 
If ways can be found to reconcile the 
need for data with current regulatory 
environments and the legitimate right 
to data privacy, lessons from the Ebola 
crisis could potentially be applied in 
future emergency settings.
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Endnotes
1 A well-functioning health system working in harmony is built on having trained and 
motivated health workers, a well-maintained infrastructure and a reliable supply of 
medicines and technologies, backed by adequate funding, strong health plans and 
evidence-based policies (WHO 2015).
2 UN DESA 2015.
3 Zoonoses – pathogenic organisms such as bacteria or viruses that humans share 
with animals – cause more than 60% of human infectious diseases and have been 
responsible for some of the most devastating disease outbreaks in recent years, 
including HIV, Ebola and SARS. See http://www.thelancet.com/series/zoonoses. 
More than more than 60% of the roughly 400 emerging infectious diseases that have 
been identified since 1940 are zoonotic. See Jones et al. 2008.
4 Gubler 2011.
5 Coburn et al. 2013.
6 Estimates suggest that in the United States at least 2 million people acquire serious 
infections with bacteria that are resistant to one or more of the antibiotics designed 
to treat them, and at least 23,000 people die each year as a direct result of these 
antibiotic-resistant infections. Estimates of economic costs range as high as US$20 
billion in excess direct healthcare costs, with additional costs to society for lost 
productivity as high as US$35 billion a year (2008 dollars). See http://www.tufts.edu/
med/apua/consumers/personal_home_5_1451036133.pdf (accessed 8 May 2013); 
extrapolated from Roberts et al. 2009.
7 Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 2015.
8 Butler 2015.
9 Butler 2015.
10 World Economic Forum 2015a.
11 UNICEF 2015.
12 UNDG 2015.
13 World Bank 2015.
14 World Bank 2015.
15 World Bank 2014b.
16 World Bank 2015.
17 World Bank 2014a.
18 Keogh-Brown and Smith 2008.
19 Heymann et al. 2015.
20 Zimmer 2015.
21 USAID 2015. 
22 World Economic Forum 2015b.
23 World Economic Forum 2015b.
24 Telefónica 2013.
25 Coburn and Blower 2013.
26 USAID 2015.
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Part 4:  
Risks for Doing 
Business at a 
Glance
Building resilience against global risks 
necessitates consensus in identifying 
the risks that should most concern 
different stakeholders across regions 
and countries. The final part of The 
Global Risks Report therefore focuses 
on the impact of global risks on the 
business community across different 
regions and countries. It draws on the 
views of executives in 140 economies 
covered by the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey 
(see Box 4.1) about the risks of highest 
concern for doing business.1
The fact that today’s businesses are 
global is not news, but the extent 
of the globalization of trade and 
commerce – and the risks it presents 
– is far from understood. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows have increased 
a staggering 25-fold since 1980, rising 
from US$54 billion to US$1.23 trillion 
in 2014,2 as marked by shifts from 
manufacturing to services and from 
developed to developing and emerging 
markets. Indeed, South-South 
investments (that is, investments from 
one developing economy to another) 
have intensified, growing by two-
thirds, from US$1.7 trillion in 2009 to 
US$2.9 trillion in 2013.3 Information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) 
have internationalized supply chains, 
linking trade and investment ever more 
tightly.4 While offering companies 
opportunities to lower production costs 
and countries the chance to develop 
economically by participating in global 
value chains, the internationalization of 
business increases exposure to global 
risks. From environmental to economic 
and political risks, companies are 
vulnerable even if they have no 
immediate presence in the geography 
where the risk arises.5 The resilience 
of any individual business depends 
heavily on the resilience of its suppliers 
and purchasers, whose supply chains 
can span many countries.
Increasingly, businesses need 
to strengthen their scenario and 
emergency planning capacity to 
analyse complex and often uncertain 
interdependencies if they are to build 
resilience to global risks. Likewise, 
countries also need to understand the 
global risks to doing business. Globally, 
FDI inflows fell by 16%, from US1.47$ 
trillion in 2013 to US1.23$ trillion in 2014 
– well below the pre-crisis 2007 peak – 
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for reasons that include perceptions of 
global economic fragility, government 
policy uncertainty and elevated 
geopolitical risks.6
This part of The Global Risk Report 
2016 therefore aims to provide insight 
for both business and policy-makers by 
drawing on the findings of the Forum’s 
Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) about 
the risks for doing business in 140 
economies. It takes the global risks 
discussed in previous chapters to the 
country level and analyses regional 
trends, country-specific responses and 
presents deep-dives into the five often-
cited risks of highest concern.
Regional Analysis
The risks of highest concern for 
doing business differ considerably 
from country to country, according to 
EOS data. However, some patterns 
emerge. In developed economies, 
economic risks such as asset bubbles 
and fiscal crises are high on the 
business agenda; concern is also 
present about technological risks 
such as cyberattacks and data theft. 
In these economies, it is increasingly 
evident that connectivity plays a 
Box 4.1: The World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey
Every year since 1979, the World Economic Forum has conducted its Executive 
Opinion Survey (EOS). Capturing executives’ perspectives on a broad range of 
socio-economic issues, the EOS primarily informs the World Economic Forum’s 
annual Global Competitiveness Report and its derivatives. The 2015 edition of the 
EOS, conducted between February and June 2015, surveyed over 13,000 
executives in 140 economies. EOS respondents were asked to select the five 
global risks that they were most concerned about for doing business in their 
country within the next 10 years, choosing from the set of 28 global risks 
presented in the The Global Risks Report 2015.1 See Appendix C for details of the 
methodology and the EOS. 
Note
1 Following an expert review in spring 2015, the set of risks was increased from 28 to 29 global risks in this 
year’s Report. Formerly part of the risk of national governance, illicit trade is now treated as a separate global 
risk. See Appendix B for details regarding the difference in the list of global risks from last year and this 
edition.  
central role in production processes, 
service provision and everyday life. In 
emerging and developing economies, 
the top concern is unemployment and 
underemployment as well as potential 
energy price shocks.
A striking finding is the relative absence 
of environmental risks and, more 
generally, of long-term issues among 
the top concerns of business leaders 
in their respective countries. For 
Asset bubble
Deflation
Energy price shock
Failure of financial mechanism or institution  
Fiscal crises
Unemployment or underemployment
Unmanageable inflation
Note: In addition to the risk drawn on the map, the following countries have another risk as the risk of highest concern: Haiti: Unemployment or 
underemployment; Oman: Energy price shock; Peru: Profound Social Instability; Paraguay: Failure of financial mechanism or institution; Senegal: 
Energy price shock; Tunisia: Profound Social instability; Venezuela: unmanageable inflation; Viet Nam: Man-made environmental catastrophes  
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instance, no executive considers failure 
of climate mitigation and adaptation 
as the number one risk for doing 
business in his/her country. This stands 
in contrast to the priorities considered 
by members of the multistakeholder 
community of the World Economic 
Forum who took part in the Global 
Risks Perception Survey and perceived 
it as the most impactful and the third 
most likely risk on a global scale (see 
Figure 1). This finding highlights the 
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2015, World Economic Forum. 
Note:
In addition to the risk indicated on the map, the following countries have another risk as the risk of highest concern:
Haiti: Unemployment or underemployment; Oman: Energy price shock; Peru: Profound social instability; Paraguay: Failure of financial mechanism or institution; Senegal: Energy 
price shock; Tunisia: Profound social instability; Venezuela: Unmanageable inflation; Vietnam: Man-made environmental catastrophes.  
Figure 4.1: Global Risk of Highest Concern for Doing Business, by Country
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divergence between national and 
global interests when it comes to some 
global risks such as climate change. 
It also calls for continued alignment 
across stakeholders whose actions are 
based on different time horizons. 
The top global risks for doing business 
for each country are shown in Figure 
4.1. Full economy-level data are 
available at www.weforum.org/risks. 
Throughout Part 4, the ranking of risks 
refers exclusively to the EOS question 
on risks of highest concern for doing 
business.7
Europe
Across Europe,8 the risks that 
stand out as being of great concern 
for doing business are all in an 
economic category. Unemployment 
or underemployment is mentioned as 
the risk of highest concern for doing 
business in 12 countries in Europe 
and is among the top five risks in 25 
countries (Table 4.1).
high;9 in Poland and Macedonia, 
where more than half of youth are 
unemployed;10 and in the Balkans, with 
unemployment sky-rocketing in Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.11 Along 
with challenges related to involuntary 
migration, high unemployment rates 
may help to explain why the risk of 
profound social instability also features 
prominently in Southern and Eastern 
Europe.
The risk of an asset bubble is the top 
concern in Iceland, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 
A related economic risk causing 
concern across Europe is fiscal crises 
(this is the risk of highest concern in 
four countries and is among the top 
five in 26 countries); although fiscal 
consolidations are starting to pay 
off, government debt in advanced 
economies is projected to aggregate at 
104.2% of GDP in 2016, much higher 
than the pre-crisis level of 71.6% in 
2007.12
Although the extent of concern about 
cyberattacks is somewhat lower than 
the above-mentioned risks (this risk is 
among the top five of highest concern 
in 12 countries), it is of high concern in 
Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. Given the cross-border 
nature of cyberspace, there is obvious 
potential for cyberattacks to have 
ramifications well beyond the countries 
in which they occur.
North America
In North America, which includes 
the United States and Canada, two 
risks have been selected as being 
among the five of highest concern 
for doing business in both countries: 
cyberattacks and asset bubbles  
(Table 4.2).
In the United States, the top risk is 
cyberattack, followed by data fraud 
or theft (the latter is in 7th position 
in Canada, which is why it scores 
50% in Table 4.2). Interestingly, the 
risks related to the internet and cyber 
dependency are considered to be of 
highest concern for doing business, 
following recent important attacks 
on businesses. The United States is 
extremely well connected, and ICT 
usage is high – 87% of the population 
use the internet,13 and the country 
ranks second globally for online 
business-to-consumer transactions.14 
The risk of terrorist attacks is third on 
the list (and 13th in Canada): according 
to the House Committee on Homeland 
Security, the home-grown Islamist 
extremist threat in the United States 
has escalated dramatically in 2015, with 
more terror cases than in any full year 
since September 11, 2011.15
Table 4.1: Europe: Percentage of 
Economies in which a Risk Appears 
among the Top Five of Highest 
Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Fiscal crises 67
Unemployment or 
underemployment 64
Failure of financial 
mechanism or institution 62
Energy price shock 56
Asset bubble 51
 
Note: 39 economies considered 
Unemployment threatens to de-skill an 
entire generation in parts of Europe, 
further aggravating businesses’ search 
for employees with the right type of 
skills to compete in today’s fast-paced 
global economy. These concerns are 
not limited to the crisis-hit Southern 
European economies – such as 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain – where unemployment remains 
well into the double digits eight years 
after the crisis, well beyond a typical 
business cycle. They are also strong in 
countries such as Austria, Finland and 
France, where unemployment rates are 
considerably lower although historically 
Energy price shock to the global 
economy tops the list of concerns in 
Canada, with the commodity price 
drop hurting the Canadian economy 
and GDP growth projected to be 
around 1% in 2015, compared with 
2.4% in 2014.16 The risks of asset 
bubble and cyberattacks come second 
and third in Canada (fifth and first in the 
United States, respectively).
Asia and the Pacific
Central Asia and Russia 
The end of the commodity boom, 
the economic slowdown in Russia, 
the weaker-than-expected growth 
in China and the slow recovery in 
the Eurozone are among the factors 
putting pressures on Central Asia’s 
economies.17  Although the region’s 
countries feature a diverse range of 
risks of highest concern for doing 
business, the most prominent are 
fiscal crises, unmanageable inflation, 
interstate conflicts and unemployment 
and underemployment (Table 4.3).
Table 4.2: North America: 
Percentage of Economies in which a 
Risk Appears among the Top Five of 
Highest Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Cyberattacks 100
Asset bubble 100
Energy price shock 50
Fiscal crises 50
Failure of critical 
infrastructure 50
Failure of climate 
change adaptation 50
Terrorist attacks 50
Data fraud or theft 50
Note: 2 economies considered
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Oil-exporting countries are suffering 
from lower prices and volumes of trade, 
which negatively affects government 
revenues; and while the lower price 
is helping the region’s oil importers, it 
is unlikely to make up for the effects 
on fiscal balances of weak domestic 
demand and Russia’s economic 
contraction. Rising public debt helps 
to explain why fiscal crises are one 
of the top three concerns in all the 
region’s countries. With only moderate 
economic prospects, unemployment 
is likely to surge in the region and is 
among the top five risks of highest 
concern in five countries.
A combination of factors could explain 
the fear of unmanageable inflation 
in several of the region’s countries. 
These factors include the recent 
volatility in foreign exchange markets, 
with regional currencies depreciating 
against the US dollar and reserve 
losses;18 a second factor is the relatively 
recent experience of hyperinflation 
during the 1990s transition period;19 
and a third is the concern that weak 
institutions will be unable to implement 
the deep structural and fiscal reforms 
necessary to foster sustainable growth.
The dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, 
and Russian military intervention in 
Syria are among many geopolitical 
developments in the region that may 
be affecting the views of business 
executives who mentioned the risk 
of an interstate conflict with regional 
consequences.
East Asia and the Pacific
The global risks of highest concern for 
doing business in East Asia and the 
Pacific are mainly economic: energy 
price shock and asset bubble (Table 
4.4).20 While energy price shock tops 
the list only in Lao PDR and Indonesia, 
it is among the top five in 12 countries. 
Many countries in the region are energy 
importers and soaring prices could 
be damaging. The risk of an asset 
bubble ranks top in seven economies 
(Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong 
Kong SAR, Myanmar, New Zealand 
and Thailand), reflecting the recent 
equity market turmoil in China and 
potential spillovers into the other 
countries from the region as well as 
over-evaluation of property in some of 
the economies such as Hong Kong or 
Sydney.
Fiscal crises is among the five most 
concerning risks for 41% of executives 
in the region. The slowdown of the 
Chinese economy is likely to moderate 
growth and could negatively impact 
public finances in neighbouring 
countries.21 Along with these two 
risks, cyberattacks – the risk of highest 
concern for doing business in three 
economies – is further explored in the 
deep-dives below.
Nargis, respectively.22 Executives 
are concerned about the region’s 
vulnerability to natural catastrophes 
– earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic 
eruptions and geomagnetic storms – 
as well as man-made environmental 
catastrophes, emphasizing the 
importance for business of sustainable 
development that respects the 
environment. In New Zealand, the 
most worrisome risk for executives is 
natural catastrophes, reflecting that the 
country’s position on the Alpine Fault 
makes it vulnerable to earthquakes 
and tsunamis. The region’s need to 
build resilience against climate and 
weather risks could also help to explain  
why risks such as failure of critical 
infrastructure and national governance 
rank high in some of the economies.
South Asia
With four of the region’s countries 
identifying energy price shock and 
three economies identifying fiscal 
crises among their top five, concern for 
doing business is centred on economic 
risks (Table 4.5).23 Unemployment and 
underemployment is also among the 
most-cited risks in South Asia, with 
the whole region facing the challenge 
of jobless growth and vulnerable and 
informal employment: vulnerable 
employment accounted for over three-
quarters of all employment in 2014 in 
South Asia.24 Youth unemployment 
is also a concern, especially in South 
Asia, where the rate is already four 
times higher than among adults and an 
additional 2.1 million youth will enter the 
labour force over the next five years.25
Table 4.2: North America: 
Percentage of Economies in which a 
Risk Appears among the Top Five of 
Highest Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Cyberattacks 100
Asset bubble 100
Energy price shock 50
Fiscal crises 50
Failure of critical 
infrastructure 50
Failure of climate 
change adaptation 50
Terrorist attacks 50
Data fraud or theft 50
Note: 2 economies considered
Table 4.3: Central Asia and Russia:  
Percentage of Economies in which a 
Risk Appears among the Top Five of 
Highest Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Fiscal crises 100
Unmanageable inflation 86
Unemployment or 
underemployment 71
Interstate conflict 71
Failure of financial 
mechanism or institution 57
Note: 7 economies considered
Table 4.4: East Asia and the Pacific: 
Percentage of Economies in which a 
Risk Appears among the Top Five of 
Highest Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Energy price shock 71
Asset bubble 59
Cyberattacks 41
Fiscal crises 41
Natural catastrophes 35
Unemployment or 
underemployment 35
Unmanageable inflation 35
Note: 17 economies considered
One of the features of the region is 
how frequently environmental risks are 
mentioned. For example, executives 
in both the Philippines and Myanmar 
identified extreme weather events 
as among their leading concerns, in 
the wake of the recent experiences 
of Typhoon Haiyan and Cyclone 
Table 4.5: South Asia: Percentage of 
Economies in which a Risk Appears 
among the Top Five of Highest 
Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Energy price shock 67
Failure of national 
governance 67
Fiscal crises 50
Unemployment or 
underemployment 50
Failure of climate-
change adaptation 50
 
Note: 6 economies considered
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Failure of national governance is 
another leading concern, highlighting 
the difficulties posed for business in the 
region by the current unstable political 
situation: for instance, according to the 
Corruption Perception Index, Nepal 
ranks 126th and Bangladesh 145th out 
of 175 economies.26
Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Failure of national governance is 
a prominent concern across Latin 
America and the Caribbean,27 
especially in South America, 
where corruption and mistrust in 
the functioning of institutions are 
increasingly compounding the 
difficulties of running a business (Table 
4.6). The region’s weak economic 
growth prospects and low levels 
of investment lie behind concerns 
about failure of critical infrastructure;28  
increasing investment in infrastructure 
would stimulate the economy as well as 
strengthen resilience to global risks.
The region relies heavily on exports 
of commodities that have declined in 
price – such as oil, gas, copper and 
iron – explaining the prominence of the 
risk of an energy price shock among 
the region’s leading concerns. Low 
commodity prices reinforce existing 
challenges such as high public debt 
and low economic growth, and 
increasing the associated risk of fiscal 
crises. 
Finally, concerns about unemployment 
reflect how skills mismatch and rigid 
labour markets are affecting business 
development in the region.
Table 4.6: Latin America and 
the Caribbean: Percentage of 
Economies in which a Risk Appears 
among the Top Five of Highest 
Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Failure of national 
governance 91
Energy price shock 82
Unemployment or 
underemployment 64
Profound social 
instability 59
Fiscal crises 45
Note: 22 economies considered
Middle East and North Africa 
Executives in oil-exporting countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa 
are most concerned about the risk 
of an energy price shock (the top 
concern in nine countries) (Table 4.7),29 
with low prices already leading to a 
decline of exports and revenue, hurting 
public finances, undermining financial 
planning and ultimately threatening to 
expose often-insufficient diversification 
of the economy.
Table 4.7: Middle East and North 
Africa: Percentage of Economies in 
which a Risk Appears among the 
Top Five of Highest Concern for 
Doing Business
Risk Percent
Unemployment or 
underemployment 71
Energy price shock 71
Fiscal crises 71
Terrorist attacks 64
Asset bubble 43
Interstate conflict 43
Note: 14 economies considered
Unemployment or underemployment, 
especially among youth, is also of 
high concern in the region, with youth 
unemployment as high as 33% in 
Jordan (2013 data) and above 20% 
in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.30 
Informal employment is a growing 
trend,31 adding to the potential for the 
job market situation to fuel profound 
social instability – a risk that makes 
the top five in five countries amid a 
regional humanitarian crisis that sees 
neighbouring countries coping with 
refugees from Syria. One in four of 
the world’s refugees is now Syrian, 
with 95% located in surrounding 
countries;32 in Lebanon, over a fifth of 
the population is refugees. Another 
potential cause of social disruption is 
water crises (among the top five risks 
in four countries), a particular concern 
for business because water is a key 
input in many industries,33 agricultural 
products and energy production.
Unsurprisingly, the risks of  terrorist 
attacks and interstate conflict also 
weigh on the minds of executives, as 
a proliferation of conflicts is putting the 
region’s geopolitical stability at stake.
Sub-Saharan Africa 
By 2035, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
projected to have more young 
people reaching working age than 
the rest of the world put together.34 
This demographic pressure helps 
to explain why unemployment and 
underemployment is the most 
concerning risk for executives in the 
region. Creating high-productivity, 
non-agricultural jobs is among the 
region’s biggest challenges, requiring 
businesses to adapt and diversify. 
Failure to reform Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
labour market could fuel social 
instability, another widespread concern 
according to survey respondents (Table 
4.8).
Table 4.8: Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Percentage of Economies in which a  
Risk Appears among the Top Five of 
Highest Concern for Doing Business
Risk Percent
Unemployment or 
underemployment 88
Energy price shock 70
Failure of national 
governance 55
Failure of critical 
infrastructure 45
Fiscal crises 39
Note: 33 economies considered
With fiscal pressures increasing for oil 
and gas exporters, the risk of energy 
price shock is prominent in executives’ 
thinking. The aggregated benefits 
of lower prices for the region’s oil 
importers are likely to be offset by falls 
in the prices of other commodities that 
they export.35 The macroeconomic 
climate is a related concern, especially 
fiscal crises and inflationary pressures.
Africa’s urban population is expected 
to triple by 2025,36 as reflected in the 
prominence of the risk of failure of 
urban planning and pointing to the 
need for more investment in urban 
infrastructure. This helps to explain why 
failure of critical infrastructure is another 
high-ranking risk: lack of infrastructure 
– both physical and virtual – is 
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estimated to reduce company 
productivity up to 40%.37 The cost of 
filling the gap in Africa’s infrastructure 
has been estimated at around US$93 
billion a year.38
Deep-Dives into Five 
Global Risks
Between them, two economic risks 
account for the global risks of most 
concern for doing business in half 
of the 140 economies covered: 
unemployment or underemployment, 
and energy price shock. Third on the 
list is failure of national governance, 
which affects businesses in many 
ways, including the failure to stamp out 
illicit trade (Table 4.9).
Table 4.9: Number of Economies in 
which a Risk Appears as the Risk of 
Highest Concern for Doing Business 
Risk Number
Unemployment or 
underemployment 41
Energy price shock 29
Failure of national 
governance 14
Asset bubble 11
Fiscal crises 10
Cyberattack 8
Note: out of 140 economies globally
The below deep-dives into the 
implications for business also explore 
asset bubbles, fourth on the global 
list, and cyberattacks, among the top 
three risks in 18 economies. While 
not exhaustive, these analyses of 
mechanisms through which these 
global risks affect businesses at the 
national level are intended to raise 
awareness of the need for action.
Unemployment or 
Underemployment 
Unemployment or underemployment 
is perceived as the global risk of 
highest concern for doing business 
in 41 countries, and is among the top 
five global risks in 92 countries (Figure 
4.2). Unemployment affects business 
in multiple ways, from holding back 
economic growth to threatening social 
stability. With a growing mismatch 
between the skills demanded by a 
fast-changing jobs market and those 
possessed by unemployed workers, 
businesses are struggling to recruit 
workers with the capabilities they need. 
Expected job growth is concentrated in 
occupations for which today’s workers 
are inadequately prepared.
Structural unemployment has 
increased in all major economies since 
the 2007 crisis. Even where growth 
has picked up, labour productivity and 
job creation often have not. Layoffs 
disproportionately affected middle-
skilled jobs, while most job creation in 
the recovery has taken place in lower-
Figure 4.2: Unemployment or Underemployment, rank
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wage jobs and in temporary and fixed-
term employment. At the same time, 
technological disruptions and the move 
towards automation are accelerating 
change in the nature of work. Currently 
it is estimated that by the year 2020 
nearly half of all current occupations 
could be affected by advances in 
robotics and machine learning.39
Given the unprecedented nature and 
pace of these displacements, large-
scale reforms will be needed, both 
by government and business. Short-
term, reactive measures based on 
past successes will not be enough: for 
example, efforts to place unemployed 
youth in apprenticeships in certain 
job categories may not be a high-
value investment if that job category 
is likely to be obsolete in five years’ 
time as a result of automation or other 
disruptions, while growth comes from 
wholly new occupations. Three main 
reforms are needed.
First, the education systems must be 
redesigned to focus on learning to 
learn and collaboration. As knowledge-
based work will increasingly be 
handled by technology, we need to 
educate future generations in skills 
where humans can still be expected to 
outperform machines – collaboration-
based attributes such as teamwork, 
interaction, relationships and cultural 
sensitivity. In a more automated future, 
value will come from emotional and 
contextual intelligence.
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2015, World Economic Forum.
Note: The darker colour, the higher the concern. 
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Second, while businesses must work 
with educators and governments 
to help education systems keep up 
with the needs of the labour market, 
companies must also fundamentally 
re-think their role as consumers of 
ready-made human capital, obtaining 
pre-trained talent from schools, 
universities and other companies. 
Some companies understand this and 
are investing more in the continuous 
learning, re-skilling and up-skilling of 
their employees. Given the ongoing 
rapid changes in the skill sets 
required for many occupations, talent 
management is no longer the preserve 
of the human resources function but 
will be a critical part of any company’s 
growth and innovation strategy – 
especially with younger cohorts of 
workers increasingly valuing a sense of 
purpose and diversity of experiences in 
their working lives.
Third, governments must look beyond 
the education system to redesign the 
broader enabling environment for 
talent. Human capital development 
depends on a series of interventions 
across a person’s lifetime, including 
hiring and firing practices, women’s 
integration, retirement policies, visa 
regulations, social safety nets, and, 
in particular, regulatory support for 
entrepreneurship and small and 
medium-sized enterprises – one of 
the most under-utilized means of 
unleashing creativity, enhancing growth 
and generating employment. Such 
areas often go neglected by policy-
makers because reforms are unlikely to 
pay off within the timeframe of political 
tenures.
Energy Price Shocks to the Global 
Economy
With lower oil prices making the 
headlines recently, the risk of energy 
price shocks to the global economy 
ranks first in 29 out of the 140 
economies represented in the 2015 
EOS and appears in the top five risks in 
93 of them (Figure 4.3).
“Price shocks” can refer to either 
sudden increases or decreases in the 
price of energy – whether in the form of 
electricity, oil, natural gas or liquid fuels 
derived from these sources. From 2010 
until June 2014 world oil prices were 
fairly stable, at around $110 a barrel 
for Brent crude; since then they have 
ranged between around US$45 to 
US$60, a plunge that surprised many. 
Natural gas prices, often indexed to 
oil, have followed a similar trajectory. 
This has resulted in significant shifts 
of wealth from oil and gas producers 
to consumers, meaning lower input 
costs for industry, lower inflation and 
more money available to spend in other 
sectors.
The outlook for oil prices is uncertain. 
On the supply side, one key factor is 
whether or not the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) – and in particular Saudi Arabia 
– will continue with its strategy of not 
curtailing production despite price 
declines. Another factor is the extent to 
which investment will fall in response 
to low prices, leading to a potential rise 
in unemployment rate of oil-exporting 
countries. Key oil and gas producers 
are estimated to have cut over US$200 
billion in capital expenditure on new 
projects, deferring oil and gas projects 
with reserves equating to 20 billion 
barrels of oil equivalent.40
If current low prices continue, the 
implications for oil-exporting countries 
may be severe. For instance, oil export 
losses in 2015 are expected to reach 
about US$300 billion in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC),41 which will 
have a heavy impact on governments’ 
budget balances. The International 
Monetary Fund expects more than 10 
million people to be looking for work 
by 2020 in the region’s oil-exporting 
countries, which will challenge fiscal 
sustainability over the medium term. 
A combination of rising import prices 
hurting the populations of many 
oil-producing countries and a lack of 
job opportunities may lead to social 
instability.42
Whether demand for oil picks up 
depends on factors such as whether 
growth recovers in China and other 
emerging economies, as well as the 
extent to which economies become 
less fuel intensive as a consequence 
of new technology and energy-
efficiency measures. It is possible 
that if prices start to recover, they 
Figure 4.3: Energy Price Shock to the Global Economy, rank
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Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2015, World Economic Forum.
Note: The darker colour, the higher the concern. 
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could unexpectedly spike: with the 
current low prices leading to reduced 
investment and job losses, there is 
less slack in the system to deal with 
unanticipated demand increases.43
Such a price spike could lead to slower 
global output and disrupt business 
models. Even many developed 
countries are vulnerable – for example, 
geopolitical tensions threaten energy 
security in Europe, which gets around 
a quarter of its gas from Russia.44 Still, 
the risks of a price spike destabilizing 
society are greatest in less-developed 
economies, which are highly 
dependent on imports and have little 
scope for alternatives to take up the 
slack. Indeed, the risks associated 
with an undiversified energy sector 
are not limited to oil – for example, 
in 2008 water shortages caused by 
an extremely harsh winter impacted 
energy production in Tajikistan, 
which relies heavily on hydro power. 
Ramifications in that instance included 
interruptions in medical care for many 
people (power shortages and cold 
weather deprived more than 50% of 
the country’s hospitals of their water 
supply).45
Failure of National Governance
Failure of national governance is 
perceived as the highest risk to 
doing business by executives in 14 
economies – half of them in Latin 
America, four in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
two in Eastern Europe and one in Asia 
(Figure 4.4). This risk captures the 
inability to efficiently govern a nation, 
which is caused by or results in factors 
such as weak rule of law, corruption, 
illicit trade, organized crime, impunity, 
and political deadlock. Weak national 
government is not the result only of 
poor governance; governance is a 
multi-faceted phenomenon in which 
business, civil society and the general 
public also play roles.
As discussed in the most recent 
edition of the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report, the consequences of failures 
of governance seriously undermine 
many countries’ competitiveness, job 
creation and economic development. 
Weak or failing national governance 
creates space for organized criminals 
and terrorists to profit from illegal 
trading in humans, weapons, 
counterfeit goods, and so on. The 
cross-sector and transnational nature 
of these illegal activities means they 
pose a risk to all, creating economic, 
social, and environmental damage at 
regional and global levels.
Businesses face additional risks 
as well as costs from operating in 
countries affected by poor governance. 
Both the risks and the costs arise 
from the difficulties of working in 
an unpredictable environment and 
complying with international standards 
when fragile governments do not 
themselves adhere to international 
regulatory regimes. These costs 
can be serious enough to become 
unsustainable in the long run. 
One aspect of poor governance – illicit 
trade – can undermine corporate 
brands and supply chains, because 
logistics and transport sectors often 
unwittingly contribute to the spread of 
illicit goods. Illicit trade is estimated to 
cost the world economy up to US$2 
trillion, although it is difficult to quantify 
accurately.46 Counterfeiting and piracy 
alone are estimated to amount to 
US$1.77 trillion in 2015,47 nearly 10% of 
world merchandise trade.48
The World Economic Forum’s 
Meta-Council on the Illicit Economy 
has published, in its State of the 
Illicit Economy report, a range of 
suggested ways in which technological 
improvements can be leveraged as 
solutions in this space: 
– Big data. Sex traffickers have 
been uncovered by a collaboration 
among financial institutions, the 
Thomson Reuters Foundation, and 
New York prosecutors.49
– Satellite tracking. Illegal fishing is 
being tackled by the Eyes on the 
Seas project – a digital platform 
that helps governments to monitor 
the world’s oceans, backed by the 
Pew Charitable Trusts.50
– Crowdsourcing. In combination 
with big data and satellite tracking, 
Global Forest Watch is enabling 
the tracking of illegal forestry 
operations by using crowdsourcing 
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2015, World Economic Forum.
Note: The darker colour, the higher the concern. 
Figure 4.4: Failure of National Governance, rank
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to combine images and provide 
near-real time data on the world’s 
forests.51
– DNA analysis. A genetic library 
of life on Earth is being used to 
detect food fraud,52 while forensic 
laboratories are able to link stolen 
ivory to specific animals.53
– Encryption: Although organized 
criminals use encryption to evade 
detection, it can also be used 
to enable the secure sharing 
of information between law 
enforcement organizations and the 
private sector.
Individual companies can take some 
steps to protect their own operations, 
reputation or assets – but for 
businesses to build resilience against 
the risk of failure of national governance 
ultimately requires finding ways to 
contribute towards improving the 
overall situation. That includes setting 
an example for political leaders by 
upholding international best practice, 
frameworks and standards, and 
looking for ways to collaborate with 
governments and civil society on the 
development of more coherent policies 
and smart governance strategies.
It is clear that the problem cannot 
be resolved with policies alone, but 
requires the support of the business 
sector as well as awareness of the 
general public. Discussions need to 
move beyond political commitment – 
the public sector, private sector and 
civil society need to come together 
to build relationships, initiatives and 
mechanisms to curb the rates of illicit 
trade.
Asset Bubble 
Executives in 11 economies, mostly 
in Europe and Asia, rate asset 
bubbles as their highest concern; it 
ranks among the top five risks in 40 
countries, representing more than 
half of the world GDP (Figure 4.5). 
Far from affecting only speculators, 
the bursting of asset bubbles hits 
businesses across the whole economy 
– particularly where leverage induces 
contagion through the banking system. 
As business confidence falls, so do 
consumption, incomes and investment, 
which can lead to a prolonged 
recession.
The trigger for the global financial 
crisis, to take one example, was a 
widespread default on US subprime 
mortgages and loss of value of related 
securities. The bursting of the dot-
com bubble in 2000–2002 destroyed 
US$5 trillion of stock market wealth in 
the United States (equivalent to half of 
annual GDP) in 30 months.54 Japan 
was mired in a low-growth deflationary 
environment for over two decades 
after this combined real estate and 
stock market bubbles burst in the early 
1990s.
Recent global economic developments 
have increased both the likelihood and 
potential impact of bubbles. In many 
countries, monetary and fiscal policy 
after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 
had some success in stimulating the 
economy to minimize the depth of the 
recession. However, as post-recession 
growth proved elusive, easy monetary 
policy was maintained or even stepped 
up. Low interest rates sent investors 
on a search for yield, creating an 
environment that is highly conducive to 
bubbles. The impact of another bubble 
bursting now in a major economy 
would be especially damaging 
because the weakness of the recovery 
and high levels of government debt 
mean there would be little remaining 
policy space for further stimulus.
Asset bubbles can never be identified 
with certainty while they are building 
up, as there is always a narrative of 
“this time is different”. Nonetheless, 
when attempting to evaluate the risk 
of a bubble bursting, three types of 
potential bubbles can be distinguished:
– Equity bubbles. These bubbles 
are often a side effect of low 
interest rates, as investors look 
to stock markets for higher yields 
than they can get from fixed 
income assets. Companies can 
use their highly-valued stock to 
make cross-border acquisitions 
– but when the bubble bursts, 
they can in turn become takeover 
targets for companies in other 
countries.
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2015, World Economic Forum.
Note: The darker colour, the higher the concern. 
Figure 4.5: Asset Bubble, rank
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– Real estate bubbles. Real estate 
bubbles are not usually a major 
concern for companies while they 
are inflating, though they make 
office and factory space more 
expensive. However, because 
banks play a major role in real 
estate finance, the bursting of 
a real estate bubble can have 
catastrophic impacts on business 
finance, as seen recently in Ireland: 
with banks struggling, credit can 
dry up completely and companies 
find it hard to finance their 
operations.
– Government bond bubbles. 
Government bonds might be 
inflated by a quantitative easing 
of purchases by central banks 
and new liquidity requirements 
increasing demand among private 
sector banks. As prices are 
pushed up, yields go down, which 
drives investors into higher-yield 
corporate bonds, raising the risk 
of a bubble here, too. In the short 
term, this can be good news for 
corporate issuers – but the ending 
of quantitative easing programmes 
could rapidly make it harder for 
businesses to raise capital. Some 
observers have raised concerns 
about whether current market 
structures can deal with the 
resulting large swings in demand 
for bonds, potentially triggering 
severe volatility in the financial 
system.
The bursting of any of these three 
types of bubble can tip an economy 
into recession. For consumer-facing 
businesses without regional or global 
diversification, this is a concern that is 
not easily mitigated. Besides shoring 
up the balance sheet – for example, by 
issuing long-dated debt – and putting 
adequate credit lines in place, most 
mitigation mechanisms would be 
more strategic and affect the business 
model, such as alliances to tap more 
diversified markets.
From a policy perspective, some 
studies suggest that the development 
of financial markets – with increased 
integration, sophistication of trading 
techniques, and removal of frictions 
to arbitrage – may be increasing the 
prevalence of bubbles.55 A fundamental 
rethink of regulation and contract 
design in financial markets could be 
necessary, to accept the inevitability of 
bubbles and seek to limit their scope.
Cyberattacks
From personal finances to business 
operations and national infrastructure, 
public and private services and 
amenities are increasingly managed via 
some form of computer network and 
are consequently vulnerable to attack. 
The Internet of Things is a growing 
reality, introducing new efficiencies 
as well as new vulnerabilities and 
interconnected consequences. Recent 
technological advances have been 
beneficial in many respects, but have 
also opened the door to a growing 
wave of cyberattacks – including 
economic espionage, cybercrime, and 
even state-sponsored exploits – that 
are increasingly perpetrated against 
businesses (Figure 4.6). In 2014, The 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and McAfee estimated that 
cybercrime alone cost the global 
economy US$ 445 billion.56 Businesses 
in all industries and of all sizes have 
been affected by the increased 
complexity, novelty and persistence 
of cyberattacks, with consequences 
ranging from the reputational to 
economic and legal. A sharp increase 
in high-profile cases in 2014 has 
continued into 2015, and shows no 
sign of slowing down.
The EOS results indicate that 
cyberattack is perceived as the 
risk of highest concern in eight 
economies: Estonia, Germany, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the United States. 
Public sector bodies in at least two of 
these countries have recently been 
disrupted by cyberattacks: the US 
Office of Personnel Management and 
the Japanese Pension Service. The 
2015 Fortune 500 CEO survey found 
that cyber security came second 
when CEOs were asked about their 
companies’ biggest challenges.57
Attempts to detect and address attacks 
are made harder by their constantly 
evolving nature, as perpetrators quickly 
find new ways of executing them. 
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2015, World Economic Forum.
Note: The darker colour, the higher the concern. 
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Businesses trying to match this speed 
in their development of prevention and 
response methods are sometimes 
constrained by a poor understanding 
of the risk, a lack of technical talent, 
and inadequate security capabilities. 
Although CEOs worry about rising 
cyber risks, the ownership of and 
responsibility for the cyber risk is less 
clear. Who in the corporation is the 
actual owner of the risk? While there 
are many “C” level owners (CISO, 
CFO, CEO, CRO, Risk Management), 
each of these owners has differing but 
related interests and unfortunately often 
does not integrate risk or effectively 
collaborate on its management. 
Defining clear roles and responsibilities 
for cyber risk is crucial.
Outdated laws and regulations inhibit 
governments’ ability to capture 
criminals but also to expedite 
the often lengthy procedure of 
elaborating and implementing legal 
and regulatory frameworks to reflect 
evolving realities. The sophisticated 
threats of government-sponsored 
economic espionage also exceed 
the defensive capabilities of many 
commercial enterprises, which are 
more and more frequently looking to 
other governments to intervene. The 
G-20 recently took an unexpected, 
but applauded, step and collectively 
affirmed “that no country should 
conduct or support ICT-enabled theft 
of intellectual property, including trade 
secrets or other confidential business 
information, with the intent of providing 
competitive advantages to companies 
or commercial sectors.”58
Businesses are increasingly accepting 
the fact that they cannot hope to 
prevent all cyberattacks. The difficulty 
in preventing attacks is not outmatched 
by the difficulty in identifying and 
effectively mitigating them. Given 
the types of vulnerabilities utilized 
by attackers and their methods, 
many attacks and intrusions are not 
immediately discovered – some are 
recognized only months and in some 
cases years later. The emphasis needs 
to be on streamlining mechanisms for 
early detection, response and recovery, 
to mitigate and better manage the 
consequences – limiting the damage, 
and ensuring business continuity.
It is also becoming clearer that 
cybercrime cannot be fought 
unilaterally. Although businesses can 
follow standard industry practices 
or adopt individually tailored ways to 
deal with cybercrimes, cooperation 
throughout the value chain (because 
attacks can be made through supplier 
systems) and with law enforcement 
is also helpful, As is often the case, 
however, public-private partnership 
can be held back by lack of trust and 
misaligned incentives. Businesses may 
fear exposing their data and practices 
to competitors or to law enforcement 
agencies. And the private sector’s 
primary interest in rapid recovery and 
continuity of business operations 
may not align with the public sector’s 
primary interest in apprehending 
and prosecuting perpetrators. In 
addition, governments need to balance 
their investments in cyber offensive 
weapons and efforts to enhance 
capabilities for cybersecurity and 
defence.
Conclusions
Addressing global risks lies beyond 
the capacity of individual businesses. 
Businesses need to strengthen 
their resilience to ensure continued 
operation and survival in the face 
of risks. At the same time, the clear 
role for collaboration among public 
and private sector actors becomes 
evident, for example, to develop better 
cybercrime prevention methods, to 
establish cybersecurity norms for 
both governments and industry, and 
to align international approaches to 
enforcement and establish industry 
norms. Above all, it is in the key interest 
of businesses to find new ways to 
partner with governments to address 
global risks. Many risks, ranging from 
energy security to unemployment, can 
only be addressed through diverse 
stakeholders recognizing the need for 
joint action. Such collaboration requires 
the identification of key risks and 
related interests and strong alignment 
and robust agreement among business 
and other stakeholders on the need to 
address them.
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Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
28 IMF 2015g.
29 Middle East and North Africa includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.
30 World Development Indicators, World Bank, retrieved 21 October 2015 from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS/countries
31 ILO 2015.
32 UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency). Facts and Figures about Refugees, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-figures.html
33 Kochhar et al. 2015.
34 Sub-Saharan Africa include Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See IMF 2015d.
35 IMF 2015d.
36 UN DESA 2015.
37 African Development Bank Group 2011.
38 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010 was a part of the Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic (AICD) project by the World Bank and co-sponsored by ICA 
partners.
39 Frey and Osborne 2013.
40 Adams 2015.
41 IMF 2015c.
42 IMF 2015a.
43 Randall 2014.
44 The Economist 2014.
45 WHO 2008.
46 UNODC 2011.
47 See the ICC-BASCAP study commissioned by Frontier Economics (Foster 
Economics 2011).
48 WTO 2015.
49 Anderson 2014.
50 The Economist 2015.
51 Sizer, Cheung, and Anderson 2014.
52 Neimark 2015.
53 BBC News 2015.
54 Gaither and Chmielewski 2006.
55 Jones 2015.
56 McAfee, Inc. 2014.
57 Fortune Editors 2015.
58 Cabinet of Prime Minister Trudeau, Canada, 2015.
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The 11th edition of The Global Risks 
Report has explored how global risks 
are becoming increasingly imminent 
and materializing in new and 
sometimes unexpected ways. From 
climate change to the imperative for 
improved water governance, from 
large-scale involuntary migration to 
reviving growth in the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution, global risks are affecting the 
lives of citizens and the functioning of 
institutions and economies. We now 
need to move beyond mitigation to 
adaptation and building resilience. 
Understanding the drivers of the global 
security landscape, boosting 
governance and strengthening policy 
agility is ever more important. Building 
a better understanding of how the new 
security landscape and technological 
change will impact countries, 
economies and peoples’ lives is, 
therefore, essential for building 
sustainable, resilient growth strategies 
and stable societies.
Global risks remain beyond the domain 
of just one actor, highlighting the need 
for collaborative and multistakeholder 
action – the key message that The 
Global Risks Report series has 
highlighted over the past decade. 
Recognizing joint interests and aligning 
stakeholders on key priorities across 
the different areas of global risks is the 
first step to make action through 
collaboration happen. We hope that 
this Report will contribute to 
recognizing the need for action, create 
an imperative towards greater 
resilience, and motivate change and 
concrete action towards a better future 
for everyone.
Conclusions
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Global Risk Description
Asset bubble in a major economy
Unsustainably overpriced assets such as commodities, 
housing, shares, etc. in a major economy or region.
Deflation in a major economy 
Prolonged ultra-low inflation or deflation in a major 
economy or region. 
Failure of a major financial mechanism or institution
Collapse of a financial institution and/or malfunctioning of a 
financial system impacts the global economy.
Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure 
Failure to adequately invest in, upgrade and secure 
infrastructure networks (e.g. energy, transportation and 
communications) leads to pressure or a breakdown with 
system-wide implications.
Fiscal crises in key economies
Excessive debt burdens generate sovereign debt crises 
and/or liquidity crises.
High structural unemployment or underemployment
A sustained high level of unemployment or underutilization 
of the productive capacity of the employed population 
prevents the economy from attaining high levels of 
employment.
Illicit trade (e.g. illicit financial flow, tax evasion, 
human trafficking, organized crime, etc.)
Large-scale activities outside the legal framework such 
as illicit financial flow, tax evasion, human trafficking, 
counterfeiting and organized crime undermine social 
interactions, regional or international collaboration and 
global growth.
Severe energy price shock (increase or decrease)
Energy price increases or decreases significantly and 
places further economic pressures on highly energy-
dependent industries and consumers.
Unmanageable inflation
Unmanageable increase in the general price level of goods 
and services in key economies. 
Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms, etc.)
Major property, infrastructure and environmental damage 
as well as human loss caused by extreme weather events. 
Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation
Governments and businesses fail to enforce or enact 
effective measures to mitigate climate change, protect 
populations and help businesses impacted by climate 
change to adapt.
Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse (land 
or ocean)
Irreversible consequences for the environment, resulting 
in severely depleted resources for humankind as well as 
industries.
Major natural catastrophes (e.g. earthquake, 
tsunami, volcanic eruption, geomagnetic storms)
Major property, infrastructure and environmental damage 
as well as human loss caused by geophysical disasters 
such as earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, tsunamis 
or geomagnetic storms.
Man-made environmental catastrophes (e.g. oil spill, 
radioactive contamination, etc.)
Failure to prevent major man-made catastrophes, causing 
harm to lives, human health, infrastructure, property, 
economic activity and the environment.
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Global Risks
A “global risk” is defined as an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for several 
countries or industries within the next 10 years.
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Global Risk Description
Failure of national governance (e.g. failure of rule of 
law, corruption, political deadlock, etc.)
Inability to govern a nation of geopolitical importance due 
to weak rule of law, corruption or political deadlock. 
Interstate conflict with regional consequences
A bilateral or multilateral dispute between states escalates 
into economic (e.g. trade/currency wars, resource 
nationalization), military, cyber, societal or other conflict.
Large-scale terrorist attacks
Individuals or non-state groups with political or religious 
goals successfully inflict large-scale human or material 
damage.
State collapse or crisis (e.g. civil conflict, military 
coup, failed states, etc.)
State collapse of geopolitical importance due to internal 
violence, regional or global instability, military coup, civil 
conflict, failed states, etc.
Weapons of mass destruction
Nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological technologies 
and materials are deployed creating international crises 
and potential for significant destruction.
Failure of urban planning
Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and associated 
infrastructure create social, environmental and health 
challenges.
Food crises
Access to appropriate quantities and quality of food and 
nutrition becomes inadequate, unaffordable or unreliable 
on a major scale.
Large-scale involuntary migration
Large-scale involuntary migration induced by conflict, 
disasters, environmental or economic reasons.
Profound social instability
Major social movements or protests (e.g. street riots, social 
unrest, etc.) disrupt political or social stability, negatively 
impacting populations and economic activity.
Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases
Bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi cause uncontrolled 
spread of infectious diseases (for instance due to 
resistance to antibiotics, antivirals and other treatments) 
leading to widespread fatalities and economic disruption. 
Water crises
A significant decline in the available quality and quantity of 
fresh water resulting in harmful effects on human health 
and/or economic activity.
Adverse consequences of technological advances
Intended or unintended adverse consequences of 
technological advances such as artificial intelligence, 
geo-engineering and synthetic biology causing human, 
environmental and economic damage. 
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and 
networks
Cyber dependency increases vulnerability to outage of 
critical information infrastructure (e.g. internet, satellites, 
etc.) and networks causing widespread disruption.
Large-scale cyberattacks
Large-scale cyberattacks or malware causing large 
economic damages, geopolitical tensions or widespread 
loss of trust in the Internet.
Massive incident of data fraud/theft
Wrongful exploitation of private or official data that takes 
place on an unprecedented scale.
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Trends
A “trend” is defined as a long-term pattern that is currently taking place and that could contribute to amplifying global risks 
and/or altering the relationship between them.
Trend Description
Ageing population
Ageing populations in developed and developing countries driven by declining fertility 
and decrease of middle and old age mortality.
Changing landscape of 
international governance
Changing landscape of global or regional institutions (e.g.  UN, IMF, NATO, etc.), 
agreements or networks.  
Climate change 
Change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters 
the composition of the global atmosphere, in addition to natural climate variability.
Environmental 
degradation
Deterioration in the quality of air, soil and water from ambient concentrations of 
pollutants and other activities and processes.
Growing middle class in 
emerging economies
Growing share of population reaching middle-class income levels in emerging 
economies.
Increasing national 
sentiment 
Increasing national sentiment among populations and political leaders affecting 
countries’ national and international political positions.
Increasing polarization of 
societies
Inability to reach agreement on key issues within countries because of diverging or 
extreme values, political or religious views.
Rise of chronic diseases
Increasing rates of non-communicable diseases, also known as chronic diseases, 
leading to long-term costs of treatment and threatening recent societal gains in life 
expectancy and quality.
Rise of cyber 
dependency
Rise of cyber dependency due to increasing digital interconnection of people, things and 
organizations.
Rising geographic 
mobility
Increasing mobility of people and things due to quicker and better-performing means of 
transport and lowered regulatory barriers.
Rising income and wealth 
disparity
Increasing socio-economic gap between rich and poor in major countries or regions. 
Shifts in power
Shifting power from state to non-state actors and individuals, from global to regional 
levels, and from developed to emerging market and developing economies.
Urbanization Rising number of people living in urban areas resulting in physical growth of cities. 
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Appendix B:  Global Risks Perception Survey and     
   Methodology 2015
Definitions
The Global Risks Report 2016 is based 
on the same methodology adopted in 
the previous year and results are 
therefore largely comparable. The 
Report adopts the following definitions 
of global risk and trend:
Global risk: an uncertain event or 
condition that, if it occurs, can cause 
significant negative impact for several 
countries or industries within the next 
10 years.
Trend: a long-term pattern that is 
currently taking place and that could 
contribute to amplifying global risks 
and/or altering the relationship between 
them. 
The list of risks and trends assessed in 
the Global Risks Perception Surveys 
has changed slightly. The risk “Illicit 
trade” was extracted from the risk 
“Failure of national governance” to 
create another risk in the economic 
category. Moreover, the risk “Massive 
Figure B.1: Survey Sample Composition
>70
6.3%
Number of participants
Gender
742
Expertise Organization 
type
Region
9.2%
Environment
 14.6%
Geopolitics
17.9%
Technology
 23.8%
Society
34.5%
Economics
1.23%11.1%
Government
3.8%
Other
8.6%
International organizations 
16.2%
NGO
 15.6%
Academia
44.7%
Business
Age distribution
60–69
8.2%
50–59
19.1%
40–49
18.6% 19.1%
30–39 
21.4%
<30
26.3%
68.9%
Male
31.1%
Female
Sub-Saharan Africa
8.8%
Middle East
and North Africa
5.9%
North America
17.7%
6.5%
Latin America
and the Caribbean
12.8%
Europe
32.2%
East Asia
and the Pacific
12.5%
Central Asia 
including Russia
2.3%
Oceania
1.2%
South Asia
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2015.
Note: Reported shares are based on number of valid responses: Gender: 742 responses; Expertise: 726; Organization type: 732; Age distribution: 742; Region: 727.
and widespread misuse of 
technologies (e.g. 3D printing, artificial 
intelligence, geo-engineering, synthetic 
biology, etc.) was reformulated into the 
risk “Adverse consequence of 
technological advances”. The definition 
of each risk also went through a review 
process. 
The following section describes the 
survey and methodology in greater 
detail. 
The Global Risks 
Perceptions Survey 
The Global Risks Perception Survey 
(GRPS), discussed in Part 1, is the main 
instrument used to assess global risks 
in this Report. The survey was 
conducted between mid-September 
and the end of October 2015 among 
the World Economic Forum’s 
multistakeholder communities of 
leaders from business, government, 
academia and non-governmental and 
international organizations.
Raw responses were cleaned in order 
to improve overall data quality and 
completeness. All questionnaires with a 
completion rate below 50% were 
dropped, reducing the number of 
available responses from 933 to 742. 
The respondents did not provide any 
information about their gender or the 
sector in 3 and 49 cases, respectively, 
but it was possible to infer this 
information from the rest of the records 
provided for the gender and for 39 
cases for the sector. Similarly, 92 
respondents did not indicate the region 
in which they are based and 77 were 
manually assigned to a region on the 
basis of their country of residence.
Figure B.1 presents the profile of the 
742 survey respondents remaining in 
the sample. To capture the voice of 
youth, the survey also targeted the 
World Economic Forum’s community of 
Global Shapers.1 Respondents under 
30 accounted for slightly more than 
one-fourth of total respondents. 
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Analysis
The Global Risks Landscape 2016 
(Figure 1) 
Respondents were asked to assess the 
likelihood and global impact of each of 
the 29 risks. For each risk, they were 
asked, “How likely is this risk to occur 
globally within the next 10 years?” and 
“What is the estimated impact globally if 
this risk were to materialize? (Impact is 
to be interpreted in a broad sense 
beyond just economic consequences)”. 
The possible answers ranged from 1 
(“very unlikely” and “low” impact, 
respectively) to 7 (“very likely” and “high” 
impact, respectively). 
Respondents were given the possibility 
to choose a “Don’t know” option if they 
felt unable to provide an informed 
answer. Respondents could also leave 
the question completely blank. For each 
risk, partial responses, i.e. those 
assessing only the likelihood or only the 
impact, were dropped. A simple 
average for both likelihood and impact 
for each of the 29 global risks was 
calculated on this basis. Formally, for 
any given risk i, its likelihood and impact, 
denoted respectively likelihoodi and 
impacti, are:
Similarly, for the Risks-Trends 
Interconnections Map 2016 
respondents had to identify up to three 
trends that they consider important in 
shaping the global agenda in the next 
10 years and the three risks that are 
driven by each of those trends. For 
completeness, the two questions read 
“From the list of trends below, which are 
the three most important trends that will 
shape global development in the next 
10 years”; and “For each of the three 
trends identified in [the previous 
question], select up to three risks from 
the list below that are most strongly 
driven by these trends”. The information 
thereby obtained was used to construct 
the Risks-Trend Interconnections Map 
2016. 
In both cases, a tally was made of the 
number of times each pair was cited. 
This value was then divided by the 
count of the most frequently cited pair. 
As a final step, the square root of this 
ratio was taken to dampen the long-tail 
effect (i.e. a few very strong links, and 
many weak ones) and to make the 
differences more apparent across the 
weakest connections. Out of the 406 
possible pairs of risks, 167 or 41% were 
not cited. Similarly, out of the possible 
377 trend-risk combinations, 33 or 9% 
were not cited. Formally, the intensity of 
the interconnection between risks i and j 
(or between trend i and risk j), denoted 
interconnectionij, corresponds to:
above); the biggest trend is the one 
considered to be the most important in 
shaping global development. 
The placement of the nodes in the 
Global Risks-Trends Interconnections 
Map was computed using ForceAtlas2, 
a force-directed network layout 
algorithm implemented in Gephi 
software, which minimizes edge lengths 
and edge crossings by running a 
physical particle simulation.2
Global Risks of Highest Concern in 
2016 (Figure 1.2)
Although the Report generally looks at 
global risks on a time horizon of 10 
years, respondents were asked to 
identify the risks of highest concern 
within two different timeframes: 18 
months and 10 years. To identify the top 
five global risks of highest concern 
described in Part 1, respondents 
answered the following question: “In this 
survey, we are looking at risks within the 
next 10 years. For this question only, 
please select the five global risks that 
you believe to be of most concern within 
the next 18 months and 10 years, 
respectively”.
For any given risk i from the list of 29 
risks, we obtained the share of total 
respondents (N = 742) that have 
declared to be concerned about that 
risk: 
where Ni is the number of respondents 
for risk i, and likelihoodi,n and impacti,n 
are respectively the likelihood and 
impact assigned by respondent n to risk 
i and measured on a scale from 1 to 7. 
Ni is the number of respondents for risk i 
who assessed both the likelihood and 
impact of that risk.  
The Global Risks Interconnections 
Map 2016 (Figure 2) and The Risks-
Trends Interconnections Map 2016 
(Figure 4) 
To draw the Global Risks 
Interconnections Map in Part 1, survey 
respondents were asked to answer the 
following question: “In your view, which 
are the most strongly connected 
risks? Please select at least three pairs 
and up to six pairs from the 29 risks 
below (one risk can be connected to 
any one of the other 28 risks)”.
where N is the number of respondents. 
Variable pairij,n is 1 when respondent n 
selected the pair of risks i and j as part 
of his/her selection. Otherwise, it is 0. 
The value of the interconnection 
determines the thickness of each 
connecting line in the graph, with the 
most frequently cited pair having the 
thickest line.
In the Global Risks Landscape and 
Risks-Trends Interconnections Maps, 
the size of each risk is scaled according 
to the “weighted degree” of that node in 
the system. Moreover, in the Risks-
Trends Interconnections Map, the size 
of the trend represents the perception of 
its importance in shaping global 
development (answer to the first part of 
the question on trend as explained 
with ci,n ∈ {0,1} and equal to 1 if 
respondent N selected risk i as a risk of 
concern. The risks with the five highest 
shares were selected as the risks of 
most concern.
The Most Likely Global Risks 2016: A 
Regional Perspective (Figure 3)
In the survey, respondents were asked 
to identify up to three risks that were the 
most likely to occur in the region in 
which they are based.3 
For any given risk i from the list of 29 
risks, we obtained the share of 
respondents from region r (Nr) who think 
that risk i is the most likely to occur in 
their region: 
with li,n ∈ {0,1} and equal to 1 if 
respondent N selected risk i. 
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Appendix C:  The Executive and Opinion Survey 2015: Views of  
   the Business Community on the Global Risks of  
   Highest Concern for Doing Business
Every year since 1979 the World 
Economic Forum has conducted the 
Executive Opinion Survey (EOS). This 
survey captures invaluable information 
on a broad range of socio-economic 
issues. In the 2015 edition, over 13,000 
executives in 140 economies were 
surveyed.4 
The 2015 edition of the EOS, conducted 
between February and June 2015, 
included a question on the risks of 
highest concern for the second time. 
More specifically, respondents were 
asked to select the five global risks that 
they believe to be of most concern for 
doing business in their country within 
the next 10 years.
The list of 28 global risks presented in 
the EOS is derived from the list of global 
risks of The Global Risks Report 2015 
and is almost similar to the global risks 
of The Global Risks Report 2016 (see 
Appendix B for the differences in global 
risks between the two editions). The 
size and nature of the EOS and the 
GRPS respondents differed 
significantly: they comprised a 
multistakeholder group of experts in the 
case of the GRPS and business 
executives in the case of the EOS. The 
EOS results provide a complementary 
perspective – that of businesses on the 
impact of global risks on their 
businesses. 
Formally, for each country j the share of 
respondents selecting each global risk i 
is: 
Interested readers can visit the portal at 
http://wef.ch/risks2016 to access the 
results for individual economies and 
regions.
where Nj is the sample size of the 
country j and ni,j is the number of 
respondents who selected the risk i in 
their five global risks of highest concern 
for doing business in country j. Ci,j is the 
share of respondents who selected risk 
i in country j. 
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Endnotes
1 The Global Shapers Community is a network of hubs developed and led by young 
people who are exceptional in their potential, achievement and drive to make a 
contribution to their communities; see http://www.weforum.org/community/global-
shapers 
2 3 See Jacomy et al. 2012. 
3 Respondents indicated the region in which they were based from the following list: 
Europe, Central Asia including Russia, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Middle-East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, 
and Oceania.
4 For more information about the Survey, see Browne et al. 2014. 
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United Arab Emirates; Gemma 
Mortensen, Crisis Action; Amr Moussa, 
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Institute; Karim Nabulsi, Deloitte 
Jordan; Yoshinobu Nagamine, 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC); Chandran Nair, Global 
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Narayanan, Air Asia; Nasser Nasser, 
Middle East Scientific Institute for 
Security; David Nbarro, UN Special 
Envoy on Ebola; Hellen Ndwiga, Kenya 
Police Service; Jonas Neihardt, Hilton 
Worldwide; Robin Niblett, Chatham 
House; Kirstjen Nielsen, Center for 
Cyber and Homeland Security; Helen 
Alderson Reat Noch, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
Victor Ochen, African Youth Initiative 
Network-Uganda; Kenichi Oki, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd; 
George Ombima, IFC Asset 
Management Company LLC; Mina 
Oraibi, Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper; 
William Overholt, Fung Global Institute; 
Christine Ownell, Owenell Global 
Consultancy; Anju Patwardhan, 
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Putri, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Indonesia; Arjen Radder, Royal Philips 
United Arab Emirates; Hilal Rahim, 
Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Aashmi Rajya Lakshmi Rana, Educomp 
Solutions Ltd; Karim Raslan, KRA 
Group; Douglas A. Rediker, Peterson 
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Nicola Reindorp, Crisis Action; Neil 
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Emirates; Nilmini Rubin, US House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign 
Affairs; Ruediger Ruediger, University of 
Vienna; Dina Sabry, Egyptian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs; William H. Saito, 
Cabinet Office of Japan; Ghassan 
Salame, Universite des Sciences 
Politiques, Paris Sorbonne; Razeen 
Sally, National University of Singapore; 
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Pedro Schaerer, Relegación Regional 
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Schandy, Schandy; Michael Schroeder, 
Royal Belgian Armed Forces; Robyn 
Scott, Brothers for All; Demba Seck, 
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Susan L. Segal, Council of the 
Americas; Chris Seiple, Institute for 
Global Engagement; Sergei Sereda, 
OJSC PhosAgro; Nasreen Seria, 
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Shivakumaran, Gulftainer Company 
Limited United Arab Emirates; Landry 
Signe, Stanford University; Tove 
Sjøblom, Statoil ASA; Silje Skogstad, 
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Stockholm International Peace 
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Transparency International; Dario 
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Srivastava, Jubilant Bhartia Group; 
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Emirates; Stefano Vescovi, Federal 
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Switzerland; Mark Vlasic, Georgetown 
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Armed Forces; Siobhan Walsh, 
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97The Global Risks Report 2016
Figure: Scenarios Methodology, Workshops’ Composition
Note: In total, the 10 workshops gathered 281 experts
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Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Almira 
Zejnilagic, FTI Consulting; Lassina 
Zerbo, Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization; and Daniel 
Zovatto, International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
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